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THE CLOSELY HELD CORPORATION:
ITS CAPITAL STRUCTURE AND THE
FEDERAL TAX LAWS
WILLIAM J. RANDS*
The labyrinthine provisions of the Internal Revenue Code make
a decision on whether or not to incorporate a closely-held business
astoundingly complex. To decide properly, one must understand the
terms "C corporations," "S corporations," a partner's "distributive
share," and a host of other cryptic concepts.' Even those initiated
into the inner sanctums of Subchapters C2, K3 and S4 must advise
* B.A., Centenary College; J.D., Tulane University; member of the Arkansas and Louisiana
state bars. The author thanks his research assistants, Linn Tweksbury, Mark Dierks, and Sohaib
Qadar, for their hard and excellent work. He also thanks the University of Cincinnati College of
Law for funding his research assistants. © Copyright 1988 by William J. Rands.
1. "C corporation" is a residual category that includes all corporations whose shareholders
have not made a valid election under Subchapter S of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.). I.R.C.
§ 1361(a)(2) (1987). C corporations are distinct taxpayers, separate and apart from their shareholders.
They compute their own tax income or loss from the year, file their own return and pay the amount
of taxes, if any, that is due.
"S corporation" is a "small business corporation" whose shareholders have elected Subchapter
S of the Internal Revenue Code. Id. § 1361(a)(1) (1987). Generally speaking, an S corporation is a
conduit for tax purposes, the tax consequences from its operations being passed through to its share-
holders. Id. § 1366 (1987).
"Partnership" is generally defined as an unincorporated business owned by two or more legal
entities. See 1 Z. CAVITCH, BusiNEss ORGANIZATIONS WITH TAX PLa'NNG, §§ 1.01, 5.01[3] (1986).
I.R.C. § 7701(a)(2) (1987) gives a catch-all definition of partnership, which includes "a syndicate,
group, pool, joint venture, or other unincorporated organization . . . which is not . . . a corpo-
ration."
While not defined by either the Internal Revenue Code or the Treasury Regulations, the term
"proprietorship" is generally thought of as an unincorporated business operated by one person in
his own right and without an independent organization separate and apart from himself. L. RiBsmmi,
BusINESS ASSOclAnONS §§ 1.01, 1.04 (1983).
For a description of these basic forms of business organizations, see Rands, Closely Held Bus-
inesses: Tax Advantages and Disadvantages of the Different Forms of Business Organizations, 91
Co . L.J. 61, 62-71 (1986).
For a full discussion of the legal criteria for differentiating between a corporation and a part-
nership for federal tax purposes, see generally Rands, Organizations Classified as Corporations for
Federal Tax Purposes, 59 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 657 (1985).
2. Subchapter C, I.R.C. §§ 301-86 (1987), provides rules regulating transfers of stock, se-
curities, cash and other types of property between corporations and their shareholders, between share-
holders inter sese and between corporations. Subchapter C by no means includes all of the sections
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their clients that their counsel.is based on the enterprise's projected
revenues and expenses, estimates that may prove to be far off the
mark. Moreover, changes in the Internal Revenue Code have been
so constant that no one can feel confident in assuming that the tax
laws in X number of years will be the same as they are now. Despite
these nettlesome problems affecting this most common of business
decisions, one might not feel too exercised, if, after incorporation,
he could be rid of the layers of abstruse tax law, free to fomulate
plans for business reasons. Unfortunately, this is not the case.
Whether one likes it or not, tax considerations continue to be vital
elements in strategic business planning even after the decision to
incorporate has been made.
The purpose of this paper is to examine the impact of the tax
laws on a key aspect of post-incorporation planning - formulation
of the capital structure of the closely-held corporation. The paper
tries to identify and explain the various components in such a capital
structure effected by the tax laws. It examines several of the amor-
phous tax issues affecting capital structures, e.g., the debt-equity
distinction. And, where appropriate, it seeks to evaluate the policy
implications of the impact of the tax laws on capital structures.
I. CAPITAL STRUCTURES, GENERALLY
"Capital structure" is the term of art that refers to the allocation
among the investors of three basic components of business own-
ership:- (1) the right to control the business, (2) the right to be paid
the income generated by the business, and (3) the right to receive
the assets of the business upon termination of the business. Capital
governing the taxation of corporations. For example, I.R.C. § 11 (1987) contains the corporate income
tax rates.
3. Subchapter K, I.R.C. §§ 701-61 (1987), contains rules that regulate the taxation of partners
and partnerships.
4. Subehapter S, I.R.C. §§ 1341-79 (1987), contains rules that govern the taxation of S cor-
porations and their shareholders. Generally speaking, an S corporation is a "small business corporation
whose shareholders have elected the special tax treatment available under Subchapter S, Id. § 1361(a)(1),
i.e., a corporation treated as a conduit whose income, losses, deductions or credits are passed through
to its shareholders. Id. at § 1366.
5. R. HAMILTON, CoRPoLRAsoN FniAcE 166 (1984).
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structure includes the mix of long-term debt and stock, i.e., the sum
of bonds (or debentures) and owner-contributed capital.
6
Traditionally, it is stated that there are three basic modes of
corporate capital structures. The first, and simplest, is for the owners
of the business to contribute all of the funding to the corporation
in exchange for all of its common stock. The founders then retain
complete control, and any economic growth in the company inures
solely to them. If the business fails, financial failure falls upon them
as common stockholders.
The second mode of capital structure is for the owners again to
furnish all the assets needed by the corporation, but to receive "sen-
ior securities ' 7 (corporate long-term debt or nonparticipating pre-
ferred stock) in addition to common stock. 8 A variation of the second
mode is for the owners to characterize the transfer of operating
assets to the corporation as a lease instead of an outright conveyance
while paying a nominal cash price for the common stock. 9 As dis-
cussed in depth later, this investor as creditor or leasor of the cor-
poration is provided with probable tax advantages and a status higher
than that of a common stockholder in the event of the corporation's
bankruptcy. The use of preferred makes sense only when not issued
proportionately to each of the common stockholders.
The third mode of capital structure is for the owners to con-
tribute only a part of the corporate funding and to allow the cor-
poration to issue senior securities to outsiders. The founders of the
business, of course, might need to look to outsiders for financing
if they do not have enough money to fund their project. They may,
6. D. GR.ENWALD, THE McGRAw-HIa DIcTONARY OF MODERN EcoNoMIcs: A HANDBOOK
OF TERRs AND ORGANIZATIONS 311 (2d ed. 1973).
7. Senior securities is a term of art in corporate finance. It refers to stock or long-term debt
that has a prior but limited claim to corporate earnings. W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CASES AND
MATERIALS ON CORPORATIONS 1108 (5th ed. 1980). It includes nonparticipating preferred stock, id. at
1111-12, and long-term corporate debt, e.g., bonds, debentures. Id. at 1108-10. From the perspective
of the holders, it has two major advantages over common stock. It provides them with a fixed rate
of return and a higher priority in bankruptcy. Its major disadvantage is that the holder doesn't share
in the prosperity, if the corporation grows. Instead, the holder is stuck with its fixed rate of return.
Usually, it also offers no rights of control to the holders.
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however, be gambling on the financial concept of "leverage" or
"trading on equity." Leverage refers to the decision made by the
board of directors on behalf of the common stockholder to cause
the corporation to issue senior securities to investors other than com-
mon stockholders. In effect, the common stockholders are betting
that the infusion of the new funds will generate income that will
exceed the costs of paying the outsiders their fixed rate of return. 0
If the founders of the business have the resources to finance the
corporation fully, the resort to outside funding obviously has the
disadvantage of requiring a payment of a portion of the enterprise's
revenue to outsiders, either as interest or dividend preferences.I
Moreover, the common stockholders take the risk that the income
from the project may be insufficient to cover the fixed charges pay-
able to the outsiders so that nothing will be left for them.12 Yet so
long as the founders keep all of the common stock, the issuance of
senior securities usually does not dilute their right to control and
to retain the lion's share of any future economic growth for them-
selves.
The financial configurations of modern closely-held corporations
obviously can deviate substantially from the three traditional modes
of capital structures outlined above. These modes ignore common
financing devices like (i) short-term loans supported by security in-
terests in accounts receivable or inventory or (ii) credit lines with
trade creditors who are willing to sell supplies, raw materials, or
inventory on open account. Additionally, the traditional modes ig-
nore the factor of loyal, hopeful, or naive employees who in effect
finance many closely-held corporations by accepting lower than mar-
ket compensation or compensation in the form of minority equity
interests. Moreover, each traditional mode presupposes a readily
identifiable group of people who will take the controlling block of
10. For several of the many discussions on leverage, see W. CARY & M. EISENBERO, supra note
7, at 114-16; Financial Handbook 4.24 (J. Bogen 4th ed. 1968); GREENWALD, supra note 6, at 336-
37; H. GuTmN & H. DOUGALL, CORPORATE FINANCIAL POLICY 167-70 (4th ed. 1962); L. RmiSTEIN,
supra note 1, at § 2.04[4][iii]; P. VAN ARSDELL, CORPORATION FINANCE POLICY, PLANNINO, ADMIN-
ISTRATION 307-15 (1968).
11. F. O'NEAL, supra note 8, at § 2.09.
12. F. HAMILTON, supra note 5, at 395.
[Vol. 901012
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common stock and become the "owners" or "founders" of the
business about to be incorporated. The modes may not serve as a
useful analytical tool when the real issue is whom to include within
the group of controlling common stockholders.
Then a myriad of other questions may crop up. For example,
does the person with the idea for the business have enough money
of his own to get the business started? Even if he does, would it
make good sense to find another investor anyway? If he finds an-
other investor, should he offer this second investor common stock?
Will the second investor insist on common stock? Should the second
investor be placed on an equal footing with the first investor who
had the idea for the business in the first place and probably will
do most of the work? Should the first investor be placed on the
same footing with the second investor who likely is providing most
of the capital for the business? These may be key questions. Yet at
some point, one or more persons will decide to gamble by making
a long-term investment in a particular closely-held corporation. That
person or persons must decide how to structure that long-term in-
vestment. Then the traditional concept of capital structure does pre-
sent a context for useful analysis. It is the starting point for allocating
the benefits and risks among the investors.
II. COMMON STOCK
Defining common stock is somewhat like describing the verb "to
be." Everyone knows what it means, but it is difficult to define
precisely. It is the basic ownership unit for American corporations.
If a corporation has only one class of stock, it is common stock.
All corporations have at least some common stock. Unless a cor-
poration's articles of incorporation provide otherwise, each share of
stock is common stock. Each share of common stock consists of
identical proportions of the three attributes of stock ownership as
each other share of common stock (voting rights, rights to dividends,
and rights to assets in liquidation). While it is possible to grant
voting control to preferred stockholders,13 ordinarily the common
13. Modern American corporation law allows the shareholders to set their own internal rules
1988] 1013
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stockholders have voting control and elect the board of directors.
Typically, the common stockholders have the biggest financial stake
in the corporation, although it is possible to provide the common
stockholders with only a minimal financial interest in the corporation
while still granting them full control. Common stock is stock that
has neither a dividend nor a liquidation preference. Instead, common
stock provides its holders with a "residual" but "unlimited interest
in the corporation's earnings and assets." ' 14 In contrast, corporate
debt and preferred stock entitle their holders to be paid in full before
the corporation pays anything to common stockholders. But the
holders of the debt and preferred stock are usually entitled to pay-
ment of a finite amount. Once that is paid, they get no more. The
rest of the corporate income and assets are for the common stock-
holders. Thus, if the business takes off, it is the common stock-
holders with their residual and unlimited interest in corporate income
and assets who benefit. The downside of this residual characteristic
is that payments to creditors and preferred stockholders may exhaust
the corporation's income or its supply of assets leaving nothing for
the common stockholders. In the worst case, bankruptcy, the com-
mon stockholders are last in line and often get nothing.
The possibility of the subchapter S election is the major tax in-
ducement for a close corporation using just common stock. Indeed,
a corporation can elect S corporation tax treatment only when it
has just one class of stock, 15 which, by definition, would have to
be classified as common stock.
The major tax disadvantage of common stock, shared by all types
of stock, is double taxation. The distributed earnings of a C cor-
poration are taxed twice. First they are taxed to the corporation
in almost any way that they want, usually through a provision in the articles of incorporation. See,
e.g., A. CONARD, R. KNAUSS & S. SIEGEL, COlPORATIONS CASES, STATUTES, AND ANALYSIS 54-55, 124-
26 (2d ed. 1982); R. JENNINGS & R. BuxnAUM, CORPORATIONS CASES AND MATERIALS 94-96 (5th ed.
1979); F. O'NRAL, supra note 8, at § 3.53; ORGANIZING CoRPoRATE AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES,
§§ 6.0314], 6.04 (C. Rohrlich 5th ed. 1981). Hence, the articles could provide for a class of preferred
stock with voting rights. Typically, however, preferred shares are made nonvoting, or they grant the
right to vote only after dividends have been in arrears for a stipulated number of dividend periods.
F. O'NEAL, supra note 8, at § 3.37.
14. W. CaY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 7, at 1112; D. GREENWALD, supra note 6, at 108.
15. I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(D) (1987).
[Vol. 901014
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when earned and second to the shareholders when distributed. 16 Even
if the close corporation retains its earnings rather than distributing
them as dividends, the common stockholders nevertheless will be
taxed on the resulting appreciation in value of their stock, 17 when
they sell,"' exchange, 9 redeem, 20 or surrender their stock in a li-
quidation. 2' Though dividend distributions of corporate earnings are
generally tax-free to S corporation shareholders, 22 these other trans-
actions are taxable events to shareholders in both C and S corpo-
rations.
III. SHAREHOLDER-HELD DEBT, GENERALLY
Free from the constraints of the public market, the shareholders
in a close corporation have virtually unlimited power to determine
the terms of transactions between themselves and the corporation.
Hence, when they commit their own property to the corporate en-
terprise, they can term the transfer to the corporation as a payment
for stock, a loan, a sale, or a lease. Strangely, the American legal
system, including the tax laws, discourages them from taking stock
("equity") as the primary consideration from the corporation in
exchange for their assets. Instead, they are likely to pay a relatively
low cash price for the stock and to lend the corporation the balance
of whatever other cash they are providing. Furthermore, if the share-
holders personally own the fixed or operating assets that the cor-
16. See id. §§ 301(c)(1), 316(a) (1987).
17. The retention of earnings generally increases the value of common stock, simply because
the corporation has more assets than it would if it had distributed them as dividends. Retained earnings
tend to have little effect on senior securities (nonparticipating preferred stock and corporate debt),
which have a fixed but limited right to income and to assets in liquidation.
18. See I.R.C. § 1001(a) (1987).
19. See id. The shareholder may be able to avoid recognizing the gain, if the exchange meets
one of the several subchapter C nonrecognition sections. See, e.g., id. §§ 354(a)(1), 368(a)(1)(A) (1987)
(nonrecognition treatment for shareholder exchanging stock for stock in a state-law merger qualifying
as a "reorganization").
20. See id. § 302(a), (d) (1987).
21. Shareholders generally must recognize a gain or a loss when they receive a liquidating
distribution. See I.R.C. § 331(a) (1987). Several of the other liquidation sections, however, provide
nonrecognition treatment for the shareholder under certain circumstances. See id. § 332(a) (1987)
(liquidation of an 80% owned subsidiary), § 354(a) (1987) (shareholders receiving stock in a liquidation
that is part of a qualifying reorganization).
22. Id. § 1368 (1987). The shareholder receiving a tax-free distribution from the S corporation
must decrease his basis in his stock. Id. § 1367(a)(2)(A).
1988] 1015
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poration will use in the business, they probably will not contribute
those assets to the corporation in exchange for stock. Instead, they
will lease or make an installment sale of those assets to the cor-
poration. Both a cash loan and an installment sale of assets make
that shareholder a creditor of the corporation. This is a status the
shareholders want even when they themselves are providing all the
money, property, and other assets needed for the business.
23
Why this heavy emphasis on "debt"?
The first reason is to provide the shareholder in the close cor-
poration with a hedge against bankruptcy. The bankruptcy law gen-
erally honors the state law principle that shareholders and their
corporations are distinct legal entities. Like anybody else, a share-
holder can lawfully become a creditor of his own corporation. Pro-
vided that the transaction is not abusive, he can then share in the
corporation's assets in a bankruptcy like any external creditor. 24 In-
deed, he is not even precluded from taking a security interest in
corporate property to protect his loan and then asserting his lien in
the bankruptcy proceeding.25
The second reason for the pervasive use of the debt (discussed
in detail over the next few pages) is the perception by most tax-
23. F. O'NEAL, supra note 8, at § 2.09.
24. F. O'NEAL, supra note 8, at § 2.13. See Levine v. Amber Mfg.Corp., 6 Mass. App. 840,
372 N.E.2d 284 (1978) (shareholder advances constitute loans under state law and shareholder entitled
to repayment on them); Annotation, Subordination, in Bankruptcy Proceedings, of Claim of Creditor
Who is Stockholder of Bankrupt Corporation, 51 A.L.R.2D 989 (1987).
See, e.g., Comstock v. Group of Inst'l Investors, 335 U.S. 211, reh'g denied, 335 U.S. 837
(1948); In re Branding Iron Steak House, 536 F.2d 299 (9th Cir. 1976); Theriot v. Plane, 126 F.2d
1015 (9th Cir. 1942); In re Lumber, Inc., 124 F. Supp. 302 (D. Or. 1954); In re Erie Drug Co., 416
Pa. 41, 204 A.2d 256 (1964); In re Mader's Store for Men, Inc., 77 Wis. 2d 578, 254 N.W.2d 171
(1977).
See generally Cohen, Shareholder Advances: Capital or Loans?, 52 AM. BANKRr. L.J. 259 (1978);
Loiseaux, Loans or Capital Contributions to the Close Corporation, 38 J. NAT'L Ass'N RF. IN BANKR.
4 (1964); Note, Equitable Subordination of Shareholder Debt to Trade Creditors: A Reexamination,
61 B.U.L. REv. 433 (1981).
25. F. O'NEAL, supra note 8, at § 2.13; Cohen, supra note 24, at 268-271; Annotation, Validity
of Security for Contemporaneous Loan to Corporation by Officer, Director or Stockholder, 31 A.L.R.2d
663 (1953 & Supp. 1987).
See, e.g., Wages v. Weiner, 381 F.2d 667 (5th Cir. 1967); Small v. Williams, 313 F.2d 39 (4th
Cir. 1963); Wood v. Gulf States Capital Corp., 217 So. 2d 257 (Miss. 1968); Eno Inv. Co. v. Protective
Chem. Laboratory, Inc., 233 N.C. 294, 63 S.E.2d 637(1951).
[Vol. 901016
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planners and writers that debt produces better tax consequences than
stock, for both the investor and the corporation.
26
A third reason for using shareholder-held debt is to implement
certain business bargains among owners of the business, giving the
shareholder group holding the debt a claim to income and to assets
in a liquidation that is surperior to that of the nondebtholding share-
holder group. The corporation can use preferred stock the same way,
and more of the specifics of such uses are described in the section
of this paper on preferred stock, infra. The relative advantages and
disadvantages of the use of debt and preferred stock for this reason
are also discussed in those sections.
Unfortunately, no one has been able to develop a precise system
for classifying an interest as. either debt or equity, although the
courts, 27 Congress 2 8 the Treasury Department, 29 and commentators °
26. See generally W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 7, at § 116-17; 1 Z. CAvITCH, supra
note I, at § 87.03[3]; A. CoNRAD, R. KNAUSS & S. SIEGEL, supra note 13, at 225-26; H. HENN &
J. ALEXANDER, LA-WS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUsINESS ENTERPRISES, § 166 (3d ed. 1983); D.
KAm, BASIC CoRPoRATE TAXATION § 8.32 (3d ed. 1981); T. NESS & E. VOGEL, TAXATION OF THE
CLOSELY HELD CORPORATION § 2.3(d) (3d ed. 1983); F. O'NEAL, supra note 8, at § 2.09; ORGANIZING
CORP'ORATE AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES, supra note 13, at § 8.03; L. RisTEiN, supra note 1,
at § 2.04[4][iii] 2-10; WEST'S FEDERAL TAxATION: CORPORATIONS, PARTNERSHIPS, ESTATES AND TRUSTS
107 (,V. Hoffman ed. 1984).
Not all writers agree. For example, one characterizes the "dominant view," which favors use
of debt, as "extreme managerial myopia, focusing exclusively on the corporate-level tax and totally
ignoring the influence of individual taxes on securities holders." W. KLEIN, BusN ss ORGANIZATIONS
AND FINANCE LEGAL AND EcONOMnC PRINCIPLES 243 (1980).
27. See B. BITTIKER & J. EUSTICE, FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHARE-
HOLDERS § 4.02 (4th ed. 1979); 1 Z. CAvrCH, supra note 1, at § 91.0411].
28. The courts have had to make the debt-equity distinction literally hundreds of times. Some
cases involved the issue of the deductibility of bad debts, see, e.g., Beaver Pipe Tools, Inc. v. Carey,
240 F.2d 843 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 958 (1957); but the bulk of them focused on the issue
of dividend versus interest. See, e.g., Stinnett's Pontiac Serv., Inc. v. Commissioner, 730 F.2d 634
(l1th Cir. 1984).
In its original version of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954, the House of Representatives
included a section (§ 312) that defined securities and participating and nonparticipating stock. Only
the payments on unconditional obligations to pay a sum certain, which were not dependent on cor-
porate earnings, could be considered as interest on "securities." The House would have limited the
interest expense deduction to instruments containing an unconditional obligation to pay a sum certain
and which payment did not depend on corporate earnings. Nonconforming instruments were to be
considered nonparticipating stock, and any payments on them were not deductible as interest expenses.
H. R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws
4017, 4206, 4235-437.
Noting the difficulty in applying bright line rules in the debt-equity area, the Senate rejected
1988] 1017
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have all tried. The problem is that the line of demarcation between
what is debt and what is equity is simply unclear. Between the classic
versions of debt31 and equity 2 is a continuum of interests that have
the notion of statutory definitions and instead opted for the flexibility of letting the courts thrash
out the debt-equity distinction in common law fashion. S. RP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 4621, 4672.
In 1957 the Advisory Group on Subchapter C of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 of the
House Committee on Ways and Means proposed a bill containing a list of factors to determine the
nature of an instrument, but Congress declined to act upon this proposal. See generally Plumb, The
Federal Income Tax Significance of Corporate Debt: A Critical Analysis and a Proposal, 26 TAX L.
REv. 369, 582-84 (1971).
Finally, in 1969 Congress tepidly addressed the issue by adding section 385 to the Code. Tax
Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172 § 415, 83 Stat. 487, 613-14 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 385
(1982)). Noting the increasing use of debt, due at least partly to the acquisition mania of that era,
Congress resolved to act, but was wary of stipulating "comprehensive and specific statutory rules of
universal and equal applicability." S. RaP. No. 552, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., reprinted in 1969 U.S.
CODE CONO. & ADmN. NEWS 2027, 2170. So instead, it adopted non-binding guidelines and instructed
the Secretary of Treasury to develop the formal definitions and rules. Id. at 2169-76.
29. The Treasury waited eleven years after the enactment of section 385 until 1980 before it
proposed any section 385 regulationsl See 45 Fed. Reg. 18,957 (1980). From that point on, whatever
the Treasury did drew criticism. Reacting rather than acting, it continued to tinker with the content
of the regulations and to postpone their effective date. See T.D. 7747, 45 Fed. Reg. 86,438 (1980);
T.D. 7774, 46 Fed. Reg. 24,945 (1981); T.D. 7801, 47 Fed. Reg. 147 (1982); T.D. 7822, 47 Fed. Reg.
28,915 (1982). At long last, in 1983, it withdrew the regulations, T.D. 7920 (1983), and indicated
that the Service would return to caselaw and revenue rulings to resolve debt-equity issues. Rev. Rul.
83-98, 1983-2 C.B. 40.
Everyone seems to agree that it is unlikely that the Treasury will take another shot at issuing
section 385 regulations. See, e.g., J. Eus'icE, 1987 CUMULATIvE SUPPLEMENT TO ABRIDOED STUDENT
EDITION OF FEDERAL INcOME TAXATION OF CORPORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS 4.05.
In 1984 the Treasury Department, in a Report to the President, confirmed that problems still
existed in the debt or equity controversy. It noted that no guidelines had been developed and that
the increasing sophistication in financial instruments were creating even more controversy. 2 Oen'ic
OF THE SEcRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF THE TREAsURY, TAx REFoRm FOR FAIREss, SIMPLICITY, AND
ECONOMIC GROWTH 135 (1984). The report, however, only proposed to try to equalize the treatment
of interest and distributions and did not address the debt-equity distinction problem itself. See generally
id.
30. See, e.g., Andrews, The ALI Reporter's Proposals on Corporate Distributions and Cor-
porate Taxation with a Personal Consumption Tax, 22 SAN DInoo L. Rav. 333 (1985); Beatty, A
Proposal for Debt-Equity Regulations Under Section 385, 21 TrL. TAX INST. 129 (1972); Clary, Stock-
holder Debt A Proposed Solution, 47 TAXEs 682 (1969); Cohen, Surrey, Tarleau & Warren, A Tech-
nical Revision of the Federal Income Tax Treatment of Corporate Distributions to Shareholders, 52
COLUM. L. Rav. 1 (1952); Taylor, Classifying Shareholder Advances To A Closely Held Corporation
as Debt or Stock: Guidelines for the Befuddled Practitioner, 33 DRAKE L. REv. 641 (1983-84); Com-
ment, Hybrid Instruments and the Debt-Equity Distinction in Corporate Taxation, 52 U. Cm. L.
REv. 118(1985) [hereinafter Comment, Hybrid Instruments]; Comment, The Thin Incorporation Prob-
lem: Are the Courts Fighting the Tar Baby?, 5 UCLA L. REv. 275 (1958).
31. "The classic debt," according to one court, is "an unqualified obligation to pay a sum
certain at a reasonably close fixed maturity date along with a fixed percentage in interest payable
10
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aspects of both debt and equity. An interest labeled as debt might
have characteristics more generally associated with equity.3 3 Con-
versely, an interest labeled as equity might have characteristics more
generally associated with debt.3 4 This article discusses in depth the
criteria for classifying an interest as either debt or equity later in
the text.
Most classification controversies involve instruments that purport
to be debt and that the taxpayers want to be debt, but that the
government claims not to be debt.35 They also usually involve debt
issued by closely-held corporations to their own shareholders 36 who,
regardless of the debtor's income or the lack thereof." Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399, 402
(2d Cir.), later appealed, 262 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1002 (1959).
32. Common stock would have to be considered the "most classic" of the classic version of
equity.
For several early definitions of equity, see United States v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 133 F.2d
990, 993 (6th Cir. 1943) ("[t]he stockholder's intention is to embark upon the corporate adventure,
taking the risks of loss attendant upon it, so that he may enjoy the chances of profit."); Commissioner
v. Meridian & Thirteenth Realty Co., 132 F.2d 182, 186 (7th Cir. 1942) ("[a] stockholder. . . intends
to make an investment and take the risks of the venture . . . ."); Commissioner v. O.P.P. Holding
Corp., 76 F.2d 11, 12 (2d Cir. 1935) ("[t]he shareholder is an adventurer in the corporate business;
he takes the risk, and profits from success.").
See generally Plumb, supra note 28, at 404.
33. An example would be a convertible, participating, voting, subordinated debenture. The
voting rights would make it resemble common stock in terms of control. The conversion feature would
make it resemble common stock in terms of cashing in on future growth of the corporation. The
participation right would mean that the holder would not be stuck with a fixed rate of return like
he would with a senior security. The subordination feature places the holder at risk in a bankruptcy
much like a preferred shareholder with a liquidation preference. For a discussion of these features,
see generally A. CONARD, R. KNAuss, & S. SIEGEL, Bus, ss ErERPRgisEs, supra note 13, at 222-24.;
ORoANImIz CORPORATE AND OTHER Busmuss EirraiusEs, supra note 13, at §§ 8.03, 8.07, 8.08.
34. An example would be nonvoting, cumulative preferred with a mandatory redemption after
a period of years.
For some interesting historical reading, see generally Berl, The Vanishing Distinction Between
Creditors and Stockholders, 76 U. PA. L. REv. 814 (1928); Hansen, Hybrid Securities: A Study of
Securities Which Combine Characteristics of Both Stocks and Bonds, 13 N.Y.U. L. REv. 407 (1936);
Uhlman, The Law of Hybrid Securities, 23 VASH. U.L.Q. 128 (1938); Comment, Status of Holders
of Hybrid Securities: Stockholders or Creditors?, 45 YALE L.J. 907 (1936).
35. See Whittington & Whittenburg, Judicial Classification of Debt Versus Equity An Empirical
Study, 55 AcCT. REv. 409, (1980); Comment, Hybrid Instruments, supra note 30, at 120-21.
See, e.g., John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner, 326 U.S. 521 (1946); Slappey Drive Indus. Park
v. United States, 561 F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1977); J.S. Biritz Co. Constr. v. Commissioner, 387 F.2d
451 (8th Cir. 1967); Taft v. Commissioner, 314 F.2d 620 (9th Cir. 1963); Jack Daniel Distillery v.
United States, 379 F.2d 569 (Ct. Cl. 1967). But see Post Corp. v. United States, 640 F.2d 1296 (Ct.
Cl. 1981).
36. See Stone, Debt-Equity Distinctions in the Tax Treatment of the Corporation and Its Share-
holders, 42 TuL. L. REv. 251, 253 (1968). See, e.g., Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States, 398 F.2d
694 (3d Cir. 1968); J.S. Biritz Construction Co., 387 F.2d 451; Taft, 314 F.2d 620.
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because they make the decisions for the corporation, can label an
instrument debt no matter how many equity characteristics it might
have. The government rarely challenges the status of debt issued by
publicly-held corporations, which, due to the constraints of the pub-
lic markets and the numbers of shareholders, lack the closely-held
corporation's ability to affix tax-motivated labels and terms desired
by their shareholders on the corporation's securities.
IV. DEBT VS. EQUITY: TAX CONSEQUENCES
The contrast between tax treatment accorded debt and equity is
stark. In some instances, the distinctions affect the corporation and
in others the investors. More often than not, taxpayers prefer the
tax treatment for debt and strive to construct a capital structure
heavily laden with debt.
A. The Corporation: Interest vs. Dividend
The Internal Revenue Code allows the corporation to deduct in-
terest paid to lenders, 37 even when the lender is also a shareholder
of the corporation.3 8 It does not allow the corporation to deduct
dividends distributed to its shareholders . 9
The deductibility of interest and the nondeductibility of dividends
furnish a powerful incentive for using debt rather than stock to
finance corporations. 40 Assuming that the corporation is going to
pay a flat rate of return to the investor, the deduction for interest
results in a tax savings that makes it cheaper for the corporation
to pay the interest than to distribute the dividend. This is the result
37. I.R.C. § 163(a) (1987).
38. See, e.g., Rowan v. United States, 219 F.2d 51, 55 (5th Cir. 1955).
39. Technically, the generic term for a one-way transfer of cash or assets by a corporation to
a shareholder is "distribution." A distribution is a "dividend" to the extent that the distributing
corporation has earnings and profits. I.R.C. §§ 301(c)(1), 316(a). But the distinction between a "dis-
tribution" and a "dividend" is irrelevant with respect to the deductibility of the payment by the
distributing corporation because the distributing corporation is not entitled to deduct the distribution,
whether or not it is a dividend. See, e.g., Fin Hay Realty Co., 398 F.2d 694.
40. 1 Z. CAVITCH, supra note 1, at § 91.04[1][c]; A. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PROSPECTIVE
§ 36 (1976); D. KAHN & P. GANN, CORPORATE TAxAxroN AND TAxAxrON OF PARTNERSmsS AND PART-
NERS 597 (1979); Hoffman, Coping with the Thin Incorporation Problem, 17 TL. TAx INST. 49, 50-
51 (1968); Comment, Hybrid Instruments, supra note 30, at 118, 137.
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because it pays interest with pre-tax dollars and dividends with post-
tax dollars. 4' To illustrate, suppose that X Corp., a C corporation
in the 34% corporate income tax bracket, has agreed to pay $660
annually to an investor, Anne, in return for Anne's investment in
X. To pay a $660 dividend to Anne, X needs to earn $1,000, because
it must pay $340 in tax (34% tax rate x $1000 earnings = $340
corporate income tax), before it has the $660 to distribute to Anne.
It needs merely to earn $660 to pay Anne $600 interest, however,
because, due to the interest deduction, it does not pay tax on the
$660 of revenues that it uses to pay Anne the interest.
Except for the contrasting tax treatment, it makes no difference
to the shareholders of a close corporation whether these routine,
periodic extractions of current income from their corporation are
called "interest" or "dividends," provided that they hold the cor-
porate debt in proportion to their stockholdings (and often they do).
The payment of interest, like a dividend, is a method of extracting
cash from corporation without disturbing their proportionate interest
in it. Moreover, the corporation uses "borrowed capital" the same
way it uses "contributed capital." 42 Additionally, absent tax dif-
ference, interest and dividends are the same thing economically to
the corporation - a fee payable to investors in return for the fund-
ing they provide the business. 43
B. The Corporation: Principal Payments on Corporate Debt vs.
Payments of Capital to Shareholders.
Unlike the distinctive treatment accorded interest and dividends,
the tax laws give roughly parallel treatment to debt and equity when
the corporation returns the corpus of the investment to the investor.
41. See generally, Plumb, supra note 28, at 372-73, Comment, Hybrid Instruments, supra note
30, at 120, 137.
42. Stone & McGeehan, Distinguishing Corporate Debt From Stock Under Section 385, 1981
S. CAL. TAX INST. § 700, § 700.1, reprinted in 36 TAX L. Rav. 341, 343 (1981).
43. See generally T. COPELAND & J. WESTON, FnA1cIAL THEORY AND COm'ORATE POLICY 382-
83 (2d ed. 1983); Miller, Debt and Taxes, 32 J. FIN. 261 (1977); Plumb, supra note 28, at 620-21;
Comment, Hybrid Instruments, supra hote 30, at 133-42.
19881
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1. Cash payments.
A cash payment on the principal of corporate debt ordinarily
does not result in any tax consequences to the corporation." It does
not get a deduction. It does not have any income, gain or loss. The
payment does not entitle the corporation to increase its basis in any
of its assets, even if the debt was incurred in connection with the
purchase of an asset. (Under the Crane doctrine, it already has in-
cluded such a liability as part of its basis in the property).
45
Like any other taxpayer, however, the corporation does have
income for the discharge of indebtedness when the creditor accepts
a payment less than the full amount due in full satisfaction of the
debt. 6 In a famous case, the United States Supreme Court held that
the reacquisition of a corporation's own bonds at less than the
amount due resulted in taxable income to the reacquiring corpo-
ration.47 Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1984 (TRA of 1984), how-
ever, the courts had held that a corporation did not realize taxable
income from discharge of indebtedness when it issued its own stock
to discharge its debt, notwithstanding that the value of the stock
was less than the amount of debt.4 8 TRA of 1984 eliminated the
stock-for-debt exception for discharge of indebtedness income. 49 Ac-
44. One major exception involves deductions for original issue discount. If the debtor cor-
poration has issued original issue discount obligations, it is allowed to deduct a portion of the original
issue discount each year, though the debt instrument refers to the original issue discount as principal.
I.R.C. § 163(e)(1) (1987).
45. If the liability was incurred in connection with purchase of an asset and that purchase was
taxable to the seller, the corporation would include the liability in its basis under the Crane rationale.
See Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1 (1947). Hence, it has no need to increase its basis by the
amount of any payments on principal, because the unpaid principal is already part of its basis under
Crane. If a corporation took a carryover basis in encumbered assets and the liability was not part
of the transferor's basis, its inability to add principal to its basis in those assets would be a disadvantage
for the use of debt.
46. See I.R.C. § 61(a)(12) (1987); CoNF. REP. ON TmE DEucrr REDUCTION ACT OP 1984, H.R.
REP. No. 861, 98th Cong., 2d Sess, 829, reprinted in 1984, U.S. CODE CONo. & ADMIN. NEws 1445,
1517.
47. United States v. Kirby Lumber Co., 284 U.S. 1 (1931).
48. See e.g., Commissioner v. Motor Mart Trust, 156 F.2d 122 (1st Cir. 1946); Commissioner
v. Capento Sec. Corp., 140 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1944); Tower Bldg. Corp. v. Commissioner, 6 T.C.
125 (1946). See also CoNF. REP. ON T DEFicrr REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, supra note 46, at 1517.
49. See Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 59(a), 98 Stat. 494 (codified at 26
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cording to new section 108(e)(10), a debtor corporation realizes tax-
able income for discharge of indebtedness when it satisfies its debt
with stock having a fair market value less than the principal of the
debt.5 0 The taxable income is the excess of the principal of the debt
over the fair market value of the stock." The new rule mandating
taxable income does not apply when the debtor corporation is in a
Title 11 bankruptcy proceeding or is insolvent.5 2 It also does not
apply to a corporation with "cash flow and credit problems" that
is engaging in a "qualified workout" with creditors. 3
2. Equity.
Redemptions and liquidating distributions to shareholders are the
functional equivalent of principal payments to the holders of cor-
porate debt. The investor recovers what he put into the corporation,
and his investment in the corporation is reduced or extinguished.
5 4
Such payments to shareholders, if in cash, result in no deduction,
income, gain, or loss for the corporation.
3. Property-in-kind.
(a) Debt.
If a corporation uses property-in-kind to pay a debt (whether
principal or interest), the transaction ordinarily is treated as a taxable
sale of the distributed property by the corporation and is governed
by the regular Code sections outside of Subchapter C. The cor-
poration's amount realized is the amount of the debt discharged.
50. I.R.C. § 108(e)(10)(a) (1987).
51. Id. See also CoNF. REP. ON TrE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, supra note 46, at 1517.
52. I.R.C. § 108(e)(10)(B) (1987).
53. Id. § 108(e)(10)(C) (1986) (repealed 1987).
See also CoNF. REP. ON Ta DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, supra note 46, at 1517.
The obvious intent of the workout exception is to permit a debtor corporation in serious financial
straits to issue stock to its creditors outside of a bankruptcy proceeding without incurring discharge
of indebtedness income.
54. Curiously, a shareholder receiving a distribution from a corporation without some earnings
or profits treats the distribution as if received for the sale of his stock - a tax-free return of capital
up to his basis in his stock and a gain thereafter. I.R.C. § 301(c)(2),(3) (1987). The idea is that if
the corporation has no earnings of profit, the distribution is an extraction of capital from the business.
19881 1023
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Accordingly, it will be compelled to recognize a gain to the extent
that the cancelled debt exceeds its basis in the transferred property.5
The creditor must recognize gain on receipt of the property to the
extent that the fair market value of the property exceeds the cred-
itor's basis in the debt discharged.
5 6
The corporation is entitled to recognize a realized loss, 5 7 but only
if it can avoid section 267, which disallows loss deductions on sales
or exchanges of property between related parties. Related parties
include corporations and their shareholders owning 50% or more
of the corporation's stock.58 For purposes of this 50% test, the
shareholder constructively owns stock actually owned by his broth-
ers, sisters, spouse, ancestors, and linear descendants. 9 Obviously,
the constructive ownership rules are often going to make the debt-
holding shareholders in closely-held corporations shareholders own-
ing more than 50% (if they aren't already) and, thus, related parties.
(b) Equity.
General. If the corporation uses property-in-kind to make a sec-
tion 301 distribution or redeem its stock, (including debt rechar-
acterized by the IRS as stock), the recently revamped section 311
rules will require it to recognize a gain to the extent that the fair
market value of the property exceeds the distributing corporation's
basis in itA0 If its basis exceeds the property's fair market value,
55. See, e.g., Helvering v. Hammel, 311 U.S. 504 (1941); Montana Power Co. v. United States,
171 F. Supp. 943 (D. Mont. 1959); Ivory v. United States, 86-1 U.S. Tax. Cas. (CCH) 9336 (D.
Or. 1986); Estate of Delman v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 15 (1979); Huberman v. Commissioner, 2
T.C.M. (CCH) 378 (1943); Rev. Rul. 76-111, 1976-1 C.B. 214.
56. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Sisto Fin. Corp., 139 F.2d 253 (2d Cir. 1943); Harrell v. Tom-
linson, 63-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9120 (M.D. Fla. 1962). The creditor, of course, must treat a
portion of the fair market value of the property received as payment of accrued interest, i.e., taxable
as ordinary interest income.
57. See, e.g., Hammel, 311 U.S. 504; Reese v. Commissioner, 615 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1980);
First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 115 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1940).
58. I.R.C. § 267(b)(2) (1987).
59. Id. § 267(c)(4) (1987).
60. See id. § 311(b)(1). Section 311(b)(1) was part of the infamous repeal of the General Utilities
doctrine. The Tax Reform Act of 1986 eliminated several of the few exceptions still in § 311 that
permitted a corporation to make a non-liquidating distribution of appreciated property tax-free to
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however, the corporation will not be able to recognize a loss on the
exchange. 6' New section 336(a) reverses the formal general rule of
section 336(a) so that a liquidating corporation generally will re-
cognize a gain or loss on a distribution of appreciated property in
a complete liquidation.
62
Transitional relief for "'small corporations." The Tax Reform
Act of 1986 provided transitional relief for liquidating "small cor-
porations." They are allowed to distribute appreciated property to
shareholders in a liquidation without recognition of gain, provided
the liquidation is completed before January 1, 1989. The nonre-
cognition rule applies only to assets that, if sold, would produce
long-term capital gain. A "small corporation" is a corporation worth
no more than $10 million and that has 50% or more in value of
its stock owned by ten or fewer people. Full nonrecognition is avail-
able only for corporations worth $5 million or less. The benefit of
non-recognition is phased out for corporations with a value between
$5 million and $10 million.
63
(c) Exception to recognition.
Subsidiaries. The new law also continues the old rule that an
80% or more owned subsidiary recognizes no gain or loss when
making liquidating distributions to its parent. 64 The subsidiary now
61. The recognition rule contained in § 311(b) refers explicitly to appreciated property only.
I.R.C. § 311(b)(1)(B) (1987). A nonliquidating distribution of loss property is covered by § 311(a),
which provides for nonrecognition of loss on the nonliquidating distribution of loss property to share-
holders. Compare I.R.C. § 336(a) (1954) with I.R.C. § 336(a) (1987). The change from nonrecognition
to recognition in § 336(a) and the repeal of § 337, major parts of the Tax Reform Act of 1986,
constituted the mortal blow to the General Utilities doctrine.
62. Contrast I.R.C. § 336(a) (1987) with I.R.C. § 336 (1954).
63. Tax Reform Act of 1986, I.R.C. § 633(d) (1987). See generally TiE TAx REFoR AcT oF
1986: CONF. Coiat REP. ON H.R. 3839, H.R. Rep. No. 841, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 206-07, reprinted
in 1986 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADmIN. NEws 4075, 4294.
64. The 1954 Code needed no special subsection to provide nonrecognition for a liquidating
subsidiary, because nonrecognition was the general rule for all liquidating corporations. See I.R.C.
§ 336 (1954). The depreciation recapture sections contained special exemptions from recognition to
recapture income for liquidating subsidiaries in § 332 liquidations, however. See, e.g., I.R.C. §§
1245(b)(3), 1250(d)(3) (1984). Now that recognition is the general rule for liquidating corporations,
liquidating subsidiaries in a § 332 liquidation no longer need a special subsection to be protected
from recognition of gain. This rule is contained in I.R.C. § 337(a) (1987). Congress left unchanged
the exemptions from recapture income for liquidating subsidiaries in § 332 liquidations. See, e.g., id.
§§ 1245(b)(3), 1250(d)(3) (1987).
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recognizes a gain 6 (but not a loss) 66 when distributing property to
a shareholder other than its parent, i.e., a minority shareholder.
Stock dividends. The corporation still recognizes no gain or loss
when it distributes its own stock (or stock rights) to its share-
holders.67
Corporate divisions and reorganizations. Additionally, the new
Code still generally allows a corporation to exchange appreciated
property tax-free for stock or securities in qualifying corporate di-
visions or reorganizations and to distribute that stock or those se-
curities tax-free to its shareholders.68 A corporate transferor in a
section 351 exchange also can drop down the stock it receives in
the exchange to its shareholders without incurring a taxable gain.6 9
Limitations on losses in liquidations. New section 336(d) tries to
prevent shareholders from manufacturing artificial losses for their
closely-held corporations in anticipation of a liquidation. The temp-
tation is especially great now that the liquidating corporation must
recognize gains on all of its appreciated property. Without this bar-
rier, the shareholders could contribute loss property to the corpo-
ration and make the corporation in turn either sell it at a loss or
distribute it back to the shareholders for a loss as part of the li-
quidation. Section 336(d)(1) disallows recognition of the loss on li-
quidating distributions of loss property to majority shareholders, if
either (i) the loss property is distributed only to the majority share-
65. The nonrecognition rule contained in new § 337(a) applies only to distributions to "80-
percent distributee[s]" in § 332 liquidations, i.e., the parent corporation. See id. §§ 337(a) (1987).
That means that distributions to minority shareholders in § 332 liquidations are governed by § 336(a),
which provides the general rule of recognition of gain for the liquidating corporation. See id. § 336(a)
(1987).
66. Id. § 336(d)(3) (1987) (no loss recognized to the liquidating corporation on any distribution
in a § 332 liquidation).
67. Id. § 311(a)(1) (1987).
68. Id. § 361(a),(b). Section 361(c), however, requires the corporation to recognize the gain of
a distribution of other types of property as if the property had been sold to the distributee at its
fair market value. Id. § 361(c) (1987). For the garbled mess that this set of rules makes, see Eustice,
A Case Study In Technical Tax Reform: Section 361, or How Not To Revise A Statute, 35 TAx
NoTEs 283 (1987).
69. See id. § 351(c) (1987) (corporate transferor counted in control group despite drop-down
of stock to shareholders).
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holders,70 or (ii) the corporation had acquired the loss property in
section 351 exchange or as a contribution to capital within the pre-
ceding five years. 71 Section 336(d)(2) requires a liquidating cor-
poration to reduce its basis by the amount of the "built-in loss"
(excess of fair market value over the corporation's basis at time of
acquisition), when computing its loss on the sale or exchange of loss
property contributed by shareholders. 72 Section 336(d)(2) requires the
basis reduction only when the shareholder's purpose in contributing
the property was to create a loss for the corporation.7 3
The changes in the liquidation sections in the new Code are a
mix of good and bad for the closely-held corporation holding loss
property. Unlike the old law,74 the liquidating corporation sometimes
now can recognize a loss on the distribution of loss property to its
own shareholders. 75 Moreover, subject to the section 336(d)(2) built-
in loss limitation rule for recently contributed property and the sec-
tion 267 rules, the Code still lets the corporation recognize a loss
on the sale of property and then distribute the proceeds to the share-
holders. That is the good. As to the bad: (i) section 311(a) prevents
the corporation from recognizing a loss when distributing the prop-
erty as a dividend or in redemptions;76 (ii) section 336(d) inhibits
the recognition of the loss by a liquidating corporation;77 (iii) and
70. A threshold requirement for the application of § 366(d)(1) is that the liquidating corporation
distribute the property to a person related within the meaning of § 267. Id. § 336(d)(1)(A)(1987). An
individual shareholder and a corporation are related under § 267, if the individual, directly or in-
directly, owns more than 50% in value of that corporation's outstanding stock. Id. § 267(b)(2) (1987).
A shareholder that is a corporation is related to the distributing corporation, if the shareholder cor-
poration owns more than 50% of the stock of the distributing corporation. Id. §§ 267(b)(3), (f),
1563(a).
Section 336(d)(l)(A)(i) provides the first of the two alternative conditions for the applicability
of the nonrecognition rule, provided that the threshold requirement of a distribution to related party
is met. The first alternative is that the distribution is disproportionate. Since it has to be made to
a 50% or more shareholder, a disproportionate distribution would seem to be a distribution made
solely to a majority shareholder. See id. § 336(d)(l)(A)(i) (1987). Apparently, a distribution of loss
property to all shareholders as tenants-in-common would not trigger section 336(d)(1)(A)(i), because
it is not "not pro-rata." Id.
71. Id. § 336(d)(1)(A)(ii), (B) (1987).
72. Id. § 336(d)(2) (1987).
73. Id. § 336(d)(2)(B)(ii) (1987).
74. Id. § 336 (1954) (nonrecognition of loss as well as gain for liquidating corporation).
75. Id. § 336(a) (1987) (general recognition rule for liquidating corporations).
76. Id. § 311(a) (1987). See generally supra note 61.
77. Id. § 336(d) (1987).
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section 267 sometimes forecloses the possibility of taking a loss by
transferring it to cancel debt held by a shareholder-creditor.
78
C. The Corportion: Receipt of Funds
Section 1032(a), a key section in corporate tax law, provides that
a corporation recognizes no gain or loss when it issues its own stock
in return for money or other property. 79 This nonrecognition rule
applies to the issuance of treasury shares as well as to authorized
but unissued shares.80 Section 1032(a) applies in transactions that
various Subchapter C code sections make tax-free to the shareholder
who is paying money or conveying other property in exchange for
the stock, e.g., a section 351 exchange. 81 Section 1032(a) also pro-
vides nonrecognition treatment to the issuing corporation when the
transaction is a taxable sale or exchange to the shareholder.8 2 The
issuance by a corporation of its own shares as compensation for
services is considered as a disposition by such corporation of such
shares for money or other property, i.e., 1032(a) governs such an
issuance. 83
78. Id. § 267 (1987).
79. Id. § 1032(a) (1987). But see id. § 108(e)(10) (1987).
80. Id. § 1032(a) (1987).
Prior to the enactment of section 1032(a) in 1954, the government sometimes posited that a
corporation should recognize a gain when it "deals in its own shares as it might in the shares of
another corporation." See Treas. Reg. § 39.22(a)-15(b) (1939). Section 1032 consciously eliminated
the pre-1954 distinction between payments received for treasury shares and payments received for
newly issued shares. B. WoLFmAN, FEDERAL INCOmE TAXATION OF BUSINESS ENTERPRISE 93 (2d ed.
1982). See also H.R. REP. No. 1337, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CONO. &
AD N. NEWS 4017, 4410; S. RaP. No. 1622, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1954 U.S. CODE CoNo.
& ADrm. NEws 4621, 5069.
81. For the tax-free treatment of the transferor of property in a section 351 exchange, see
I.R.C. § 351(a) (1987).
Another example would be the parent corporation in a D reorganization. The first step in a D
reorganization is for a corporation to transfer assets to a controlled corporation. Id. § 368(a)(l)(D)
(1987). If the controlled corporation issues stock for those assets, section 1032(a) insulates it from
the recognition of a gain or a loss. If the controlling corporation does receive stock in that exchange,
section 361(a) protects it from recognizing a gain or loss for transferring property in exchange for
the stock of the controlled corporation. For the transaction to constitute a D reorganization, the
controlling corporation must distribute the stock of the controlled corporation to the shareholders of
the controlling corporation in a transaction qualifying under sections 354, 355 or 356. Id. § 368(a)(l)(D)
(1987). Sections 354 and 355 provide nonrecognition treatment for the shareholders in the controlling
corporation on receipt of the stock of the controlled corporation. Id. §§ 354(a)(1), 355(a)(1) (1987).
82. See, e.g., Grant v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 893 (1982).
83. Treas. Reg. § 1.1032-1(a) (1987).
20
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 4 [1988], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss4/4
CLOSELY HELD CORPORATION
A corporation, like any other taxpayer, has no income, gain or
loss, when it issues debt in exchange for money or other property.
It does not treat borrowed money as income 4 because conceptually
the increase in liabilities offsets the increase in assets. The borrowing
does not increase its net worth.
D. The Investor: Tax Consequences on Payment of Obligation
1. Debt.
If an investor's interest in a corporation is determined to be debt,
a payment on the principal of the debt is a tax-free return of capital
up to the investor's basis in the debt.85 Prior to the TRA of 1984,
principal payments in excess of the investor's basis in the debt or-
dinarily were treated as capital gains,8 6 though a portion of the prin-
cipal payment occasionally would have been treated as ordinary
income under original issue discount rules.87 The TRA of 1984 sub-
stantially expanded the applicability of the original issue discount
rules, which are discussed in IV(e), infra, and they are now more
likely than before to produce interest income for the holder on dis-
counted debt issued by a close corporation. The TRA of 1984 also
introduced a new tax concept, market discount, that sometimes re-
quires payment on principal above the owner's basis to be treated
as interest income.88 The market discount rules, discussed in IV(f),
infra, do not affect the general rule that payments of principal up
to the investor's basis are tax-free returns of capital, but they can
affect the tax treatment of payments of principal above basis.
84. B. VoLFmAN, supra note 80, at 94.
85. See I.R.C. § 1271(a)(1) (1987) (exchange treatment on retirement of debt instrument). The
rule mentioned in the text was formerly codified in § 1232(a), which was repealed by the Tax Reform
Act of 1984. See Tax Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-369, § 42(a)(1), 98 Stat. 494, 556 (1984).
86. Id. § 1271(a)(1) (1987).
87. See id. §§ 1271-1275. See generally J. EusTIcE, THm TAx REFOnR ACT OF 1984 - A SE-
LECTIVE ANALYSIS, 2.02 (1984); MATrHEW BENDER'S TAx STAFF, ANALYSIS OF = TAx REFORM ACT
OF 1984, 103, 107 & 108 (1984); T. NESS & E. VOGEL, TAXATION OF THE CLOSELY HELD CORPORATION
§ 5.12-11 5.13-14 (3d ed. Supp. 1985); Bolt, The New Original Issue Discount Rules, 58 FLA. B.J.
683 (1984); Canellos, The Extension of Original Issue Discount Rules in the Tax Reform Act of 1984,
in TAx REFoRm ACT OF 1984- 341 (D. Brockway & J. Fuller 1984).
88. See I.R.C. § 1276(a)(1) (1987).
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Interest paid on a debt is taxable as ordinary income to the
recipient 89 regardless of the corporation's earnings and profits.
2. Stock.
Closely-held corporations have a variety of choices in structuring
transfers of corporate assets to shareholders, and the tax treatment
for the shareholders varies according to the particular structure cho-
sen. But before mastering the Code sections that implement the rules
respecting these transfers, one needs to be well-versed in a certain
amount of jargon. One of the key words is "distribution." It refers
to a transfer of something by a corporation to its own shareholders
who receive the distributed item in their capacity as shareholders.
In other words, rent paid by a corporation to a shareholder who
is leasing property to the corporation is not considered a distri-
bution. 90 Distributions include dividend-style distributions, "stock
dividends," 91 some transfers to shareholders in corporate divisions
and reorganizations, 92 and distributions in redemptions and liqui-
dations. The commonality in these transactions is a transfer of some-
thing by a corporation to its own shareholders. In this section,
"liquidating distribution" is used to refer to payments to share-
holders, "redemption proceeds" is used to refer to payments made
to redeem stock, and "distribution" is used to refer to a dividend-
style distribution of cash or property by a corporation to its own
shareholders - a one-way nonliquidating transfer from a corpo-
ration to its own shareholders.
(a) Liquidating distributions.
The shareholder usually is entitled to "sale or exchange" treat-
ment upon receipt of a liquidating distribution from the corpora-
89. Id. § 61(a)(4) (1987).
90. Often the best tax consequences are produced by finding a reason other than the recipient's
status as a shareholder. For example, the closely-held corporation might be able to hire the shareholder
as an employee and pay him a salary, which the corporation can deduct as a business expense. Since
the purpose of the text is to discuss the tax consequences of payments to shareholders in their capacity
as shareholders, this and other similar devices are not discussed at this point.
91. "Stock dividend" itself is a term of art that refers to a one-way transfer of a corporation's
own stock to its own shareholders. I.R.C. § 316(a) (1987).
92. The term "distribution" properly can be used to refer to a parent's distribution of a sub-
sidiary's stock in a corporate division.
1030 [Vol. 90
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tion, 93 a tax-free return of capital up to the shareholder's basis in
the stock and a recognized gain thereafter. 94 Liquidating distribu-
tions have nothing corresponding to the interest paid to debtholders.
Unlike the interest paid to the debtholder, no part of the liquidating
distribution is routinely ordinary income to the shareholder. The
debtholder is entitled to exchange treatment (tax-free return of basis
and a recognized gain thereafter), but only on the repayment of the
principal of the debt. He does not get exchange treatment on the
interest. For both debt and stock, the Code contains several excep-
tions to this capital gain treatment the original issue discount 95 and
market discount9 6 rules for debts and the collapsible corporation
rules for stock.
(b) Dividend-style distributions.
The key sections of the Internal Revenue Code that govern non-
liquidating, dividend-style corporate distributions are:
(1) Section 61(a)(7),9 7 which states that gross income includes dividends;
(2) Section 316(a),93 which defines the term "dividend";
(3) Section 312,9 which contains "earnings and profits" rules, which in turn
determines which distributions will be considered dividends under section 316;
(4) Section 301,100 which describes the tax treatment for shareholders receiving
nonliquidating distributions; 10
(5) Section 311,1"2 which describes the tax treatment for corporations making div-
93. See I.R.C. § 331(a) (1987). The Code contains several exceptions to the rule quoted in the
text. See, e.g., id. § 332(a) (nonrecognition to a parent corporation on receipt of a liquidating dis-
tribution from an 80% or more owned subsidiary). See also I.R.C. § 333 (1954) (complete or partial
nonrecognition for shareholders in certain "one month" liquidations). A shareholder may be entitled
to nonrecognition on receipt of a liquidating distribution when the distribution is part of a reorgan-
ization. See id. §§ 354(a)(1), 368(a)(1)(C), (2)(G)(i)(1987).
94. See id. §§ 331(a) (1987) (liquidations), 1271(a)(1) (exchange treatment for amounts received
by a holder on retirement of a debt instrument).
95. See id. § 1271-75 (1987).
96. See id. §§ 1276-78 (1987).
97. Id. § 61(a)(7) (1987).
98. Id. § 316(a) (1987).
99. Id. § 312 (1987).
100. Id. § 301 (1987).
101. More particularly, § 301 describes the tax treatment for shareholders receiving dividend-
style corporate distributions. Id. § 301 (1987). Other nonliquidating distributions, e.g., redemptions,
are sometimes treated by other code sections in Subchapter C. See, e.g., id. § 302 (1987) (redemptions).
102. Id. § 311 (1987).
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idend-style distributions to their own shareholders; 3 and
(6) Section 243(a),' which entitles corporations receiving dividends to deduct 80%
of dividends received from nonaffiliated corporations and 100% of dividends
received from affiliated corporations.
"Dividend" is one type of a distribution. It is specifically defined
in section 316 of the Internal Revenue Code as any distribution of
property made by a corporation to its shareholders to the extent
that the corporation has either accumulated or current earnings and
profits. 015 "Distribution," thus, is a general term, "dividend," a
specific term. A dividend-style distribution - a one-way transfer of
cash or property-in-kind to a shareholder - is a dividend only to
the extent that the distributing corporation has earnings and profits.
The determination that part of a distribution is a dividend is of
immense tax significance, because "dividends" must be included in
the recipient's gross income under sections 6110 and 301 (c)(1),'0 7 sub-
ject to the section 243 dividends received deduction for corpora-
tions. 08 Any part of a dividend-style distribution that exceeds the
distributing corporation's earnings and profits are not "dividends"
for tax purposes. The concept of a dividend for tax purposes, thus,
is what an old-fashioned economist would consider to be a dividend
transaction - a profitable corporation passing out assets (including
cash) to its shareholders.
To the extent that the earnings and profits do not cover the
distribution, it is treated like a payment to the shareholder on the
sale of his stock. It is a tax-free return of capital up to his basis
in his stock' 1 and a recognized gain thereafter." 0
103. Section 311 applies to most dividend-style distributions and redemptions. Id. Other sections
in Subchapter C sometimes apply to particular, nonliquidating distributions, however. See, e.g., id.
§ 361(b)(1)(B) (1987) (tax-free treatment for distributions to own shareholders of property-in-kind or
money received by a corporation in a reorganization).
104. Id. § 243(a)(1), (3) (1987).
105. Id. § 316(a) (1987).
106. Id. § 61(a)(7) (1987).
107. Id. § 301(c)(1) (1987).
108. Id. § 243(a)(1), (3) (1987).
109. Id. § 301(c)(2) (1987).
110. Id. § 301(c)(3)(A) (1987). Usually, recognized gain is a capital gain. If the corporation is
collapsible, however, the shareholder probably will be required to treat the gain as ordinary income.
Id. § 341(a)(3) (1987).
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When the corporation has substantial earnings and profits, dis-
tributions to shareholders generally produce inferior tax conse-
quences for the unincorporated investor than do payments to
debtholders. To debtholders, interest is always ordinary income.111
Payments of principal are tax-free returns of capital up to basis.112
Payments of principal above basis are capital gain,113 unless there
is some original issue discount or market discount. Payments of
principal above basis are ordinary income to the extent of the orig-
inal issue1 4 or market1 5 discount. None of these tax consequences
depend on earnings and profits. In contrast, the presence or absence
of earnings and profits plays a key role to the shareholder receiving
a distribution. If the corporation has enough earnings and profits
to cover the full amount of its distributions, that full amount is
ordinary income to the shareholder.11 6 No part of the distribution
is a capital gain. Moreover, unlike the debtholder, the shareholder
is not entitled to reduce the amount of the payment includable in
his income by his basis in his investment.
Investors that are themselves corporations must be excepted from
the group of investors who generally prefer the tax consequences of
debt repayments over the receipt of dividends. As discussed later,
this excepted group of taxpayers is entitled to the section 243 div-
idends received deduction'17 and often prefers receiving dividends.
(c) Stock Redemptions.
Stock redemptions are governed by their own, unique subsystem
inside Subchapter C. The key section is section 302. If a redemption
111. Id. § 61(a)(4) (1987).
112. Id. § 1271(a)(1) (1987) (exchange treatment of amounts received by a debt holder on re-
tirement of any debt).
113. Id. §§ 1221, 1271(a)(1) (1987).
114. Id. § 1272(a)(1) (1987).
115. Id. § 1276(a)(1) (1987).
116. Id. §§ 301(c)(1), 316(a) (1987). The statement in the text assumes that the recipient of the
distribution is a human being, not another corporation. A corporate recipient of a distribution is
entitled to a § 243(a) dividends-received deduction. See id. § 243(a) (1987).
117. See id. § 243(a) (1987). The corporation is generally entitled to an 80% dividends-received
deduction. Id. § 243(a)(1) (1987). An electing member of an affiliated group can choose to deduct
all of the dividend. Id. § 243(a)(3), (b) (1987).
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meets any of the four tests contained in section 302(b), the share-
holder treats the redemption proceeds as if received in payment in
exchange for his stock, 18 i.e., tax-free return of capital up to his
basis and a recognized gain thereafter. If a redemption fails all of
the section 302(b) tests, the redemption proceeds are treated as a
section 301 distribution,1 9 i.e., a dividend and ordinary income to
the extent of the distributing corporation's earnings and profits. The
distinction in tax treatment between stock redemptions failing all of
the 302(b) tests and repayments on debt is essentially the same as
those discussed under the heading "Liquidating distributions." The
distinction in tax treatment between stock redemptions not meeting
one of the 302(b) tests and repayments on debt is essentially the
same as those discussed in the heading entitled "Dividend-style dis-
tributions."
3. Purported debt instruments recharacterized as stock or a
contribution to capital.
The government frequently tries to characterize "loans" by
shareholders to closely-held corporations as either contributions to
capital or as payments for "stock." If the government successfully
recharacterizes a purported debt instrument as equity, any "interest"
payments on the debt are considered section 301 distributions 120 and
are dividends to the extent of the distributing corporation's earnings
and profits. Dividends are treated as ordinary income. "Principal"
payments on the debt usually are considered distributions in re-
demption of the "STOCK."'?' More.often than not these "re-
demptions" fail the section 302(b) tests and are treated as section
118. Id. § 302(a) (1987).
119. Id. § 302(d) (1987).
120. Bacon & Patterson, Corporate Stock Redemption Definitions; Basic Categories, 343-2d Tax
Mgmt. (BNA) A-34 (1986). See, e.g., Moughon v. Commissioner, 329 F.2d 399 (6th Cir. 1964), aff'g
32T.C.M. (CCH) 94 (1963); Zilkha & Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner, 52 T.C. 607 (1969); W.D. Killhour
& Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 855 (1973).
121. See, e.g., Dillin v. United States, 433 F.2d 1097 (5th Cir. 1970); Peterson v. Commissioner,
380 F.2d 1 (9th Cir., 1967); Burr Oaks Corp. v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 635 (1965), aff'd, 365 F.2d
24 (7th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1007 (1967); Rev. Rul. 73-122, 1973-1 C.B. 66.




West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 4 [1988], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss4/4
CLOSELY HELD CORPORATION
301 distributions because (A) that debt is apt to be recharacterized
as stock only when the stock holders hold it in proportion to their
stock ownership, (B) the "redemptions" of the purported debt in-
struments are consequently likely to be proportionate, and (C) pro-
portionate redemptions generally fail the section 302(b) tests and are
treated as section 301 distributions.
It is possible that the initial payment by the investor to the cor-
poration might be reclassified as a contribution to capital and not
even as a purchase of stock. If that is the case, the payment by the
corporation to the investor is oufside of section 302, since the in-
vestor has no stock to be redeemed. Hence, the payment must be
treated as a section 301 distribution. 22
E. The Investor and Original Issue Discount
Discounted debt is a debt issued for less than the amount due
on the debt at maturity. Original issue discount is the difference
between the issue price and the amount due at maturity. 123 Eco-
nomically, it is identical to interest-an amount charged for the use
or forbearance of money. 24 The Supreme Court held that in a pre-
1954 transaction, gain realized on account of original issue discount
was taxable as ordinary income because the discount was the eco-
nomic equivalent of interest. 25 Congress first promulgated statutory
rules on original issue discount when it enacted section 1232 in 1954.126
122. See, e.g., B. BrrrKER & J. EusTicE, supra note 27, at 4.08.
123. E.g., I.R.C. § 1273(a)(1) (1987).
124. E.g., United States v. Midland-Ross Corp., 381 U.S. 54, 56-57 (1965).
125. Id. at 67.
126. As originally enacted in 1954, section 1232 stated:
(a) General Rule. For purposes of this subtitle, in the case of bonds, debentures, notes, or
certificates or other evidences of indebtedness, which are capital assets in the hands of the
taxpayer, and which are issued by any corporation, or government or political subdivision
thereof -
(1) Retirement. Amounts received by the holder on retirement of such bonds or other
evidences of indebtedness shall be considered as amounts received in exchange therefor
(except that in the case of bonds or other evidences of indebtedness issued before January
1, 1955, this paragraph shall apply only to those issued with interest coupons or in reg-
istered form, or to those in such form on March 1, 1954).
(2) Sale or Exchange.
(A) General Rule. Except as provided in subparagraph (B), upon sale or exchange of
1988]
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According to those rules, which affected bonds issued between 1954
bonds or other evidences of indebtedness issued after December 31, 1954, held by the
taxpayer more than 6 months, any gain realized which does not exceed an amount which
bears the same ratio to the original issue discount (as defined in subsection (b)) as the
number of complete months that the bond or other evidences of indebtedness was held
by the taxpayer bears to the number of complete months from the date or original issue
to the date or maturity, shall be considered as gain from the sale or exchange of property
which is not a capital asset. Gain in excess of such amount shall be considered gain
from the sale or exchange of a capital asset held more than 6 months.
(B) Exceptions. This paragraph shall not apply to -
(i) obligations the interest on which is not includable in gross income under section
103 (relating to certain governmental obligations), or
(ii) any holder who has purchased the bond or other evidence of indebtedness at a
premium.
(C) Election as to inclusion. In the case of obligations with respect to which the taxpayer
has made an election provided by section 454(a) and (c) (relating to accounting rules
for certain obligations issued at a discount), this section shall not require the inclusion
of any amount previously includable in gross income.
(b) Definitions.
(1) Original issue discount. For purposes of subsection (a), the term "original issue dis-
count" means the difference between the issue price and the stated redemption price at
maturity. If the original issue discount is less than one fourth of 1 percent of the re-
demption price at maturity multiplied by the number of complete years to maturity, then
the issue discount shall be considered to be zero. For purposes of this paragraph, the
term "stated redemption price at maturity" means the amount fixed by the last modi-
fication of the purchase agreement and includes dividends payable at that time.
(2) Issue price. In the case of issues of bonds or other evidences of indebtedness registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission, the term "issue price" means the initial
offering price to the public (excluding bond houses and brokers) at which price a sub-
stantial amount of such bonds or other evidences of indebtedness were sold. In the case
of privately placed issues of bonds or other evidence of indebtedness, the issue price of
each such bond or other evidence of indebtedness is the price paid by the first buyer of
such bond. For purposes of this paragraph, the terms "initial offering price" and "price
paid by the first buyer" include the aggregate payments made by the purchaser under the
purchase agreement, including modifications thereof.
(3) Issue date. In the case of issues of bonds or other evidences of indebtedness registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission, the term "date of original issue" means
the date on which the issue was first sold to the public at the issue price. In the case of
privately placed issues of bonds or other evidences of indebtedness, the term "date of
original issue" means the date on which the issue was first sold to the public at the issue
price. In the case of privately placed issues of bonds or other evidences of indebtedness,
the term "date of original issue" means the date on which each such bond or other
evidence of indebtedness was sold by the issuer.
(c) Bond with excess number of coupons detached. If -
(1) a bond or other evidence of indebtedness issued at any time with interest coupons is
purchased after the date of enactment of this title, and
(2) the purchaser does not receive all the coupons which first become payable more than
12 months after the date of the purchase, then the gain on the sale or other disposition
of such evidence of indebtedness by such purchaser shall be considered as gain from the
sale or exchange of property which is not a capital asset to the extent that the market
[Vol. 901036
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and 1969, the debt-holder was not taxed on the discount until the
debt was paid off at maturity or sold or otherwise disposed of at
a gain in a taxable transaction.1 27 The cases, however, allowed the
corporation to deduct the discount as interest ratably over the life
of the debt.1 28 The amount of the gain attributable to the discount
was treated as ordinary income.1 29 In 1969,130 Congress amended sec-
tion 1232 so that the holder of a corporate bond was required to
include the original issue discount in his income ratably over the
time he held the bond.131 In 1982132 and 1984,133 Congress again
amended the original issue discount rules, which are now contained
in sections 1271 through 1275134 and several other related sections.1 35
value (determined as of the time of the purchase) of the evidence of indebtedness with
coupons attached exceeds the purchase price. If this subsection and subsection (a)(2)(A)
apply with respect to gain realized on the retirement of any bond, then subsection (a)(2)(A)
shall apply with respect to that part of the gain to which this subsection does not apply.
I.R.C. § 1232 (1954). Congress amended section 1232 in 1969, see Tax Reform Act of 1969,
Pub. L. No. 91-172, § 413, 83 Stat. 487, 609-12 (1970), and repealed it and replaced it with I.R.C.
§§ 1271-88 (1987). See Tax Reform Act of 1984, supra note 49, at § 42(a)(1).
127. The interest deduction for original issue discount was not codified until 1982 when section
163(e) was added to the Code. The courts created the corporate interest deduction for original issue
discount prior to 1982. See Helvering v. Union Pac. R.R., 293 U.S. 282 (1934); Chicago R.I. & Pac.
Ry. Co., 13 B.T.A. 988 (1928), aff'd & rev'd on other grounds, 47 F.2d 990 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
284 U.S. 618 (1931).
Regulations under the 1954 Code assumed the validity of the deduction. See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-
12(c)(3) (1957). See generally J. Cionana, TEE LAW OF FEDERAL INcomE TAXATION (2d ed. 1973);
de Kosmian, Original Issue Discount, 22 TAX LAW. 339, 347-49 (1969); Kimmelfield, Original Issues
Discounts: Convertible Debentures and Warrants; Package Deals, 21 N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAx'N
1451, 1460-61 (1963).
128. Prior to the 1954 Code and section 1232(a), the courts usually determined that the gain
recognized by the debt-holder on account of the discount was ordinary income. The 1939 Code did
not address the issue. However, one case, Commissioner v. Caulkins, 144 F.2d 482 (6th Cir. 1944),
held the gain was a capital gain. Thus, the issue was open until Congress passed section 1232 in 1954
and the Supreme Court decided Midland Ross Corp., 381 U.S. 54. See generally J. Croasnma, supra
note 127, at § 127; de Kosmian, supra note 127, at 340-44; Kimmelfield, supra note 127, at 1453-
58.
However, if the debt instrument is non-interest bearing, issued at a discount, and redeemable
for fixed amounts increasing at stated intervals, the holder can elect to treat each increase in redemption
price as income in the year the increase accrues. I.R.C. § 454(a) (1987).
129. I.R.C. § 1232(a) (1954). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.61-7(c) (1957). See generally de Kosmian,
supra note 127, at 340-44; Kimmelfield, supra note 127, at 1453-58.
130. Tax Reform Act of 1969, supra note 28, at § 413.
131. I.R.C. § 1232(a)(3) (1969).
132. Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, (TEFRA), Pub. L. No. 97-248, § 231,
96 Stat. 324, 496-99 (1982).
133. Tax Reform Act of 1984, supra note 49, at §§ 41(a), 42, 98.
134. I.R.C. §§ 1271-75 (1987).
135. For example, the expansion of the original issue discount rules required a concomitant
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The thrust of the 1982 change was to take into account the concept
of the time value of money. 36 The 1984 legislation also eliminated
some of the exceptions to the applicability of the original issue dis-
count rules. 137
1. Tax consequences.
New section 1271(a)(1) 138 recodified the rule formerly contained
in section 1232(a); 139 payments in retirement of corporate debt are
considered amounts paid in exchange therefor. Hence, they represent
a tax-free return of capital up to the holder's basis in the debt and
a recognized gain thereafter. 40 If the debt is issued with original
discount, however, section 1272(a)(1) requires the holder of the debt
to include a part of the original issue discount in his gross income
each year.' 4' Each inclusion in income results in an increase in the
holder's basis in the debt. 42 If, at the time of the original issuance
135. For example, the expansion of the original issue discount rules required a concomitant
reduction in the scope of the imputation of interest rules in section 482. See Tax Reform Act of
1984, supra note 49, at § 41(b). The '84 Act also amended sections 1235(c), 6706, 103A(i)(2)(c), 163(e),
1650)(3), 249(b)(1), 263(g)(u)(B), 822(b)(3), 1037(b), 1251(h) and 6049(d)(6) and repealed sections 1232,
1232A and 1232B. Id. §§ 41-42.
136. Prior to the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982, issuing corporations deducted
original issue discount on a straight-line basis over the life of the bond. This straight-line method
resulted in what Congress considered to be unduly large interest deductions in the early years, because
it ignores the compounding of interest. See J. EusncE, supra note 87, at 2.02[1]; STAFF OF TIM
JOINT COMM. ON TAx'N, 97TH CONG., 2D Sass., GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS
OF Ta TAX EQUITY AND FISCAL RESPONsiBLITY ACT OF 1982,,158-63 (Comm. Print 1982). See TEFRA,
supra note 132, at § 231. See generally Abusive Tax Shelters, 1983: Hearing on S.268 Before the
Subcomm. on the Oversight of the Internal Revenue Service of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 98th
Cong., 1st Sess. 100-01 (1983) (statement of Robert G. Woodward, Acting Tax Legislative Counsel,
Dep't of Treas.) [hereinafter Abusive Tax Shelters]; Canellos & Kleinbard, The Miracle of Compound
Interest: Interest Deferral and Discount After 1982, 38 TAX L. REv. 565 (1983).
137. The Tax Reform Act of 1984 extended the original issue discount rules to discounted debt
(1) issued for property, even though neither the debt nor the property is publicly traded, (2) discounted
debt that is not a capital asset and discounted debt issued by individuals. Tax Reform Act of 1984,
supra note 49, at § 41(a); J. EusTIcE, supra note 87, at 2.02; Cliff & Levine, Interest Accrual and
the Time Value of Money, 34 AM. U.L. REV. 107, 135-38 (1984).
138. I.R.C. § 1271(a)(1) (1986).
139. The Tax Reform Act of 1984 repealed sections 1232, 1232A and 1232B and replaced them
with sections 1271-1275. Tax Reform Act of 1984, supra note 49, at §§ 41(a), 42.
140. The excess of the principal payment over the debt-holder's basis is a capital gain, only if
the debt is a capital asset in his hands.
141. I.R.C. § 1272(a)(1) (1987). The amount includible each year is based on compound interest
principles.
142. Id. § 1272(d)(2) (1987).
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of the discounted debt, the parties intended that the debt would be
called before maturity, the gain on a sale, exchange, or redemption
prior to maturity must be treated as ordinary income to the extent
of any untaxed original issue discount. 143 Section 163(e)(1) allows
the issuing corporation an interest expense deduction on that portion
of the original issue discount that accrued during the taxable year.144
2. Applicability to closely-held corporations.
If a closely-held corporation issues a debt instrument with an
original issue discount in exchange for cash, the "issue price" of
that instrument is the cash price paid by the issuee of that debt
instrument, 145 and the tax consequences described in the preceding
section apply.
Prior to the TRA of 1984, the original issue discount rules did
not apply to debt instruments issued in exchange for property when
neither the debt itself nor the property received in the exchange was
publicly traded. 146 TRA of 1984 eliminated that exemption. 147 Thus,
if a corporation issues a discounted debt instrument in exchange for
property, the original issue discount rules generally apply. 148 As a
practical matter, however, the statute is written to allow closely-held
corporations to issue discounted debt in exchange for property worth
$250,000 or less and still avoid the original issue discount rules.
This practical limitation operates as follows. Section 1273(a)(1)
defines original issue discount as the excess of stated redemption
price at maturity over issue price. 149 Sections 1273(b)(1) through (4)150
143. Id. § 1271(a)(2) (1987).
144. Id. § 163(e)(11) (1987).
145. See id. § 1273(b)(2) (1987).
146. Id. § 1232(b)(2)(B) (1954) (repealed by Tax Reform Act of 1984, supra note 49, at § 42(a)(1));
STAFF OF THE JOINT CoMi. ON TAX., 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., PROPOSALS RELATING TO TAX SHELTERS
AND OTHER TAX-MOTIVATED TRANSACTIONS 63 (Comm. Print 1984).
147. See generally J. EUSTICE, supra note 87, at 2.02[1] 2.0212][a]; Canellos, supra note 87,
at 343-61.
148. Transactions excepted from the original issue discount rule are looked at in section 1272(a)(2)
and do not include discounted debt issued in exchange for property. I.R.C. § 1272(a)(2) (1987).
149. Id. § 1273(a)(1) (1987).
150. Id. § 1273(b)(1)-(4) (1987).
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and 1274151 contain all of the definitions of "issue price." Section
1273(b)(1) 152 defines the term "issue price" for publicly offered debt
instruments issued for cash, section 1273(b)(2) 153 for other debt in-
struments issued for cash, and section 1273(b)(3) 154 for debt instru-
ments issued for property where either the debt instrument itself is
publicly traded or is issued in exchange for stock or securities that
are publicly traded. Of these definitions, only that in section
1273(b)(3) could apply to debt issued by a closely-held corporation
in exchange for property, and then only if the closely-held corpor-
ation received publicly traded stock or securities in the exchange.
Section 1274 defines "issue price" for discounted debt issued in
exchange for property when neither the debt nor the property re-
ceived in the exchange is publicly traded. 155 This is the typical trans-
action between an investor and a closely-held corporation. Section
1274(c)(4)(C), however, renders the issue price definition of section
1274 inapplicable to a debt instrument when the aggregate amount
of all consideration to be paid to acquire the property, including
the aggregate amount of the payments due under the debt instru-
ment, totals $250,000 or less. 156 The only other definition of issue
price is in section 1273(b)(4), a catch-all provision. It defines "issue
price" for a debt instrument issued for property and not covered
by section 1273(b)(1), (2) or (3) or section 1274.157 The section
1273(b)(4) definition of "issue price" is the "stated redemption price
at maturity."' 58 This definition effectively denies the applicability of
the original issue discount rules to transactions within section
1273(b)(4)'s coverage because the stated redemption price at maturity
must exceed the issue price to have any original issue discount. 15 9
Since section 1271(b)(1) defines "issue price" as stated redemption
price at maturity, 16 the issue price cannot possibly exceed the stated
151. Id. § 1274 (1987).
152. Id. § 1273(b)(1) (1987).
153. Id. § 1273(b)(2) (1987).
154. Id. § 1273(b)(3) (1987).
155. Id. § 1274 (1987).
156. Id. § 1274(c)(3)(C) (1987).
157. Id. § 1273(b)(4) (1987).
158. Id.
159. See id. § 1273(a)(1) (1987).
160. Id. § 1271(b)(1) (1987).
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redemption price at maturity, and there cannot be any original issue
discount.
The original issue discount rules do apply to discounted debt
issued by a closely-held corporation in exchange for property when
the aggregate consideration to be paid to acquire the property ex-
ceeds $250,000.161 Section 1274 details an elaborate scheme for de-
termining issue price 62 and, therefore, the amount of original issue
discount, if any, for these transactions. 163
F. The Investor and Market Discount.
"Market discount" is any excess of stated redemption price of
a bond at maturity over its basis to its holder immediately after its
acquisition.?64 "market discount bond" is any bond having market
discount. 65 The term "bond'" includes notes, certificates or "other
evidence of indebtedness" as well as traditional bonds or deben-
tures.1 66 Market discount typically arises when the interest rate on
an existing bond is less than the current market rate of interest for
bonds with similar terms and credit risks. 67 To sell such a bond,
the holder discounts the sale price to a point below the stated re-
demption price at maturity to account for the bond's below-market
interest rate. To the purchaser of the bond, the market discount is
161. The transaction would not fall under the practical exemption of section 1274(c)(3)(C), which
is described in the preceding paragraph in the text. See id. § 1274(c)(3)(C) (1987).
162. Id. § 1274 (1987).
163. For a full discussion of these rules, see generally J. EusTICE, supra note 87, at 2.0212];
REsEARcH INSTITUTE OF AMEERICA, Tim R.I.A. COmPLETE ANALYSIS OF THE TAx REFORM ACT OF 1984,
106 (1984); Cannellos, supra note 87, at 356-61; Cliff & Levine, supra note 137, at 136-37.
164. I.R.C. § 1278(a)(2)(A) (1987).
If the bond has original issue discount, the stated redemption price of the bond at maturity
equals its "revised issue price," which means the sum of the issue price of the bond plus the aggregate
amount of original issue discount includible in the gross income of all holders before acquisition of
the bond by the taxpayer. Id. § 1278(a)(4) (1987).
165. Id. § 1278(a)(1)(A) (1987).
The term "market discount bond" does not include obligations with a fixed maturity date of
one year or less, tax-exempt obligations, United States savings bonds and section 453B installment
obligations. Id. § 1278(a)(1)(B)(i)-(iv) (1987).
166. Id. § 1278(a)(3) (1987).
167. Abusive Tax Shelters, supra note 136, at 108.
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the equivalent of interest 68 since, when added to the interest rate
stated on the bond, it bootstraps the return on the bond up to the
interest rates prevailing at the time of the acquisition of the bond.
Since the purchaser uses the sale price as his basis in the bond and
the sale price is lower than the stated redemption price at maturity,
he takes a basis lower than the stated redemption price at maturity.
Prior to TRA of 1984, the market discount on debt obligations
generally was taxed as a capital gain on payment of the obligation
at maturity under old 1232(a). 169 Because market discount is the
equivalent of interest to the purchaser of the debt, Congress finally
decided that it should be taxed to him as ordinary income like other
forms of interest. 170 TRA of 1984 added sections 1275 through 1278
to the Code. 171 After a taxpayer buys a bond at a market discount,
the market discount accrues during the period that he holds the
bond. 72 Unlike the treatment under the original issue discount rules,
however, he is not taxed on the accrual. 73 Instead, when he disposes
of the bond or it is retired, his realized gain is recognized as ordinary
income to the extent of the "accrued market discount," i.e., the
market discount that accrued from the date of his purchase to the
date of the disposition or retirement. 74 The gain in excess of the
accrued market discount is treated as a capital gain.
75
168. E.g., STAFF OF TBE JOINT COMM. ON TAX'N, 98TH CONG., 2D SESS., GENERAL EXPLANATION
OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF THE DEFICIT REDUCTION ACT OF 1984, 93-99 (Comm. Print 1984)
[hereinafter REVENUE PROVIsIONs]. See e.g., SENATE FIN. COMM., 98TH CONG., 2D SEss., EXPLANATION
OF TmE DEFICIT REDUCTION TAX BILL OF 1984, 155-59 (S. Print 1984) [hereinafter DEFICIT REDUCTION];
Abusive Tax Shelters, supra note 136, at 108-09.
169. I.R.C. § 1232(a) (1954).
170. See, e.g., Abusive Tax Shelters, supra note 136, at 108-09; DEFCrr REDUCTION, supra note
168; REVENUE PROVISIONS, supra note 168.
171. Tax Reform Act of 1984, supra note 49, at § 41(a).
172. See I.R.C. § 1276(b) (1987). See also Abusive Tax Shelters, supra note 136.
173. According to the legislative history, Congress thought it would have been "correct" to
require the bond holder tb include the discount in income annually, but, for administrative conven-
ience, decided to require computation of the periodical accrual market discount and recognition of
the market discount as ordinary income only when the bond is sold or paid out at maturity. See
Abusive Tax Shelters, supra note 136, at 108-09; DEFICIT REDUCTION, supra note 168, REVENUE PRO-
VIsIONs, supra note 168.
174. I.R.C. § 1276(a)(1) (1987).
See also Abusive Tax Shelters, supra note 136, at 108-09; REVENUE PROVISIONS, supra note 168;
DEFICrr REDUCTION, supra note 168. See generally Auster, Market Discount Elections With Respect
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The holder of a bond with market discount can deduct interest
on debt incurred to purchase or carry the market discount bond
only to the extent that the interest expense exceeds the market dis-
count allocable to that bond for that particular year. 176 The disal-
lowed interest deduction is deferred until the taxable year when the
purchaser makes a taxable disposition of the market discount bond.
177
The purpose of this deferral of the interest deduction is to require
the taxpayer to match his interest deduction for purchasing the bond
with the inclusion of the market discount in his income. The mis-
matching of expenses and income-current expense deductions and
to Bonds After The Tax Reform Act of 1984, 63 TAXES 111 (1985).
Section 1276(b) provides two alternative methods for computing the accrued market discount.
The first is a straightline method based on the number of days between the acquisition of a market
discount bond and the bond's maturity date. For example, if the holder purchased the bond 1,000
days from maturity at a market discount of $20,000, the market discount would accrue at $20 a day
($20,000 market discount divided by 1,000 days to maturity). If he sells the bond at a $5,000 gain
after holding it for 400 days, his accrued market discount would be $800 (400 days x $20 accrued
market discount per day). He would be required to treat the $800 accrued market discount as interest
income. The other $4,200 of gain would be treated as if received in exchange for the bond, i.e.,
probably a capital gain.
Alternatively, the holder can elect to compute the accrued market discount under the "yield to
maturity" or "constant interest" principles of the section 1272(a) original issue discount rules. In
general, this means that the market discount accrues from the date of acquisition through the date
of maturity on compound interest principles.
Under compound interest principles, the interest accruals are smallest at the beginning of the
term and highest at the end of the term, because on the date of each compounding, the accrued
interest for that period is added to the amount against which the interest will be computed for the
new period. When these compound interest principles are applied to the accrual of market discount,
they produce much smaller accruals at the beginning than under the straight-line method. Since both
the straight line and compound interest approaches are designed to produce the same aggregate amount
of accrued market discount on the date of maturity of the bond, the choice between the two makes
little difference to the investor who holds the bond until maturity, unless he elects to include the
accrued market discount in his income currently. The choice makes an enormous difference to the
investor who intends to sell the bond shortly after he purchases it, because the compound interest
method will produce smaller accruals and, therefore, smaller interest income on the sale. The investor
interested in the quick resale ought to choose the compound interest alternative, unless, for some
reason, he wants to accelerate income or avoid the interest deduction deferral rule of section 1277.
J. EusTIcE, supra note 87, at 2.0214][a] n.97.
175. The statement in the text assumes that the bond is a capital asset to the holder, which it
is, unless held by a dealer. The rules on market discount require the gain on the disposition of a
market discount bond to be treated as ordinary income to the extent that it is covered by the accrued
market discount on the bond. I.R.C. § 1276(a)(1) (1987). That leaves any gain above accrued market
discount to be governed by general tax rules. If the gain is realized on retirement of the debt, that
means § 1271(a)(1) applies. It provides exchange treatment. Id. § 1271(a)(1) (1987).
176. Id. § 1277(a), (c) (1987).
177. Id. § 1277(b)(2) (1987).
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deferral of taxation of income-had long been a staple of tax shel-
ters. 78
The purchaser can elect to include the accrued market discount
in gross income in the taxable year when it accrues. 179 If the pur-
chaser elects to include market discount in income currently, he avoids
the rule requiring ordinary income treatment upon disposition or
retirement of the market discount bond80 and need not defer the
deduction for his interest expense incurred in buying or carrying the
bond. 181
The market discount sections parallel the recapture sections in
their treatment of transactions governed by nonrecognition sections.
As a starting point, section 1276(a)(1) provides that the ordinary
income treatment it requires overrides the nonrecognition rules pro-
vided by other sections, except as otherwise provided in section
1276.182 For example, section 1276(a)(1) overrides the nonrecognition
rule of former section 337(a) since section 1276 does not specifically
exempt section 337(a) transactions from section 1276's coverage. Ex-
empted from immediate recognition of ordinary income under the
market discount rules are transferors in nonrecognition exchanges
wherein the transferee takes a carryover basis. 8 3 Transactions fitting
under this exemption include section 332 liquidations, 4 section 351
exchanges,8 5 reorganizations, 86 and transfers at death. 187 Instead,
178. See, e.g., Abusive Tax Shelters, supra note 136, at 21; REVENUE PRovisIoN s, supra note
168.
179. I.R.C. § 1278(b) (1987).
180. Id. § 1278(b)(1)(A) (1987).
181. Id.
182. Id. § 1276(a)(1), (c) (1987).
183. Id. § 1276(a), (c)(1) (1987). Section 1276(c)(1) uses the term "transferred basis" rather than
"carryover basis."
184. Section 332 applies to a complete liquidation of an 80% or more owned subsidiary. Id. §
332 (1987). The parent in a § 332 liquidation takes a carryover basis in the assets it receives from
the subsidiary. See id. § 334(b)(1) (1987).
185. Section 351 refers to the transfer of property to a controlled corporation in exchange for
that corporation's stock or securities. Id. § 351 (1987). The transferee corporation in § 351 exchanges
takes a carryover basis (plus any gain recognized to the transferor) in the transferred assets. Id. §
362(a)(1) (1987).
186. See id. §§ 1276(d)(1)(B), 1245(b)(3) (1987). See also REvEmE PRovisioNs, supra note 168,
at 94.
187. Section 1276(d)(1)(A) makes it explicit that gifts, though they do not trigger a recapture
under § 1245(b)(1), are not exempted from recognition of accrued market discount. Section 1276 does
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the transferee taking a carryover basis in a market discount bond
in the nonrecognition transaction inherits the accrued market dis-
count from the transferor, 8 8 though the transferor can adjust its
basis in the market discount bond to reflect gain recognized by the
transferor and any original issue discount or market discount income
included in the transferor's gross income. 18 9
As originally enacted, property acquired in a tax-free exchange
for a market discount bond was tainted with the accrued market
discount of the transferred bond only if the transferee did not take
a carryover basis in the market discount market bond and the trans-
feror took a substituted basis in the property received in exchange
therefor 290 This provision permitted the holder of a market discount
bond to transfer the bond to a controlled corporation in a section
351 exchange and receive stock that was free of the accrued market
discount taint. Congress quickly amended the law so that the accrued
market discount is taxed as interest income to the transferor in a
section 351 exchange.1 91 The corporate transferee of the market dis-
count bond takes the bond with the basis that reflects any gain
recognized to the transferor, including that on account of any mar-
ket discount.192 If the stated redemption price of the bond exceeds
the corporate transferee's basis immediately after acquisition, the
bond constitutes a market discount bond in the hands of the cor-
porate transferee.
93
If a taxpayer conveys appreciated property to a controlled cor-
poration in exchange for a security of that corporation, the exchange
is covered by section 351, and the transferor takes a substituted basis
in that security. The substituted basis should be less than the re-
not make the same provision for transfers at death. Accordingly, the clear intention is that transfers
at death should not trigger recognition of income on account of accrued market discount, because
§ 1245(b)(2) exempts transfers at death from the general rule that any disposition of depreciable
property triggers § 1245 recapture income.
188. Id. § 1276(c)(1)(A) (1987).
189. Id. § 1276(c)(1)(B) (1987).
190. SENATE FIN. CoMMi., TAx REFORm ACT OF 1986, S. REP. No. 313 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 900-
01 (1986) [hereinafter S. FiN. Co~iN., TAx REFORm OF 1986].
191. Section 1803(a)(5) of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 added I.R.C. § 1276(d)(1)(C). See also
S. FIN. Cozmi., TAx REFORi OF 1986, supra note 190, at 900-01.
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demption price of the security, which presumably would be equal
to the fair market value of the transferred appreciated property.
Thus, the stated redemption price of the security would exceed its
basis immediately after acquisition to the extent that the appreciation
of the transferred property is greater than its basis to the transferor
immediately before the transfer. Because market discount is defined
as any excess in the stated redemption price over basis, there was
much initial concern that, under a literal interpretation of that def-
inition, market discount would be. created on the issuance of a se-
curity by the controlled corporation in such a section 351 exchange. 94
Such an interpretation of the market discount rules would result in
most securities issued in section 351 exchanges being treated as mar-
ket discount bonds. The 1986 Act, 9 5 however, provided that, with
certain exceptions, no market discount is created on the original
issuance of a bond. 196 This later clarification was aimed specifically
at preventing a security issued in exchange for appreciated property
in a section 351 exchange from being a market discount bond. 97
G. Equity Classification Favorable for Noncorporate
Shareholders of Corporations With Small or No Earnings and
Profits.
One of the exceptions to the generally more favorable tax con-
sequences of debt over equity occurs when the corporation has little
or no earnings and profits. A stockholder receiving a dividend-style
distribution has a dividend, i.e., ordinary income, only to the extent
that the distributing corporation has earnings and profits. 98 Any
part of the distribution above earnings and profits is treated by the
stockholder as if received upon the sale of his stock-a tax-free
return of capital up to his basis 99 and a recognized gain thereafter. 200
194. Id. J. EusTICE, supra note 87, at 2.02(4)(a) n.100.
195. See Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, § 1803(a)(6), 100 Stat. 2085 (codified
at I.R.C. § 1278 (1987)).
196. I.R.C. § 1278(a)(1)(C) (1987).
197. See S. FiN. Comm., TAX REFORM OF 1986, supra note 190, at 900-01.
198. I.R.C. §§ 301(c)(1), 316(a) (1987).
199. Id. § 301(c)(2) (1987).
200. Id. § 301(c)(3) (1987).
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In contrast, interest paid on a debt is taxable as ordinary income
to the stockholder, 20' regardless of the corporation's earnings and
profits account. Moreover, if the corporation has little or no earn-
ings and profits, it likely has little or no taxable income and, there-
fore, little need for an interest deduction, which, in addition to the
shareholders' avoidance of dividend treatment, is the primary tax
advantage of debt over equity.
A side effect of recasting debt as equity is to increase the holder's
aggregate basis in his "stock" (his regular stock plus a debt in-
strument recast as equity)202 This increase results in more basis to
be absorbed by a section 301 distribution in excess of earnings and
profits and, thus, a smaller recognzied gain for the holder.
H. Equity Classifiction Favorable for a Shareholder that is a
Corporation.
A shareholder that is also a corporation is entitled to an 80%
deduction on dividends received.20 3 In the case of electing affiliated
corporation, the deduction is 100%.204 Thus, at most only 20% of
the dividends received is taxable income. This is likely to be less
than the interest income that it would have had upon receipt of
payment of interest on debt. 2 5 The tax planner must remember,
however, that the distributing corporation loses the interest expense
deduction, which it would have on repayment of debt, but which
it does not have on the distribution of dividends. The better tax
consequences for the shareholders, who in close corporations are
usually concerned with the aggregate tax to be paid by the cor-
201. Id. § 61(a)(4) (1987).
202. With some exceptions, see, e.g., Motel Co. v. Commissioner, 340 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1965),
a purported debt instrument is virtually never recast as equity, unless the issue of that debt instrument
owns regular stock in the corporation. Because the holder of the recast debt instrument is adding
more "equity" to the corporation, he is entitled to increase his basis in his equity holdings.
203. I.R.C. § 243(a)(1) (1987).
204. Id. § 243(a)(3), (b) (1987).
205. Suppose, for example, that the distributing corporation is to pay $100 to the investing
corporation each year. The 805o dividends-received deduction results in only $20 of each year's pay-
ment being taxable income, if the payment is considered a dividend. If the $100 is considered a
repayment on debt, however, it would produce taxable income of $20 or less only if $80 or more
of the payment constituted a repayment of principal. If the interest component of the payment was
more than $20, a classification of the investment interest as debt produces more taxable income.
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poration and themselves and not merely with what they themselves
must pay, may not be beneficial enough to offset the worse tax
consequences for the distributing corporation. 2 6 This is another one
of those situations where the tax planner must put pencil to paper
to compute which alternative produces the better tax consequences.
L Losses on Sale or Exchange or Worthlessness; Section 1244
Stock.
An investor in a corporation does not have a loss deduction until
he sells or exchanges his interest at a loss or his interest becomes
worthless. Mere diminution in value short of worthlessness does not
permit recognition. The tax treatment of losses is the same for stock
as it is for debt securities. Except for dealers, 207 a loss on a sale or
exchange of stock or debt securities is usually treated as a capital
loss. 20 8 The investor is also entitled to a capital loss under section
165(g) when his stock or debt securities becomes worthless.2 9
An exception to this general rule of capital loss treatment is the
treatment of "section 1244" stock. Section 1244 permits share-
holders in qualifying corporations (called "small business corpo-
rations") to treat a recognized loss on the sale, exchange or
worthlessness of stock as an ordinary loss instead of a capital loss. 210
It does not take away capital treatment for recognized gains. It limits
the ordinary loss deduction to $50,000 per shareholder per year
($100,000 for a husband and wife filing a joint return).21 l This special
treatment is available only to the original issuee of the stock, 212 i.e.,
not to vendees, donees or other transferees. The issuing corporation
206. See Plumb, supra note 28, at 374, n.25. For an example of when the distributing corporation
wanted debt classification to get the interest deduction and the investing corporation wanted equity
classification to get the dividend-received deduction, see Ragland Inv. Co. v. Commissioner, 52 T.C.
867 (1969), aff'd, 435 F.2d 118 (6th Cir. 1970).
207. See e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.165-5(g) (1987); Plumb, supra note 28, at 383 n.71. See also Treas.
Reg. § 1.471-5 (1987).
208. Stock and securities are usually treated as capital assets. See Treas. Reg. § 1.165-5(a), (b),
(c) (1987). A loss of a sale or exchange of a capital asset, of course, is allowed only to the extent
allowed in sections 1211 and 1212 of the Code. I.R.C. § 165(0 (1987).
209. I.R.C. § 165(g) (1987).
210. Id. § 1244(a) (1987).
211. Id. § 1244(b) (1987).
212. Id. § 1244(a) (1987). The issuee must also be either an individual or a partnership. Id.
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must be a domestic corporation. 213 Its shareholders must have put
in no more than $1 million into the corporation as payment for
stock or contributions to capital. 214 This $1 million includes amounts
paid for the section 1244 stock. When the shareholder sustains the
loss on section 1244 stock, the corporation must have derived 50%
or more of its gross revenues for the preceding five years, or for
its lifetime if the corporation has not yet existed for five years, from
other than passive investments .215
The purpose of section 1244 is to equalize the treatment of losses
between partnerships, proprietors and small business corporations.
It is a rare gem in the tax treatment of closely-held corporations,
allowing the best of both worlds-capital gain and ordinary loss. It
is all good and no bad. It requires no election (as it did prior to
1978) and imposes no sanctions or penalities for failure to meet any
of its criteria.
J. Bad Debts Owed by the Corporation to the Investor.
Worthless debts not amounting to a security are treated differ-
ently than stock or securities. Debts that are not securities are gov-
erned by section 166, the bad debt section, instead of section 165,
the loss section. For noncorporate taxpayers, section 166 divides bad
debts into business bad debts and non-business bad debts.2 6 A busi-
ness bad debt is a bad debt incurred in connection with an indi-
vidual's trade or business.21 7 If a business debt becomes noncollectible
or worthless, it is "business bad debt," and the creditor is entitled
to deduct it against ordinary income. 218 If a non-business bad debt
becomes noncollectible or worthless, it is a "non-business" bad debt,
and the creditor/investor treats it as a short term capital loss,219 an
intermediate position220 between the ordinary loss treatment for busi-
213. Id. § 1244(c)(1) (1987).
214. Id. § 1244(c)(3)(A) (1987).
215. Id. § 1244(c)(1)(C), (2)(A) (1987).
216. Id. § 166(d)(2) (1987).
217. Section 166(d)(2) makes "nonbusiness debt" a residual category that includes all debt not
created or acquired in connection with a taxpayer's trade or business.
218. Id. § 166(a), (d) (1987).
219. Id. § 166(d)(1)(B) (1987).
220. See e.g., Plumb, supra note 28, at 384.
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ness bad debts and the long-term capital loss treatment generally
accorded losses on stock and securities. The law presumes that a
debt owed to a corporation is a business debt.22'
In one of the most litigated areas of corporate tax law, share-
holders in close corporations have generally been unsuccessful when
arguing that debts owed to them by their corporations should be
treated as business debts rather than non-business debts222 (and thus
as deductions against ordinary income instead of short-term capital
losses). Most loans by shareholders to their close corporations are
intended to enhance the value of the shareholder's investment in the
corporation and are deemed to be incurred in connection with the
shareholder's investment and not with his trade or business. 223 The
business bad debt characterization may be allowed to a promoter
who is in the business of seeking out opportunities, organizing and
financing the enterprises, and selling them at a profit or loss, 2 4 or
221. Section 166(d), which provides that a taxpayer must treat worthless nonbusiness debts as
short-term capital losses, does not apply when a corporation is the holder of the debt. I.R.C. §
166(d)(1) (1986).
222. See e.g., Smith v. Commissioner, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 353 (1984), aff'd, 800 F.2d 930 (9th
Cir. 1986); Roy v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1333 (1981); Estate of Ripson v. Commissioner,
39 T.C.M. (CCH) 224, 231 (1979); Thaler v. Commissioner, 37 T.C.M.(CCH) 147 (1978).
A 1963 Supreme Court case, Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S. 193, reh'g denied, 374 U.S.
858 (1963), made it more difficult for taxpayers to win these cases, though they do occasionally win.
See e.g., Bowers v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 1047 (4th Cir. 1983); Anderson v. United States, 555
F.2d 236 (9th Cir. 1977); La Staiti v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 511 (1980); Estate of Avery
v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 364 (1969); Morrow v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 239
(1965).
223. See e.g., Betson v. Commissioner, 802 F.2d 365 (9th Cir. 1986); Smith, 49 T.C.M. (CCH)
353; Roy, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 1333; LaStaiti, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 511; Estate of Rioson, 39 T.C.M.
(CCH) 224; Thaler, 37 T.C.M. (CCH) 147. See generally Cohen, Supreme Court Restricts Business
Bad Debt Treatment of Stockholder-Corporate Loans, 36 J. TAX'NJ 194, 195 (1972); Note, Charac-
terization of Shareholder Creditor Bad Debt: United States v. Generes Sounds the Knellfor Deductions
from Ordinary Income, 26 VAD. L. Ray. 105 (1973).
224. The promoter qualifies for the business bad debt characterization only if the particular loan
was proximately related to the promotion. See Whipple, 373 U.S. 193; Anderson 555 F.2d 236;
SchIumberger Technology Corp. v. United States, 443 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v.
Clark, 358 F.2d 892 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 817 (1966); Giblin v. Commissioner, 227 F.2d
692 (5th Cir. 1955); Hutton v. Commissioner, 35 T.C.M. (CCH) 16 (1976); Farris v. Commissioner,
31 T.C.M. (CCH) 821 (1972); Braunstein v. Commissioner, 21 T.C.M. (CHH) 1132 (1962). Moreover,
even a person who organizes corporations does not qualify as a promoter, if he neither earns fees
for the promotion nor profits from quick sales, but seeks only the usual investor's gains from long-
term investments in the businesses. See Syer v. United States, 380 F.2d 1009 (4th Cir. 1967); United
States v. Byck, 325 F.2d 551 (5th Cir. 1963); Townshend v. United States, 384 F.2d 1008 (Ct. Cl.
1967); Plumb, supra note 28, at 384 n.75.
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to a taxpayer whose business is lending money for profit. 225 Few
shareholders in close corporations are promotors or professional
lenders, however, and an investment in a close corporation, by itself,
does not constitute a trade or business.
226
The shareholder's greatest chance of success is to show that he
needed to extend credit to the corporation to preserve his job, since
such an expenditure, so obviously connected with his trade or busi-
ness, counts as a business debt.227 For example, a real estate salesman
was allowed a business bad debt deduction on a loan to his cor-
poration because he earned substantial commissions from the com-
pany and his compensation depended on corporate profits. 228 A pair
of Supreme Court opinions, 229 however, has squelched the hopes of
many shareholders/employees by requiring that, for a loan to a close
corporation to count as a business debt, protection of one's job be
the shareholder's dominant motive in making the loan. Unfortu-
nately, protecting one's investment is usually too important for pres-
ervation of one's salary to be considered the primary motivation for
the loan.
2 0
K. Miscellaneous Tax Consequences Affected by Reclassification
of Debt as Stock.
The reclassification of an instrument as debt or stock can change
tax consequences in a variety of other ways. Some of these differ-
ences are discussed below.
225. See Gross v. Commissioner, 401 F.2d 600 (9th Cir. 1968); United States v. Henderson, 375
F.2d 36 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 953 (1967); Marks v. Commissioner, 46 T.C.M. (CCH)
1408 (1983); Christie Coal & Coke Co., Inc. v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 498 (1969); Con-
stantine v. Commissioner, 28 T.C.M. (CCH) 308 (1969); Plumb, supra note 28, at 384 n.75.
226. See e.g., United States v. Generes, 405 U.S. 93, reh'g denied, 405 U.S. 1033 (1972); Niblock
v. Commissioner, 417 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1969); Adelson v. United States, 782 F.2d 1010 (Fed. Cir.
1986); Raab v. IRS, 85-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9859 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
227. See e.g., B.B. Rider Corp. v. Commissioner, 725 F.2d 945 (3d Cir. 1984), on remand,
Stratmore v. Commissioner, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 1369 (1984), rev'd 785 F.2d 419 (3d Cir. 1986); An-
derson, 555 F.2d 236; Raab, 85-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9859; Brown v. United States, 74-2 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) 9622 (D. Vt. 1974).
228. See Bowers, 716 F.2d 1047.
229. See Whipple, 373 U.S. 193; Generes, 405 U.S. 93.
230. See e.g., Generes, 405 U.S. at 104; Raab, 85-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9859; Cohen, supra
note 223, at 195.
1988] 1051
43
Rands: The Closely Held Corporation: Its Capital Structure and the Feder
Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1988
WEST VIRGINIA LA W REVIEW
1. Subchapter S.
If a purported debt instrument is reclassified as stock for tax
purposes, is it a second class of stock that renders the issuing cor-
poration ineligible for S corporation status? Generally no, provided
the debt meets the Code's "safe harbor" conditions for straight
debt, an issue discussed, infra, in the section on S corporations.
2. Measurement of Control.
The applicability of numerous corporate tax code sections de-
pends on the percentage of stock ownership of a particular taxpayer.
For example, section 368(c) defines "control" for section 351 ex-
changes, 23' corporate divisions, 2 2 and reorganizations23 3 as the own-
ership of stock possessing at least 8070 of the total combined voting
power and at least 80% of the total number of all other classes of
stock. 234 A revenue ruling, which is generally recognized as properly
stating the law, construes section 368 as requiring the shareholder
to own 80% of each class of nonvoting stock. 235 Thus if a purported
debt instrument is considered to be a separate class of stock, a tax-
payer must own 80°/o of it to have "control" of the corporation
under section 368(c).
23 6
Other sections whose applicability depends on a percentage of
stock ownership include sections 267,237 269A, 238 243,239 246A, 240
301(f), 2A' 302(b),2 2 304(c), 243 318,2" 341(e), 25 542, 246 1235 24 7 and 1239.248
231. I.R.C. §§ 351(a), 368(c) (1987).
232. Id. §§ 355(a)(1)(A), (d), 368(c) (1987).
233. Id. § 368(a), (c) (1987).
234. Id. § 368(c) (1987).
235. Rev. Rul. 59-259, 1959-2 C.B. 115.
236. See Plumb, supra note 28, at 393-95.
237. I.R.C. §§ 267(b)(2), (3), (10)-(12), (f)(1)(A) (1987).
238. Id. § 269A(b) (1987).
239. Id. § 243(a) (1987).
240. Id. §§ 246A(c)(2)(A), (B) (1987).
241. Id. § 301(f) (1987).
242. Id. § 302(b)(I)-(3) (1987).
243. Id. § 304(c) (1987).
244. Id. §§ 318(a)(2)(C), (3)(C) (1987).
245. Id. § 341(e) (1987).
246. Id. § 542 (1987).
247. Id. § 1235(d) (1987).
248. Id. § 1239 (1987).
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Several other provisions, including sections 332,249 338,250 382,251
1504252 and 1563,53 depend on the percentage of stock ownership,
but say to disregard nonvoting stock that is limited and preferred
as to dividends. Since debt reclassification as stock is likely to be
viewed as a class of nonvoting preferred stock, it should have no
effect on these provisions.
3. Avoidance of the accumulated earnings tax.-24
Accumulations of funds to retire corporate debt are more likely
to be considered within the reasonable needs of the business, and
thereby avoid imposition of the accumulated earnings tax, than ac-
cumulations to redeem stock. The accumulated earnings tax regu-
lations permit the close corporation to accumulate funds to retire
bona fide debt created in connection with the corporation's trade
or business. 2"1 The regulatiofis clearly contemplate funds accumu-
lated to pay off securities as well as short-term debt, since they offer
the establishment of a sinking fund to retire bonds as a justifiable
ground for accumulating earnings. 2 6 Courts are less willing to find
a corporate purpose for the accumulation of earnings to fund a
redemption of stock, though a corporate purpose is sometimes found
when the redemption is to break a deadlock in a closely-held cor-
poration. 25 7
249. Id. § 332(b)(1) (1987).
250. Id. § 338(d)(3) (1987).
251. Id. §§ 382(g), (j)1), (k), (1)(3)(A), (D) (1987).
252. Id. § 1504(a)(2), (4) (1987).
253. Section 1563(a) gives the definitions for a "controlled group of corporations." Several of
the definitions give alternative control tests: either 80% of the combined voting power of all classes
of stock or 80% of the total value of all classes of stock. Id. § 1563(a)(1), (2) (1987). The definition
following the "semi-colon" would include non-voting, preferred stock.
254. See Plumb, supra note 28, at 395.
255. Treas. Reg. § 1.537-2(b)(3) (1987).
256. Id.
257. See, e.g., Atlantic Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 519 F.2d 1233 (1st Cir. 1975); Moun-
tain State Steel Foundries, Inc. v. Commissioner, 284 F.2d 737 (4th Cir. 1960); Hedberg-Freidheim
Contracting Co. v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 839 (8th Cir. 1958); Farmers & Merchants Inv. Co. v.
Commissioner, 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 705 (1970). See generally Cunningham, More Than You Ever Wanted
To Know About The Accumulated Earnings Tax, 6 J. Co-Pa. TAX'N 187, 215-19 (1979); Rands, Closely
Held Corporations: Federal Tax Consequences of Stock Transfer Restrictions, 7 J. CoRP. L. 449,
461-63 (1982) [hereinafter Rands, Tax Consequences]; Rudolph. Stock Redemptions and the Accu-
mulated Earnings Tax And Update, 4 J. CoP. TAX'N 101 (1977); Comment, Accumulated Earnings
Tax and Stock Redemption Under the Tax Reform Act of 1969, 32 U. Pr. L. REv. 71 (1970).
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V. DEBT EQUITY: CLASSIFICATION CRITERIA
Despite the important differences in tax treatment of debt and
equity, no one has been able to devise workable criteria for clas-
sifying an interest as either debt or equity. While the debt-equity
distinction has always been an implicit part of the tax codes, required
by the fact that interest payments have been deductible in computing
corporate income while dividends have not, Congress has never pro-
vided a statutory definition of either term.5 8 In 1969, it attempted
to clarify the manner in which the distinction should be drawn by
adding section 385 to the Code.259 Instead of establishing statutory
criteria, however, section 385 empowers the Treasury to prescribe
regulations containing classification criteria. 26° Section 385 also sug-
gests "factors" that the regulations might use in formulating the
criteria. 261 The Treasury made three abortive attempts at issuing re-
gulations under section 385, the first not coming until 1980 and the
last in 1983.262 All three sets were criticized extensively. 263 At this
point, it seems doubtful that the Treasury will try again. 264 Addi-
tionally, the Commissioner refuses to issue advance rulings or de-
termination letters on whether an interest in a corporation is to be
treated as stock or debt where the determination is primarily one
258. Comment, Hybrid Instruments, supra note 30, at 122 n.23.
259. See Tax Reform Act of 1969, supra note 28, at § 415.
260. I.R.C. § 385(a) (1987).
261. The "factors" listed by section 385(b) are: (I) whether there is a written unconditional
promise to pay on demand or on a specified date a sum certain in money return for an adequate
consideration in money or money's worth, and to pay a fixed rate of interest, (2) whether there is
subordination to or preference over any indebtedness of the corporation, (3) the ratio debt to equity
of the corporation, (4) whether there is convertibility into the stock of the corporation, and (5) the
relationship between holdings of stock in the corporation and holdings of the interest in question.
262. See supra note 29.
263. For some general commentary, see generally, Bloom & Bush, New Reproposed Regs. on
Section 385: How They Compared To The Prior Final Regs., 56 J. TAX'N 153 (1982); Kaplan &
Yoder, New Variations On An Old Enigma: The Treasury Department's Debt-Equity Regulations,
1981 U. ILL. L. REv. 567; Levin & Bowen, The Section 385 Regulations Regarding Debt Versus
Equity: Is The Cure Worse Than the Malady?, 35 TAX LAW. 1 (1981); Manning, Hyperlexis and the
Law of Conservation of Ambiquity: Thoughts on Section 385, 36 TAX LAW. 9 (1982); Natbony,
Cleaning the Augean Stables: The Debt Equity Regulations, 8 J. CoRP. TAx'N 185 (1981); Comment,
Hybrid Instruments, supra note 30.
264. See, e.g., T.D. 7920, 1983-2 C.B. 69; D. KAnN & P. GANN, supra note 40, at 598; C.C.H.,
THE STuDy oF FEDERAL TA LAW INCOME TAx BusiNess ENTERPRsEs, 1 9217 (1984-1985); Comment,
Hybrid Instruments, supra note 30, at 132.
1054 [Vol. 90
46
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 90, Iss. 4 [1988], Art. 4
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol90/iss4/4
CLOSELY HELD CORPORATION
of fact.265 As a practical matter, this means that there will be few
rulings or letters as resolution of most of these disputes depend on
factual findings. The courts have fared even worse. Literally hun-
dreds of reported decisions discuss the criteria for differentiating
debt and equity. Unsurprisingly, it is impossible to harmonize so
many cases. The caselaw has been called a "jungle," 266 a "mo-
rass," 267 "bewildering," 268 and "labyrinthine." 269 One judicial way,
impishly comparing the process of separating debt and equity to the
problem of defining pornography, adopted Justice Stewart's famous
line, saying as hard as it is to define the distinction, "I know it
when I see it. "270 The voluminous literature on the subject contains
titles describing the debt-equity law as the "Old Disease" 271 and the
"Augean Stables. ' 272 It is, of course, fun to select epithets to de-
scribe the confused state of the law. And it is probably better for
the psyche to formulate comic descriptions of the problem than to
fall into despair. The tax professional enjoys a good joke like any-
one, but, in the end, must grapple with this classification problem.
As a starting point, one should be mindful that it has often been
stated that owners are free to commit such capital as they choose
to their corporation and to lend such additional amounts as they
wish, thus reserving the right to share with other creditors in the
distribution of assets if the enterprise fails.273 Nevertheless, there is
a pitfall in using debt, especially a high percentage of debt, because
courts in both tax and bankruptcy cases may declare the creditor-
owners to be shareholders and nothing more and reclassify the "debt"
as stock, or, even worse, treat the "loan proceeds" as a contribution
to capital. In the tax cases, the government is likely to contend that
265. See Rev. Proc. 76-19, 1976-1 C.B. 560.
266. Commissioner v. Union Mut. Ins. Co., 386 F.2d 974, 978 (1st Cir. 1967).
267. Ballenger v. United States, 301 F.2d 192, 196 (4th Cir. 1962).
268. Comment, Hybrid Instruments, supra note 30, at 127.
269. Weis, The Labyrinth of The Thin Corporation, 40 TAxEs 568 589 (1962).
270. Sansberry v. United States, 70-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9216, at 82-862 n.4 (S.D. Ind.
1970).
271. Hickman, The Thin Corporation; Another Look at an Old Disease, 44 TAXEs 883 (1966).
272. Natbony, supra note 263.
273. Rowan, 219 F.2d at 55.
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the instruments they claim to represent debt are really equity at the
risk of the business and should be taxed accordingly.
274
According to one case,
The classic debt is an unqualified obligation to pay a sum certain at a reasonably
close fixed maturity date along with a fixed percentage in interest payable re-
gardless of the debtor's income or lack thereof. While some variation from this
fomula is not fatal to the taxpayer's effort to have the advance treated as debt
for tax purposes, . . ., too great a variation will preclude such treatment.
273
The "classic" distinction between shareholder and creditor has been
stated as follows:
The shareholder is an adventurer in the corporate business; he takes the risk, and
profits from success. The creditor, in compensation for not sharing the profits,
is to paid independently of the risk of success, and gets a right to dip into the
capital when the payment date arrives. 6
With these platitudes out of the way, the next few sections try to
explain the classification criteria as clearly as possible.
A. Unqualified Obligation to Pay Principal on a Fixed Maturity
Date.
Inherent in debt is the expectation that at some point the debt
will be fully paid and the debtor-creditor relationship will be extin-
guished. To qualify as debt, the instrument should carry an un-
qualified obligation to pay the principal on a fixed or ascertainable
maturity date. 277 Since preferred stock often carries a set or ascer-
tainable date for redemption, 2 8 the presence of a maturity date is
274. F. O'NEAL, supra note 8, at § 2.10.
275. Gilbert, 248 F.2d at 402-03. See generally Plumb, supra note 28, at 404-05.
276. O.P.P. Holding Corp., 76 F.2d 11.
277. See e.g., I.R.C. § 385(b)(1) (1986); see also Texas Farm Bureau v. United States, 725 F.2d
307 (5th Cir.), reh'g denied, 732 F.2d 437 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985); Bauer
v. Commissioner, 748 F.2d 1365, 1370 (9th Cir. 1984); In re Lane, 742 F.2d 1311, 1315-16 (11th Cir.
1984); Stinnett's Pontiac Serv., Inc., 730 F.2d at 639; Scriptomatic, Inc. v. United States, 555 F.2d
364 (3d Cir. 1977); Alterman Foods, Inc. v. United States, 505 F.2d 873 (5th Cir. 1974), reh'g denied,
509 F.2d 576(5th Cir. 1975); Newman v. Quinn, 558 F. Supp. 1035 (D.V.I. 1983).
278. See e.g., Messenger Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 168 F.2d 903 (3d Cir. 1948); Charles
L. Huisking & Co. v. Commissioner, 4 T.C. 595, 599 (1945). See generally TAx REEsARCH INST. OF
AM. FEERAL TAx COORDINATOR 2D I K-5122 (2d ed. 1977).
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not conclusive of debt statusy 9 but numerous cases holding an in-
strument to be debt have stressed the presence of such a date. 80
The absence of a maturity date has often been fatal to investors'
claims that an instrument should be debt.281 A debt without a fixed
maturity date is too much like cumulative preferred stock to be
treated as debt. 28 2 Management is awaiting future events to determine
when, if ever, it will allow the corporation to pay the creditor. The
creditor has the right to demand payment only in a liquidation.
These are risks normally associated with stock but not debt. 23
The cases are not especially helpful in defining what counts as
an ascertainable maturity date. If there is any theme at all, it is that
the presence of a contractual term making payment contingent on
anything other than the election of the holder is a factor tending
to show stock and not debt. 2 4 The less likely an occurrence of the
contingency, the less likely the instrument will be called debt. For
example, when the holder can enforce payment only upon disso-
lution of the corporation or a sale of substantially all of its assets,
the instrument is likely to be classified as stock and not debt.28 5 If
the corporation has the right to defer payment solely at its option,
that right in the corporation is a strong indicator that the obligation
has no fixed maturity date and is not a bona fide debt.28 6 Moreover,
279. See e.g., Slappey Drive Indus. Park, 561 F.2d at 582; Newman, 558 F. Supp. 1035; Bowen
v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 932 (1974).
280. See e.g., Scriptomatic, Inc., 555 F.2d 364; Estate of Mixon v. United States, 464 F.2d 394
(5th Cir. 1972); Alamositas Cattle Corp. v. Campbell, 62-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9458 (N.D. Tex.
1962).
281. See e.g., Lane, 742 F.2d at 1317-18; Stinnett's Pontiac Serv., Inc., 730 F.2d at 739; Foresun,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 348 F.2d 1006 (6th Cir. 1965), aff'g on this point, 41 T.C. 706 (1964).
As is true for all factors in the debt-equity area, there is an exception to every rule. For cases
where an instrument was held to be debt despite a lack of a maturity date, see, e.g., Bauer, 748 F.2d
1365; Culberson, Inc. v. United States, 79-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9694 (N.D. Tex. 1979).
282. See e.g., P.F. Scheidelman & Sons, Inc. v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 168 (1965).
283. See e.g., Texas Farm Bureau, 725 F.2d 307; Lane 742 F.2d 1311; Stinnett's Pontiac Serv.,
Inc., 730 F.2d 634; Austin Village, Inc. v. United States, 432 F.2d 741 (6th Cir. 1970).
284. See e.g., Texas Farm Bureau, 725 F.2d at 313; Lane, 742 F.2d at 1316; Stinnett's Pontiac
Serv., Inc., 730 F.2d at 638-39; Slappey Drive Indus. Park, 561 F.2d at 582-83; Beaver Pipe Tools,
Inc. v. Carey, 139 F. Supp. 470 (N.D. Ohio 1955), aff'd, 240 F.2d 843 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 353
U.S. 958 (1957); Mullin Bldg Corp. v. Commissioner, 9 T.C. 350 (1947), aff'd, 167 F.2d 1001 (3d
Cir. 1948).
285. See Beaver Pipe Tools, Inc., 139 F. Supp. 470.
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when payment is made contingent on the existence of surplus, earn-
ings etc., the instrument is likely to be considered stock and not
debt. 2 7 The investor's return on his investment, like a shareholder's,
is subject to the risks of the business, a factor tending strongly
toward stock and against debt classification. 28 The mere expectation
that payment on the debt will be made from future earnings does
not automatically taint debt as equity as many lenders and borrowers
rely on future earnings to pay the debt obligation. 2 9 But a true
contingency, either in the contract or in the parties' informal ex-
pectations, causes a problem. 29
0
Demand notes perhaps should pass muster as debt, because pay-
ment, though contingent on demand, is at the election of the holder. 291
The holder has a more powerful position than the holder of a note
with a fixed maturity date. 292 A pattern of not making demand on
the note may be likened to an informal subordination, however, a
factor tending toward debt rather than stock and one emphasized
in recent cases.
293
B. Unqualified Right to Payment of Interest at a Fixed Rate.
Another key characteristic of debt is that it entitles the holder
to an unqualified right to collect interest when due at a fixed or
287. A number of cases have said that if repayment is possible only out of corporate earnings,
the transaction has the appearance of a contribution of equity capital. See, e.g., Stinnett's Pontiac
Serv., Inc., 730 F.2d at 638; Estate Of Mixon, 464 F.2d at 404.
288. See, e.g., Bauer, 748 F.2d 1365; Slappey Drive Indus. Park, 561 F.2d 572; Fin Hay Realty
Co., 398 F.2d 694.
289. See, e.g., Biritz Constr. Co., 387 F.2d 451; Estate of Miller v. Commissioner, 239 F.2d
729, 732 (9th Cir. 1956).
290. See, e.g., Stinnett's Pontiac Serv., Inc., 730 F.2d 634; Jones v. United States, 659 F.2d
618 (5th Cir. 1981); Scriptomatic, Inc., 555 F.2d 364.
291. See, e.g., Piedmont Minerals Co. v. United States, 429 F.2d 560, 563 n.5 (4th Cir. 1970);
J.S. Biritz Constr. Co., 387 F.2d 451; Taft, 314 F.2d at 622; Security Fin. & Loan Co. v. Koehler,
210 F. Supp. 603, 605 (D. Kan. 1962); P.F. Scheidelman & Sons, Inc., 24 T.C.M. (CCH) at 172.
See also I.R.C. § 385(b)(1) (1987); Plumb supra note 28, at 418; A.L.I., INcoME TAX PROBLEMS OF
CoRPOATIoNs AND SHAREHOLDERS (1958) [hereinafter A.L.I., Ir~coMsu TAX PROBLEMS].
292. See Plumb, supra note 28, at 418; A.L.I., INcomE TAX PROBLEMS, supra note 291.
293. See, e.g., Lane, 742 F.2d at 1317-18; Stinnett's Pontiac Serv. Inc., 730 F.2d at 640; Tyler
v. Tomlinson, 414 F.2d 844, 849 (5th Cir. 1969); Fin Hay Realty Co., 398 F.2d at 698; O.H. Kruse
Grain & Milling v. Commissioner, 18 T.C.M. (CCH) 487, 489-90 (1959), aff'd, 279 F.2d 123, 126
(9th Cir. 1960); Plumb, supra note 28, at 418-19.
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ascertainable rate. In contrast, dividends, though the economic
equivalent of interest, are normally contingent, first, upon the cor-
poration having the requisite amount of surplus to justify their dis-
tribution, and, second, upon the declaration of a dividend by the
board of directors. Thus, to qualify as debt, an instrument should
bear interest at a fixed or ascertainable rate294 and should entitle the
holder to collect the interest when due,295 regardless of the corpor-
ation's surplus or earnings.
296
The last version of the section 385 regulations, though rescinded,
provided an excellent definition of what should be considered an
"ascertainable" rate of interest: the rate is ascertainable if it is (a)
applied to a definitely ascertainable principal either (b)(i) at an in-
variable rate, e.g., 10% per year or (b)(ii) at a variable rate deter-
mined according to an external standard not subject to the borrower's
control and that is not related to the success or failure of the bor-
rower's business or activities, e.g., 1% above prime. 297
Courts have looked askance at instruments with interest pay-
ments restricted to net profits or surplus 298 or interest rates pegged
to either income or dividend rates, 299 such interest provisions indi-
cating, though not necessarily determining, equity status. 3°°
C. Subordination.
A primary advantage of debt over equity is that upon insolvency
of the corporation, the holders of the debt must be paid in full
before anything at all can be paid to the shareholders. 30 1 If necessary,
294. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 385(b)(1), 1361(c)(5) (1987); Bauer, 748 F.2d 1365; Rev. Rul. 83-98,
1983-2 C.B.40; Rev. Rul. 73-122, 1973-1 C.B. 66.
295. See, e.g., Scriptomatic, Inc., 555 F.2d 364; Fin Hay Realty Co., 398 F.2d 694; Dobkin v.
Commissioner, 15 T.C. 31 (1950), aff'd, 192 F.2d 392 (2d Cir. 1951).
296. See, e.g., Stinnet Pontiac Serv., Inc., 730 F.2d 634; Rev. Rul. 83-98, 1983-2 C.B. 40, 41.
297. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-(d)(4)(i) (proposed regulation adopted December 28, 1980
and withdrawn by T.D. 7920 (Aug. 5, 1983)).
298. See, e.g., Stinnet's Pontiac Serv., Inc., 730 F.2d 634; Jones, 659 F.2d 618.
299. See, e.g., Slappey Drive Indus. Park, 561 F.2d 572.
300. See, e.g., Texas Farm Bureau, 725 F.2d 307; Post Corp., 640 F.2d 1296. See also Plumb,
supra note 28, at 432.
301. See generally Z. CAVrrCH, supra note 1, at § 71.05; H. Scmc G.AN, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 7417 (1981); B. MANNINo, A CONcISE TExTBooic ON LEGAL CAPrrAL
6-8 (2d ed. 1981); L. RmSTEIN, supra note 1, at 2-47.
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the entire assets of the corporation must be devoted to payment of
its creditors, even if such payment leaves nothing for the corporation
or its shareholders.102 Inversely, absent some contractual arrange-
ment like a shareholder guarantee, the creditors of the corporation
must look solely to the pool of assets belonging to the debtor cor-
poration for payment of their debt.3 3 If the corporate assets are
insufficient to pay all claims, the creditors are out of luck, absent
a special arrangement for recourse to assets lying outside the cor-
porate enterprise.3 4 To be sure, the creditors of the corporation take
less risk than the shareholders, since the creditors have first shot at
the corporate assets in bankruptcy. Nevertheless, the creditor faces
the possibility that the corporation, if bankrupt, may not have enough
assets to pay anybody anything. As a protective measure, appre-
hensive creditors sometimes exact a promise by the debtor corpo-
ration to defer extractions of cash (or assets) by its shareholders
until the debt has been paid off. If this type of limitation is imposed
on the repayment of debt reflecting advances by shareholders to their
own corporation, it is called a subordination. The subordination can
be formal or informal. It might be a continuing obligation through-
out the life of the corporation, or it might become operative only
upon insolvency. A contractual subordination of a corporate debt
held by a shareholder is a factor tending to show that the instrument
is equity rather than debt,30 5 though the subordination feature is not
always fatal to a claim of the shareholder-creditor that the debt
should be honored as debt for tax purposes.3 06 The absence of a
subordination feature is a factor indicating a bona fide debt.30 7
If the subordination takes place at insolvency, the subordination
feature makes the holder look like a preferred stockholder,3 08 the
302. See B. MANNiNG, supra note 301, at 6-8.
303. Id.
304. Id.
305. See, e.g., Jones, 659 F.2d 618; Scriptomatic, Inc., 555 F.2d 364.
306. See, e.g., Tomlinson v. 1661 Corp., 377 F.2d 291 (5th Cir. 1967); Kraft Foods Co. v.
Commissioner, 232 F.2d 118, 125-26 (2d Cir. 1956); Commissioner v. H.P. Hood & Sons, 141 F.2d
467, 470 (1st Cir. 1944); Burke Golf Equip. Corp. v. United States, 193 F. Supp. 615 (N.D. II.
1961). See also Plumb, supra note 28, at 423-24.
307. See, e.g., Taft, 314 F.2d at 622; Rowan, 219 F.2d at 55; Liflans Corp. v. United States,
390 F.2d 965, 969 (Ct. Cl. 1968); Jordan Co. v. Allen, 85 F. Supp. 437, 444 (M.D. Ga. 1949). See
also Plumb, supra note 28, at 428.
308. See, e.g., Foresun, Inc. v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 706, 717 (1964), aff'd, 348 F.2d 1006
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shareholder-creditor being in an intermediate position, taking after
the holders of the senior debt but before the common stockholders.
Yet more objectionable is a complete subordination that prohibits
or limits payments on subordinated debt until the senior debt has
been retired. 09 Less offensive is the arrangement, typical in sub-
ordinated debentures, wherein the subordination takes place only
upon insolvency, a corporation being permitted to make regular pay-
ments to the holders of the subordinated debt outside of bankruptcy
or at least prior to a default on the senior debt. 10
An informal subordination on the part of the shareholder cred-
itor is yet another factor indicating that the purported debt instru-
ment held by the shareholder ought to be reclassified as stock. The
continued failure to enforce payment, tolerance of prolonged de-
faults, making advances after default, repeated extensions of the
maturity date, and failure to make demand on a demand note or
an open account all are factors indicating equity instead of debt
because, instead of acting like a bona fide creditor, the shareholder-
creditor is playing the part of an ordinary shareholder who has sub-
jected his investment to the risks of the business and to prior claims
of creditors.31' However, such informal subordination arrangements
by no means invariably lead to equity classification. 12 Creditors who
are unrelated to the debtor frequently decide that it is not in their
best interest to enforce every single contractual or legal right they
have. For example, the creditor might believe that it has a better
(6th Cir. 1965); Hubbard v. Commissioner, 11 T.C.M. (CCH) 958, 961 (1952). See also Plumb, supra
note 28, at 421-22; Goldstein, Corporate Indebtedness To Shareholders: Thin Capitalization and Re-
lated Problems, 16 TAx L. REv. 1, 14-15 (1960).
309. See, e.g., Jones, 659 F.2d 618; Scriptomatic, Inc., 555 F.2d 364; Tyler, 414 F.2d 844; Reef
Corp. v. Commissioner, 368 F.2d 125, 132 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1018 (1967); P.M.
Fin. Corp. v. Commissioner, 302 F.2d 786, 790 (3d Cir. 1962); Plumb, supra note 28, at 425.
310. See, e.g., Scriptomatic, Inc., 555 F.2d at 370-71; Harlan v. United States, 409 F.2d 904,
907-08 (5th Cir. 1969) (inchoate subordination equals no subordination); Plumb, supra note 28, at
425.
311. See, e.g., Bauer, 748 F.2d at 1370; Stinnett's Pontiac Serv., Inc., 730 F.2d at 640; Scrip-
tomatic, Inc., 555 F.2d at 370-71; Slappey Drive Indus. Park, 561 F.2d at 582-83; Hollenbeck v.
Commissioner, 422 F.2d 2, 4 (9th Cir. 1970); Tyler, 414 F.2d at 849; Berkowitz v. United States,
411 F.2d 818, 821 (5th Cir. 1969); Dodd v. Commissioner, 298 F.2d 570, 578 (4th Cir. 1962); Fin
Hay Realty Co. v. United States, 261 F. Supp. 823, 827, 829 (D.N.J. 1966), aff'd, 398 F.2d 694 (3d
Cir. 1968); Foresun, Inc., 41 T.C. at 714, 717. See also Plumb, supra note 28, at 493.
312. See, e.g., Jones, 659 F.2d at 622.
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chance of full payment by allowing the debtor corporation to con-
tinue operating its business rather than forcing it into a bankruptcy
liquidation.
Timely payments of interest and principal indicate that the debt
instrument should be honored as a debt.313 Even without principal
payments, regular interest payment may indicate debt,314 especially
if paid when the corporation has no earnings. 31 5
D. Convertible Debt and Warrants.
The aborted section 385 regulations treated convertibility as an
equity feature.316 The cases, 317 revenue rulings,' 8 and regulations, 31 9
however, mostly honor convertible debt as debt, until it is converted
into stock. It is only after the conversion that it is treated as equity.
The law has taken a parallel approach in treating bonds issued with
stock or stock warrants added as a sweetener. The bonds are treated
as bona fide debt despite the equity flavor added by the stock or
the warrant.
320
313. See, e.g., Piedmont Corp. v. Commissioner, 388 F.2d 886, 891 (4th Cir. 1968); Jack Daniels
Distillery, 376 F.2d at 582; Plumb, supra note 28, at 491.
314. See, e.g., Bauer, 748 F.2d at 1370; Stinnet's Pontiac Serv., Inc., 730 F.2d at 640; Slappy
Drive Indus. Park, 561 F.2d at 582; Utility Trailer Mfg. Co. v. United States, 212 F. Supp. 773,
786 (S.D. Ca. 1962); Plumb, supra note 28, at 702.
315. See, e.g., Stinnet's Pontiac Serv., Inc., 730 F.2d at 638; Slappy Drive Indus. Park, 561
F.2d at 582-83; Estate of Mixon, 464 F.2d at 405; Kipsborough Realty Corp. v. Commissioner, 10
T.C.M. (CCH) 932 (1951); Plumb, supra note 28, at 492.
316. See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.385-5(b) (1980). The Internal Revenue Service eventually withdrew
the regulations. T.D. 7920, 48 Fed. Reg. 31,053 (1983). Section 385 itself lists convertibility as a
factor to be considered in debt-equity cases. I.R.C. § 385(b)(4) (1987).
317. See, e.g., Southwest Grease & Oil Co. v. United States, 308 F. Supp. 107, 110 (D. Kan.
1969), rev'd on another issue, 435 F.2d 675 (10th Cir. 1971); Ades v. Commissioner, 38 T.C. 501,
510-11 (1962), aff'd, 316 F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1963); L.Z. Dickey Grocery Co. v. Commissioner, 1
B.T.A. 108, 111 (1924); B. BrrrKER & J. EusnicE, supra note 27, at 4.06; Plumb, supra note 28,
at 435-36.
318. See Rev. Rul. 69-91, 1969-1 C.B. 106; Rev. Rul. 67-269, 1967-2 C.B. 298; Rev. Rul. 77-
437, 1977-2 C.B. 28.
One exception to the statement in the text is Revenue Ruling 83-98, which treated adjustable
rate convertible notes as equity, partly because they had a "very high probability of conversion."
Rev. Rul. 83-98, 1983-2 C.B. 40; Rev. Rul. 85-119, 1985-30 C.B. 21.
319. The regulation on original issue discount limits the amounts of the interest deduction for
the issuer of a convertible bond, thereby inferentially recognizing convertible debt as debt and not
as equity. See Treas. Reg. § 1.163-3(c)(2) (1987). See also Plumb, supra note 28, at 435 n.364.
320. See, e.g., Helvering v. Richmond, F. & P. R.R., 90 F.2d 971, 974 (4th Cir. 1937); Leach
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E. Economic Participation Rights.
Corporate debt typically is nonparticipating, meaning that its
holders are limited to specified payments of principal and interest
regardless of the amount of corporate earnings or of dividends paid
on common stock. Since the rights of debtholders are largely a mat-
ter of contract, however, it is possible to grant participation rights
to debtholders that approximates those normally associated with
stock.3 2' For example, there is such a thing as an income bond, a
debt security on which interest is payable only to the extent covered
by corporate earnings. 32 2 Such arrangements are indicative of eq-
uity, 32 though the courts have occassionally been lenient in honoring
their debt status,32 at least where the participation rights are not
fully within the discretion of management.125 Participation rights that
Corp. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 563, 566-67 (1958); Gordon Lubricating Co. v. Commissioner, 24
T.C.M. (CCH) 697, 711 (1965).
The most recent case was Scriptomatic, Inc. v. United States, 555 F.2d 364 (3d Cir. 1977). In
Scriptomatic, one of the two basic government arguments was that "where an advance would not
have been made without the accompanying equity feature, an inference arises that the package rep-
resents preferred stock." Id. at 370. The court felt it did not need to decide the question of whether
such an inference arises, because other factors favoring debt status predominated. Id. But see, e.g.,
Universal Castings Corp. v. Commissioner, 303 F.2d 620, 625 (7th Cir. 1962), aff'g 37 T.C. 107
(1961).
321. See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 7, at 111-13.
322. Id. at 113.
323. See, e.g., Richmond F. & P. R.R. v. Commissioner, 528 F.2d 917 (4th Cir. 1975), aff'g
62 T.C. 174 (1974); Universal Castings Corp., 302 F.2d at 620; Leach Corp., 30 T.C. at 566-67;
Unitex Indus., Inc. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C. 468, aff'd, 267 F.2d 40 (5th Cir. 1959); Gordon Lu-
bricating Co., 24 T.C.M. (CCH) at 711; Lasker v. McDonnell & Co., 75-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH)
9622 (Del. Ch. 1975); Plumb, supra note 28, at 437.
324. See, e.g., H.P. Hood & Sons, 141 F.2d at 470; Steven Bros. & Miller-Hutchinson Co. v.
Commissioner, 24 T.C. 953, 956 (1955)nsing Community Hotel Corp. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 183,
189 (1950), aff'd, 187 F.2d 487 (6th Cir. 1951); New England Lime Co. v. Commissioner, 13 T.C.
799, 804 (1949); Plumb, supra note 28, at 432, 438.
325. See, e.g., Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Corp. v. Commissioner, 283 F.2d 279 (7th Cir.
1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 965, reh'g denied, 368 U.S. 870, vacated, 367 U.S. 906, on remand,
293 F.2d 628 (7th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 976 (1962); Lee Tel. Co. v. Commissioner, 260
F.2d 114 (4th Cir. 1958); Gregg Co. v. Commissioner, 239 F.2d 498 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353
U.S. 946 (1957); H.P. Hood & Sons, 141 F.2d at 470; Washmont Corp. v. Hendricksen, 137 F.2d
306, 308 (9th Cir. 1943); Commissioner v. National Grange Mut. Liab. Co., 80 F.2d 316, 319 (1st
Cir. 1935); O.P.P. Holding Corp., 76 F.2d 11; Gokey Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 34 T.C. 829
(1960), aff'd, 290 F.2d 870 (2d Cir. 1961); Lansing Community Hotel Corp., 14 T.C. at 189; New
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depend upon action by management 26 or are measured by profits
or dividends3 27 on common stock are factors indicating an equity
interest and not debt.
What would seem to be especially noxious to the Commissioner
is debt that truly participates, i.e., debt with interest pegged to a
percentage of profits with neither a floor nor a ceiling on the amount
of interest payable. Like the stockholder, the holder of such debt
earns no income unless the business prospers, but he can earn far
more than his capital investment if the business does prosper. Sub-
ject to the risks of the business, although a participant in its success,
his state is about the same as that of a shareholder.32
F. Voting Rights.
Where the articles of incorporation are silent, each share of stock
has one vote irrespective of the class to which it belongs.3 29 Preferred
shares are usually made nonvoting, although they may grant the
right to vote only after dividends have been in arrears for a stip-
ulated number of dividend periods.3 0 Many state statutes grant
shareholders the right to vote on specified matters, even where the
articles of incorporation label the shares as nonvoting. Thus, they
are likely to have a statutorily guaranteed right to vote on charter
amendments, consolidations, mergers, distributions in partial liqui-
dation, sale of all corporate assets, dissolution and perhaps other
matters. 33' The holders of debt typically are not granted voting rights,
though statutes in some states specifically allow the articles of in-
corporation to confer voting rights upon the holders of debt se-
326. See, e.g., Berkowitz, 411 F.2d 818; O.P.P. Holding Corp., 76 F.2d 11; Nat'l Say. & Trust
Co. v. United States, 285 F. Supp. 325, 332 (D.D.C. 1968); Wilbur Sec. Co. v. Commissioner, 31
T.C. 938, aff'd, 279 F.2d 657 (9th Cir. 1960); Hale-Justis Drug Co. v. Commissioner, 2 T.C.M.
(CCH) 39, 41, 43 (1943); Plumb, supra note 28, at 438.
327. See, e.g., Berkowitz, 411 F.2d 818; Milwaukee & Suburban Transp. Corp., 283 F.2d 279;
Portage Plastics Co. v. United States, 301 F. Supp. 684, 689 (W.D. Wis. 1969), supp. op., 326 F.
Supp. 452 (W.D. Wis. 1971), rev'd, 470 F.2d 308 (7th Cir. 1972), different results reached on rehi'g,
486 F.2d 632 (7th Cir. 1973); Pottstown Fin. Co. v. United States, 73 F. Supp. 1011, 1014 (E.D.
Pa. 1947); Plumb, supra note 28, at 438.
328. Portage Plastics Co., 301 F. Supp. at 689; Plumb, supra note 28, at 437.
329. See, e.g., F. O'NEAL, supra note 8, at § 3.37.
330. Id.
331. Id. § 3.20.
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curities,33 2 and creditors occasionally insist on some type of control
mechanism to protect their loan. For example, when a debtor cor-
poration is in a precarious financial condition, creditors sometimes
insist on a shareholder voting trust that empowers the creditors to
elect the board of directors until the debt is repaid.
333
Though virtually all laundry lists of factors mention voting rights
as factors indicating equity, 3 4 the courts have not stressed them in
determining the debt-equity issue, 3 5 probably because, when present,
they serve the same basic purpose for both preferred stock and debt-
a sort of protective device for the investor, akin to a security in-
terest 3 6 Accordingly, their presence in a debt instrument generally
does not require reclassification of the instrument as stock, though
as with virtually every rule or factor in the debt-equity area, there
are some contrary cases. 317 Since neither preferred stock nor debt
usually carry voting rights, the absence of voting rights in an in-
strument is generally given no or little weight in distinguishing debt
from equity.3 38 Moreover, since voting rights in a debt instrument
332. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 204(7) (West 1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 221 (1983);
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LA-W § 518(c) (McKinney 1986).
333. See, e.g., W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 7, at 414.
334. See, e.g., O.H. Kruse Grain & Milling v. Commissioner, 279 F.2d 123 (9th Cir. 1960);
R.C. Owen Co. v. United States, 180 F. Supp. 369 (1960). Virtually all recent cases list "participation
in management" as number five of thirteen. See, e.g., Bauer, 748 F.2d at 1368; Lane, 742 F.2d at
1314; Stinnett's Pontiac Serv., Inc., 730 F.2d at 639; Jones, 659 F.2d at 622 n.12; Fin Hay Realty
Co., 398 F.2d at 696 (participation in management and voting power both listed as factors); J.S.
Biritz Constr. Co., 387 F.2d at 457.
335. See, e.g., Texas Farm Bureau, 725 F.2d at 313 n.13; Fin Hay Realty Co., 398 F.2d 694;
Jordan Co., 85 F. Supp. 437; C.D. Vantress v. Commissioner, 23 T.C.M. (CCH) 711 (1964); Plumb,
supra note 28, at 447-48.
336. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Johnson, 267 F.2d 382, 384-85 (lst Cir. 1959); Jordan Co., 85
F. Supp. 443; Union Mut. Ins. Co. v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 842, 845 (1966), aff'd, 386 F.2d 974,
978 (Ist Cir. 1967); Drachman v. Commissioner, 23 T.C. 558 (1954); Hemenway-Johnson Furniture
Co. v. Commissioner, 7 T.C.M. (CCH) 380 (1948), aff'd, 174 F.2d 793 (5th Cir. 1949); Plumb, supra
note 28, at 447-48.
337. Decisions that went against taxpayers at least partly on the basis of voting rights or rights
to participate in control include Stinnett's Pontiac Serv., Inc., 730 F.2d at 639; Gardens of Faith,
Inc. v. Commissioner, 23 T.C.M. (CCH) 1045, 1058 (1964), aff'd, 345 F.2d 180 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 927 (1965); Hale-Justis Drug Co., T.C.M. (CCH) at 43-44.
338. See, e.g., John Kelley Co., 326 U.S. 521; Diamond Bros. Co. v. Commissioner, 322 F.2d
725 (3d Cir. 1963); McSorley's, Inc. v. United States, 323 F.2d 900 (10th Cir. 1963); H.P. Hood &
Sons, 141 F.2d at 469; Portage Plastics Co., 301 F. Supp. at 690; Green Bay & W. R.R. v. Com-
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would be superflous to a debtholder owning a controlling block of
stock in the debtor, the presence or absence of such rights in debt
held by controlling shareholders is usually considered to be mean-
ingless.319
Voting rights acquired or effective only after default should not
be considered as indicating an equity interest, at least if their purpose
is merely to allow creditors to control the process of winding up.3 40
G. The Intrinsic Economic Nature of the Transaction.
In addition to determining whether the contract between the cor-
poration and investor, as written, includes key debt characteristics
and excludes key equity characteristics, the courts also evaluate the
"intrinsic economic nature of the transaction" to determine whether
or not the investment interest it created is truly debt.341 According
to one case, "the ultimate question [is] whether the investment, an-
alyzed in terms of its economic reality, constitutes risk capital en-
tirely subject to the fortunes of the corporate venture or represents
a strict debtor-creditor relationship." 342 After such analysis, an in-
vestment interest with prototypical debt features can be reclassified
as equity on the basis of economic realities.143 Conversely, stock can
be reclassified as debt after an economic analysis, 344 but such a re-
classification is rare.
339. See, e.g., Texas Farm Bureau, 725 F.2d at 313 n.13; Dillin, 433 F.2d at 1101; Talbot Mills
v. Commissioner, 146 F.2d 809, 811 (lst Cir. 1944), aff'd sub nom., John Kelley Co. v. Commissioner,
326 U.S. 521 (1946). See also Plumb, supra note 28, at 436.
In the debt-equity area, research always produces a few cases with a rule contrary to the majority
position. For examples of cases that do take into account voting rights in connection with debt held
by controlling shareholders, see, e.g., Tomlinson, 377 F.2d at 297; Lundgren v. Commissioner, 376
F.2d 623, 626 (9th Cir. 1967); Lansing Community Hotel Corp., 14 T.C. at 189. See also Plumb,
supra note 28, at 449.
340. See authorities cited supra note 336.
341. The Third Circuit used the term "intrinsic economic nature of the transaction" in Scrip-
tomatic, Inc., 555 F.2d at 367-68 and Fin Hay Realty Co., 398 F.2d at 697. See also Austin Village,
Inc., 432 F.2d 741; Fischer v. United States, 441 F. Supp. 32 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff'd without op.,
532 F.2d 1274 (3d Cir. 1978).
342. See Scriptomatic, Inc., 555 F.2d at 367 (quoting Fin Hay); Fin Hay Realty Co., 398 F.2d
at 697.
343. See, e.g., Fin Hay Realty Co., 398 F.2d 694.
344. See Zilkha & Sons, Inc., 52 T.C. 607.
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The next three sections discuss the most commonly used methods
for determining the economic reality of an investment interest-the
comparison of the terms of the obligation to those that would be
reached in an arms-length transaction, the corporation's debt to eq-
uity ratio, and the proportionality of the debtholding to the stock-
holding.
1. Equivalence to an Arms-Length Transaction.
According to some cases, the "touchstone of economic reality" 345
is whether an outside lender would have extended credit on terms
similar to those existing between the debtor corporation and the
shareholder-lender.3 46 This is an inherently fact-oriented issue.347 To
decide a case properly under this standard, a court must vigorously
scrutinize the debtor corporation, investigating its net assets, cash
flow, debt to equity ratio, credit history, current assets, current li-
abilities, and the extent to which its assets are encumbered, amongst
other things.3 48 External factors also may have to be considered.3 49
For example, the state of the local economy mayhave a profound
effect on the ability of a small corporation in a service industry to
pay its debts on time. The court must then compare the terms of
the debt (the amount, the adequacy of the interest rate, payment
schedules, maturity date, security interests supporting the debt, etc.) 30
345. Scriptomatic, Inc., 555 F.2d at 367.
346. See, e.g., Stinnett's Pontiac Serv., Inc., 730 F.2d at 640; Scriptomatic, Inc., 555 F.2d at
367-68; Austin Village, Inc., 432 F.2d 741; Fin Hay Realty Co., 398 F.2d at 697.
347. See, e.g., Gilbert, 248 F.2d at 407; Nassau Lens Co. v. Commissioner, 308 F.2d 39, 47
(2d Cir. 1962); Steury v. Commissioner, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 744 (1985); Barton Theatre Co. v. Com-
missioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 198 (1980). See also Hickman, Incorporation and Capitalization-The
Threat of the "Potential Income" Item and a Sensible Approach to Problems of Thinness, 40 TAxEs
974, 990-91 (1962).
348. See, e.g., Stinnett's Pontiac Serv., Inc., 730 F.2d 634; Fin Hay Realty Co., 398 F.2d at
696; J.S. Biritz Constr. Co., 387 F.2d at 456-57; Tomlinson, 377 F.2d at 295; Smith v. Commissioner,
370 F.2d 178, 180 (6th Cir. 1966); Nassau Lens Co., 308 F.2d at 46-47; Gilbert v. Commissioner,
262 F.2d 512, 514 (2d Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1002 (1959); Scriptomatic, Inc. v. United
States, 397 F. Supp. 753, 762-66 (E.D. Pa. 1975), aff'd, 555 F.2d 364 (3d Cir. 1977).
349. See, e.g., Fin Hay Realty Co., 398 F.2d at 698; Federal Express Corp. v. United States,
645 F. Supp. 1281, 1288 (W.D. Tenn. 1986).
350. See, e.g., Stinnett's Pontiac Serv., Inc., 730 F.2d at 640; Scriptomatic, Inc., 555 F.2d at
372; Foresun, Inc., 348 F.2d at 1009; Northeastern Consol. Co. v. United States, 406 F.2d 76, 78
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 819 (1969); Fischer, 441 F. Supp. at 38; J.A. Tobin Constr. Co.
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with the terms of a similar transaction with a hypothetical outside
lender. Would an outside lender lend this corporation that much
money? Does the obligation bear an adequate interest rate? Con-
sidering the risk, is the security interest sufficient? The more "no"
answers there are to these and other questions, the more likely the
purported debt will be reclassified as stock. Finally, the court must
study the behavior of the parties to determine whether they treated
the obligation as an arms-length debt transaction. To determine this,
the court should consider the factors discussed in section V(c) on
informal subordination. The tolerance of prolonged defaults, for
example, would be inconsistent with the normal behavior of an out-
side creditor and would thus indicate equity.351 On the other hand,
timely payments of interest and principal would indicate that the
debt instrument should be honored as debt.
3 52
One problem is especially noteworthy. Not uncommonly, share-
holders of a floundering close corporation must infuse their com-
pany with new capital to stave off insolvency and to save their
investment. If they do not do it, no one will, since outside creditors
are least likely to extend a new credit during financially dire times.
Naturally, the shareholders want to characterize these advances as
loans, both for the better tax consequences flowing from debt and
to attain creditor status in case of bankruptcy. These last ditch ad-
vances would seem to epitomize capital contributions. Yet the courts
have sometimes relaxed the criteria in favor of these shareholder-
lenders, recognizing these advances as debt.35 3 A point arrives, how-
ever, when the advances must be treated as capital contributions
instead of debt,354 although the demarcation of that point is unclear.
351. See, e.g., Texas Farm Bureau, 725 F.2d at 314; Motel Co., 340 F.2d at 446; Universal
Racquetball Rockville Centre Corp. v. Commissioner, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 143, 158-59 (1986); Toney
v. Commissioner, 51 T.C.M. (CCH) 472 (1986). See also Plumb, supra note 28, at 493-94.
352. See, e.g., Estate of Mixon, 464 F.2d at 410; Piedmont Corp. v. Commissioner, 388 F.2d
886, 891 (4th Cir. 1968); Bradshaw v. United States, 683 F.2d 365 (Ct. Cl. 1982); Allen v. Com-
missioner, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 677, 683-84 (1985). See also Plumb, supra note 28, at 490-91.
353. Plumb, supra note 28, at 535-36. See, e.g., Byerlite Corp. v. Williams, 286 F.2d 285, 293
(6th Cir. 1960); American Processing & Sales Co. v. United States, 371 F.2d 842, 856 (Ct.Cl. 1967);
Swain v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 121, 129 (1981).
354. See, e.g., Roth Steel Tube Co. v. Commissioner, 800 F.2d 625 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied,
107 S. Ct. 1888 (1987); C.M. Gooch Lumber Sales Co. v. Commissioner, 49 T.C. 649, 658-59 (1968);
Steury, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 744; Dunmire v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 438 (1981); Sekulow,
41 T.C.M. (CCH) 582; Hill v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 1307 (1975).
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2. Thin Corporations: Corporations with High Debt to
Equity Ratios.
In 1946, the Supreme Court stated in dictum: "As material
amounts of capital were invested in stock, we need not consider the
effect of extreme situations such as nominal stock investments and
an obviously excessive debt structure. ' 3 55 Since then, "thin incor-
poration," which refers to an initial capital structure with a relatively
high percentage of debt and a correspondingly low percentage of
equity, has been one of the most discussed factors in the debt to
equity imbroglio.3 56 Currently, an excessively high debt to equity
ratio probably would be considered as a highly significant but not
controlling factor in determining whether purported debt ought to
be reclassified as stock.3 57 Furthermore, it is one of the section 385
"factors" that the Treasury can consider in formulating the regu-
lations on debt and equity.
358
The antipathy towards thin capitalization and high debt to equity
ratios perhaps had its origins in the bankruptcy courts where the
355. Talbot Mills, 146 F.2d 809. See also Small v. Williams, 313 F.2d 39, 42 (4th Cir. 1963);
F. O'NEAL, supra note 8, at § 2.11.
356. The literature on thin capitalization has been voluminous. For some of the law review
commentary, see generally Beatty, supra note 30; Erickson, Capitalization of Close Corporations After
1980, 17 IDAHO L. REV. 139 (1980); Garver, Tax Factors Affecting Debt-Equity Financing For A
New Small Corporation, 17 W. RESERvE L. REv. 773 (1966); Hamilton, Internal Revenue Code:
Section 385 Sets Stock Or Debt Rules, 56 CAL. ST. B.J. 278 (1981); Kramer, Tax Consequences Of
Inadequate Equity Capital: The Thin Corporation Problem, 96 J. AccT. 449 (1953); Kuneckelhan,
Forming a Corporation Tax Wisely, 2 PRAc. ACCT. 80, 85 (1969); Schlesinger, Acceptable Capital
Structures: How Thin Is Too Thin?, 5 U. FLA. L. Rav. 355 (1952); Schnur, Use Of Debt and Stock
In Closely Held Corporations: A Guide to The New IRC Rules, 55 Wis. B. BuLL. 19 (1982); Weis,
Successfully Incorporating Thin . . . . A Case of Proper Planning, 51 ILL. B.J. 898 (1963); Note,
Non-Tax Aspects of Thin Incorporation, 13 VAND. L. Rav. 751 (1960); Comment, Inadequately Cap-
italized Subsidiaries, 19 U. Cin. L. REv. 872, 872-76 (1952); Comment, The "Thin Corporation"
Problem, 12 Sw. L.J. 373 (1958).
For some of the books with sections on thin capitalization, see generally Z. CAVITCH, supra note
1, at §§ 71.01-.07; D. HERwrrz, Busnmss PLANNING ch. 1, §§ 4EI-6 (1966); F. O'NEAL, supra note
8, at § 2.10; W. PAINTER, CORPORATION AND TAX ASPEcTS OF CLOSELY HELD CORPORATIONS § 2.04
(2d ed. 1981); I. SHEnIaVR & J. SKIBA, THm CLOSELY HELD CORPOATION: TAX FINANCIAL AND ESTATE
PLANNNo 106 (1983).
357. See, e.g., Bauer, 748 F.2d at 1368; In re Lane, 742 F.2d at 1314-15; Stinnett's Pontiac
Serv., Inc., 730 F.2d at 638; Byerlite Corp., 286 F.2d 285; Baker Commodities, Inc. v. Commissioner,
48 T.C. 374, 396 (1967), aff'd, 415 F.2d 519 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 988 (1970);
Gooding Amusement Co. v. Commissioner, 32 T.C. 408, 419 (1954), aff'd, 236 F.2d 159 (6th Cir.
1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1031 (1957).
358. I.R.C. § 385(b)(3) (1987).
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judges sometimes have subordinated shareholders' claims as credi-
tors to those of unrelated, third parties. Fairness is at the heart of
most of these cases. The judges sense that it would be unfair for
a shareholder to participate equally with unrelated, third party cred-
itors in a bankruptcy liquidation when the shareholders did not pro-
vide their own corporation with adequate funding 59 Some of these
decisions are based on a misperception that a high debt to equity
ratio means that a corporation is inadequately financed. 30 Whether
based on a misperception or not, these decisions reflect an under-
lying judicial attitude toward the close corporation and its share-
holders; the courts expect the shareholders as the owners of a business
to make an unqualified commitment of their own money to the
business enterprise. If they do not, they are somehow acting unfairly,
and the law can take that unfairness into account in the bankruptcy
359. See, e.g., Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S. 295 (1939); Taylor v. Standard Gas & Elec. Co., 306
U.S. 307 (1939); Costello v. Fazio, 256 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1958); In re Fett Roofing & Sheet Metal
Co., 438 F. Supp. 726 (E.D. Va. 1977), aff'd without op., 605 F.2d 1201 (4th Cir. 1979); In re
Multiponics, Inc., 436 F. Supp. 1065 (E.D. La. 1977), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 622 F.2d 709
(5th Cir. 1980).
For some state court cases involving debt-equity disputes, see, e.g., Fountain v. Burke, 160 Ga.
App. 262, 287 S.E.2d 39 (1981); Levine, 6 Mass. App. 840, 372 N.E.2d 284; Wood, 217 So. 2d 257;
O'Reilly v. Cellco Indus., 265 Pa. Super. 558, 402 A.2d 686 (1979); Tacoma Ass'n of Credit Men
v. Lester, 72 Wash. 2d 453, 433 P.2d 901 (1967).
For general discussions, see, e.g., F. O'NEAL, supra note 8; Ashe, Subordination of Claims
Equitable Principles Applied In Bankruptcy, 84 BANYKNG L.J. 778 (1967); Herzog & Zweibel, Equitable
Subordination of Claims and Bankruptcy, 15 V"aD. L. REv. 83, 93-98 (1961); Reimer, Claims Against
Bankrupt Corporations Based On Advances By Controlling Shareholders Or Parent Corporations, 73
CoM. L.J. 273 (1968); Note, Subordination of Stockholder Loans on the Grounds of Corporate Under-
Capitalization: Obre v. Alban Tractor Company, 23 MD. L. REv. 260 (1963); Note, supra note 24;
Comment, Disregarding The Corporate Entity: Contract Claims, 28 Omo ST. L. REv. 441 (1967).
360. One such case is Costello, 256 F.2d 903. Two partners incorporated their plumbing supply
business. Since their business was already in financial distress, they constructed a capital structure
with a high debt-equity ratio. While it would be hard to quarrel with the court's decision to subordinate
the two shareholders' claims as creditors to those of outside creditors, it is far more difficult to accept
the court's hyperbolic comments that the two shareholders "stripped" the corporation of its "capital,"
thereby endangering the corporation. Id. at 910. True, the shareholders tried to get a leg up on
bankruptcy. Moreover, in contrast to their partnership, their corporation had a high debt-equity ratio.
Yet the inference that the corporation capital structure somehow was a type of theft against the
corporation was ill-founded. No matter what the debt-equity ratio was, the same amount of money
was committed to the corporate enterprise.
For discussion of the debt-equity distinction and finance theory, see generally R. BEMsIY & S.
MEYEas, PRiNcIPLEs oF CORpORATE FiNANcE (1981); T. COPELAND & J. WESTON, supra note 43;
Modigliani & Miller, The Cost Of Capital, Corporation Finance and The Theory of Investment, 48
AM. EcoN. R v. 261 (1958); Comment, Hybrid Instruments, supra note 30.
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context by surordinating their claims as creditors to those of outside
creditors.
This sense of unfairness has spilled over into federal tax law
where there is this feeling that the close corporation shareholder
must commit at least a threshold amount of equity capital to that
close corporation. If this threshold is not reached, he can be pe-
nalized by having his loans reclassified as stock or contributions to
equity. Paradoxically, the fairness approach to debt-equity deter-
minations is a virtual invitation to high debt equity ratios since the
federal courts3 6' have more or less initially adopted the Califormia
state law 62 standards for piercing the corporate veil on account of
inadequate capitalization. Under the standards, the purported debt
instrument should be honored as debt where the amount of equity
is at least more than nominal or not insubstantial. Naturally, one
should not expect the Internal Revenue Service to be keen on the
fairness approach.
While unfairness is still an undercurrent, more recent cases treat
debt-equity ratios as bearing on the economic reality of the pur-
ported debt since they affect the ability of the debtor corporation
to pay the debt when due.3 63 Since the economic realities test depends
361. See, e.g., Utility Trailer Mfg. Co., 212 F. Supp at 789; Santa Anita Consol. Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 50 T.C. 536, 551 (1968); Rosenthal v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1373, 1382 (1965);
Evwalt Dev. Corp. v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 220, 227 (1963); Davidson Bldg. Co. v.
Commissioner, 20 T.C.M. (CCH) 1291, 1298 (1961). See generally Plumb, supra note 28, at 511.
362. According to several early California cases, if the shareholders of a closely held corporation
provide only nominal capital to their corporation, they have abused the corporate privilege, and, as
a matter of equity, should be made personally liable to creditors of the business. See, e.g., Minton
v. Cavaney, 56 Cal. 2d 576, 364 P.2d 473, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641 (1964); Automotriz Dell Golfo De
California S.A. de C.V. v. Resnick, 47 Cal. 2d 792, 306 P.2d 1 (1957). Under later California cases,
nominal capitalization is an important, perhaps even a key factor, but no longer a sole factor for
piercing the corporate veil. See, e.g., Plyman v. Hickmott Foods, Inc., No. A018682 (Cal. Ct. App.,
Apr. 23, 1987); RRX Indus. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543, 546 (9th Cir. 1985); Pearl v. Shore,
17 Cal. App. 3d 608, 95 Cal. Rptr. 157 (1971). See generally Hackney & Benson, Shareholder Liability
for Inadequate Capital, 43 U. Prrr. L. Rav. 837 (1982); Note, Inadequate Capitalization as A Basis
For Shareholder Liability: The California Approach and A Recommendation, 45 S. CAL. L. REv.,
823 (1972).
363. See, e.g., Bauer, 748 F.2d at 1368-69; Lane, 742 F.2d at 1314; Tyler, 414 F.2d at 848;
Piedmont Corp., 388 F.2d at 890-91; Liflans Corp., 390 F.2d at 970; Dixie Dairies Corp. v. Com-
missioner, 74 T.C. 476, 497 (1980); J.F. Stevenhagen Co. v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 852
(1975), aff'd, 551 F.2d 106 (6th Cir. 1977). See generally Plumb, supra note 28, at 512-513; Taylor,
supra note 30, at 655-57.
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on the unique circumstances of each particular case, the fixing of
a "safe" ratio generally is impossible,364 though numerous com-
mentators have suggested safe harbor ratios,3 65 e.g., 4 to 1. One
problem is that a normal ratio of debt to equity in one industry
would be excessive debt in another industry, and even within the
single industry no two enterprises are exactly the same.3 66 Moreover,
an infinite variety of circumstances in addition to the corporation's
debt to equity ratio also affects the decision whether a particular
security represents debt or stock. 67 As a result, the cases are a tangle.
What might be viewed as an acceptable ratio under one set of cir-
cumstances might be unacceptable under another set.36
Since a high debt to equity ratio is merely one factor indicating
equity, other factors have influenced courts to uphold shareholder
advances as debts despite rather thin capitalizations. For example,
debt status was sustained in one case where the debt to equity ratio
was 700 to 1, but the corporation had sufficient cash flow and earn-
ings power to pay its debts as they became due. 69 In calculating
debt to equity ratios, the courts use the true value of property owned
by the corporation rather than its book value. 370 The value of fran-
364. See, e.g., Fischer, 441 F. Supp. at 38 n.16; Lehman-Mehornay, Inc. v. United States, 72-
2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9582 (W.D. Mo. 1972); Steiner v. Commissioner, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) 1392,
1398 (1981). Other cases say much the same; each case must be decided on its own facts. See e.g.,
Fin Hay Realty Co., 398 F.2d at 696-97; Tomlinson, 377 F.2d at 295.
365. See, e.g., F. O'NEAL, supra note 8, at § 2:10 (just under 4:1); Benjamin, Thin Corporations
- Whose "Substance Over Form"?, 34 TutL. L. REv. 99, 103-106 (1959) (3:1 or 4:1); Weis, supra
note 356, at 899 (2:1).
366. See, e.g., Bauer, 748 F.2d 1365; Post Corp., 640 F.2d at 1307; Security Fin. & Loan Co.,
210 F. Supp. 603; Scotland Mills, Inc. v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 265 (1965). See generally
F. O'NEAL, supra note 8, at § 2.10.
367. See, e.g., Texas Farm Bureau, 725 F.2d at 311; Lane, 742 F.2d at 1314-15; Scriptomatic,
Inc., 555 F.2d at 367. See generally, F. O'NEAL, supra note 8, at § 2.10.; Holzman, The Interest-
Dividend Guidelines, 47 TAxEs 4 (1969) (listing 38 factors).
368. Compare Lumber, Inc., 124 F. Supp 302 with L&M Realty Corp. v. Leo, 249 F.2d 668
(4th Cir. 1957) (1.8:1); Doornbosch Bros. v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 199 (1966) with Gooding Amuse-
ment Co., 32 T.C. 408 (1:1); Tomlinson, 377 F.2d 291 with Talbot Mills, 326 U.S. 521 (4:1); Litton
Bus. Systems v.. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 367 (1973) with Austin Village, Inc., 432 F.2d 741 (2:1);
Brook v. Commissioner, 23 T.C.M. (CCH) 1730, 1738 (1964), rev'd on other grounds, 360 F.2d 1011
(2d Cir. 1966) with Berkowitz, 411 F.2d 818 (2:1).
369. See Baker Commodities, Inc., 48 T.C. 374 noted in 27 J. TAX'N 170 (1967). In one case
involving an asphalt manufacturer, the court accepted a 20,000 to I debt-equity ratio. See Byerlite
Corp., 286 F.2d 285.
370. See, e.g., Dillin, 433 F.2d 1097; Kraft Foods Co., 232 F.2d 118; Estate of Miller, 239 F,2d
729; Nye v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 203, 216 (1968).
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chises and licenses have also been included in calculating equity cap-
ital.371 Courts have also allowed the shareholder to assign a value
to good will upon incorporation of an ongoing business. 372 The judges
are sometimes suspicious about assigning value to intangibles, how-
ever, since they are likely to have little or no value in a liquidation.
373
Courts have been especially reluctant to asslgn a value for ability
and experience of a shareholder-employee, 374 unless backed by an
employment contract and a covenant not to compete375 or unless
there is convincing evidence that the intangibles have a direct and
primary relationship to the well-being of the corporation. 376 In any
event, the tax advisor should urge his clients to document the un-
realized appreciation of the assets and the value of the intangibles.
377
In calculating the equity part of the debt to equity fraction, the
court should include accumulated earnings as well as stated capital
and paid-in-surplus for shareholder advances made to an ongoing
corporation. 378 With some exceptions, 379 the cases have included debts
owed by the debtor corporation to outside creditors as well as to
their own shareholders in calculating the debt to equity ratio.
380 It
371. See, e.g., Motel Corp. v. Commissioner, 54 T.C. 1433, 1437 (1970); Perrault v. Commis-
sioner, 25 T.C. 439, 451 (1955), aff'd, 244 F.2d 408 (10th Cir. 1957).
372. See, e.g., Murphy Logging Co. v. United States, 378 F.2d 222, 224 (9th Cir. 1967); Estate
of Miller, 239 F.2d at 733 n.10; Nye, 50 T.C. at 215; La Staiti, 41 T.C.M. (CCH) at 520 n.8; Fischer
Bros. Aviation, Inc. v. Commissioner, 30 T.C.M. (CCH) 1351, 1355 (1971).
373. See, e.g., Plantation Patterns, Inc. v. Commissioner, 462 F.2d 712, 723 (5th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1076 (1972); Moughon, 329 F.2d at 400.
374. See, e.g., Plantation Patterns, Inc., 462 F.2d at 723; Allen H. Dahme Assoc. v. United
States, 436 F.2d 486 (Ct. CI. 1971). But see Murphy Logging Co., 378 F.2d at 224; Bradshaw, 683
F.2d at 374. See generally Goldstein, supra note 308, at 19; Plumb, supra note 28, at 517-18.
375. See, e.g., Plantation Patterns, Inc., 462 F.2d at 723; Allen H. Dahme Assoc., 436 F.2d
486; Plumb, supra note 28, at 517-18.
376. See, e.g., D. KAHN & P. GANN, supra note 40, at 600; See also Plantation Patterns, Inc.,
462 F.2d at 723.
377. F. O'NEAL, supra note 8, at 2.10 n.6.
378. See, e.g., Bauer, 748 F.2d at 1368; Affiliated Research v. United States, 351 F.2d 646, 650
n.8 (Ct. Cl. 1965); Utility Trailer Mfg. Co., 212 F. Fupp. at 789; Wilbur Sec. Co., 31 T.C. at 949-
50.
379. See, e.g., P.M. Fin. Corp., 302 F.2d at 788; Erickson v. Commissioner, 15 T.C.M. (CCH)
1338, 1343 (1956).
380. See, e.g., Ambassador Apts. v. Commissioner, 50 T.C. 236, 241 (1968), aff'd, 406 F.2d
288 (2d Cir. 1969); Motel Co. v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M. (CCH) 825, 831-833, affd, 340 F.2d
445 (2d Cir. 1965); Lockwood Realty Corp. v. Commissioner, 17 T.C.M. (CCH) 247, 251 (1958),
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has also been held that when initial capitalization has been adequate,
later shareholder loans to the corporation are to be recognized as
debt, regardless of the debt to equity ratio at the time the advances
are made.381 Similarly there has been a judicial tendency towards
the conclusion that debt is not bona fide if issued to shareholders
in exchange for assets required to get the business underway.
382
3. Shareholder Guarantees.
Some commentators have suggested shareholder guaranteed loans
to the close corporation as a solution to the risks of thin incor-
poration. 3 3 Instead of the shareholders furnishing all of the capital
necessary to launch the corporation, a considerable part of the cap-
ital can be borrowed in the corporate name from a bank or other
institutional lender, with the shareholders guaranteeing the loan.
Hopefully, the corporation will be able to deduct the periodic in-
terest payments, and its shareholders will not be required to treat
payments on the loan as constructive dividends. 34 Others have ques-
tioned this device, suggesting that if a direct loan by a shareholder
to the corporation would constitute a capital contribution due to
too thin capitalization, it is rash to assume that the technique of a
guaranteed loan would change the result.3 85 These reservations are
modified, 264 F.2d 241 (6th Cir. 1959).
This no longer seems to be an issue, as it should not be. When a shareholder advances money
to his corporation, corporate debts owed to outside creditors clearly have an impact on whether or
not the corporation is thinly capitalized.
381. See, e.g., Waterman Steamship Corp. v. United States, 203 F. Supp. 915, 919 (S.D. Ala.
1962), rev'd on other issues, 330 F.2d 128 (5th Cir. 1964), aff'd, 381 U.S. 252 (1965), reh'g denied,
382 U.S. 873 (1965); Holmes v. Clow, 533 S.W.2d 99, 105 (Tex. 1976); In re Mader's Store for Men,
77 Wis. 2d 578, 608-609, 254 N.W.2d 171, 188 (1977); Hackney & Benson, supra note 362, at 898.
382. See, e.g., Lane, 742 F.2d at 1315; Estate of Mixon, 464 F.2d at 410; Dillin, 433 F.2d at
1102. See generally Natbony, Worthlessness, Debt Equity, and Related Problems, 32 HASTNSis L.J.
1407, 1470-71 (1981); Taylor, supra note 30, at 657.
383. See, e.g., F. O'NEAL, supra note 28, at § 2.12; Cohen, Treatment of Shareholder Guarantees
of Third-Party Loans to Corporations, 39 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 321 (1970); Comment, Guaranteed
Loans and Direct Loans: Equal Treatment Under The Tax Law, 16 UCLA L. Rav. 421, 425-26 (1969)
[hereinafter Comment, Guaranteed Loans].
384. Past proponents of guaranteed loans include F. O'NEA, supra note 8, at § 2.12; Calkins,
Coughlin, Hacker, Kidder, Sugarman & Wolf, Tax Problems of Close Corporation; A Survey, 10
W. Ras. L. REv. 9, 32 (1959).
385. See, e.g., Bittker, Thin Capitalization; Some Current Ouestions, 34 TAxEs 830, 834-35 (1956);
Note, Guaranteed Shareholder Loans and Thin Capital, 70 W. Ras. L. Rv. 52, 54-55 (1967); Com-
ment, Guaranteed Loans, supra note 383, at 425-29.
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partly borne out by the attitude of the government. Since the lenders
generally rely on the credit-worthiness of the shareholders guar-
anteeing the loan rather than that of the close corporation - the
government has sometimes argued that the substance of the trans-
action is a loan to the shareholder followed by a prearranged equity
investment of the borrowed funds by the shareholders. 86 When the
government has successfully recast the transaction in this manner,
the result is a disallowance of the corporate deduction for interest
payments made on account of the loan and a characterization of
the corporate payments on the loan as constructive distributions to
the shareholders who guaranteed it.387 The government has also lost
in some of these cases.
3 88
Commercial banks are still a primary source of credit for small
corporations. Since shareholder guarantees constitute a normal pro-
tective device for the lenders, it would be unduly harsh for the gov-
ernment to try to characterize all shareholder guaranteed loans as
capital contributions. These recharacterizations probably should be
limited to thinly capitalized corporations and cases in which it is
shown that the parties did indeed consider the corporation as no
more than a depository for a loan made to shareholders. According
to some commentators, 3 9 the government has been most successful
when the loans involved corporations with high debt to equity ra-
tios .39
H. Proportionality of Debt to Stock.
If loans made by the individual shareholders are substantially in
proportion to their stockholdings, that is a strong factor tending to
386. See, e.g., Casco Bank & Tr. Co. v. United States, 544 F.2d 528, 533-34 (lst Cir. 1976);
Kavich v. United States, 507 F. Supp. 1339, 1346 (D. Neb. 1981); Santa Anita Consol. Inc., 50 T.C.
at 550; Stone King v. Commissioner, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 1301 (1985); Atkinson v. Commissioner, 48
T.C.M. (CCH) 577 (1984); Hunter v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 385, 389 (1982). See generally
D. KAHN & P. GAtN, supra note 40, at 602; Bittker, Thin Capitalization, supra note 385, at 834-
45; Comment, Guaranteed Loans, supra note 383, at 426-29.
387. See, e.g., Plantation Patterns, Inc., 462 F.2d 712; TAx RESEARCH INST. OF AMi., supra note
278, at K-5182.
388. See, e.g., Murphy Logging Co., 378 F.2d at 224; Ackerson v. United States, 277 F. Supp.
475, 476-77 (,V.D. Ky. 1967); Santa Anita Consol. Inc., 50 T.C. at 550; La Staiti, 41 T.C.M. (CCH)
at 514; Estate of Ripson, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) at 231.
389. See, D. KAHN & GANN, supra note 40, at 602-03; Comment, Guaranteed Loans, supra note
383.
390. Several of the cases certainly bear out the contention of the commentators. See e.g., Plan-
tation Patterns, Inc., 462 F.2d 712; Atkinson, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) at 577.
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support a holding that the loans are not bona fide and should be
treated as contributions to capital.3 91 Conversely, debt securities are
not as likely to be treated as stock, if the individual holdings of
debt are substantially disproportionate to their holdings of stock.3 92
Section 385 of the Internal Revenue Code also lists proportionality
as one of the "factors" that the Treasury can consider in formu-
lating regulations, 393 and the aborted section 385 regulations espe-
cially emphasized it.394
Property concepts partly underlie the emphasis on proportion-
ality. When each shareholder owns the same proportion of stock as
he does of the ostensible debt, the division of each shareholder's
contribution to the corporation into debt and equity does not affect
his relative percentages of ownership of the corporation. 395 The
shareholders have the same "bundle of sticks," i.e., the same voting
rights and the same income and liquidation percentages, with the
debt as they would have without the debt. Most importantly, pay-
391. See, e.g., Roth Steel Tube Co., 620 F.2d at 630; Texas Farm Bureau, 725 F.2d at 312-13;
Bauer, 748 F.2d at 1370; Stinnett's Pontiac Serv., Inc., 730 F.2d at 639-40; Slappey Drive Indus.
Park, 561 F.2d at 583-84; Tyler, 414 F.2d at 849; J.S. Biritz. Constr. Co., 387 F.2d at 457; Covey
Inv. Co. v. United States, 377 F.2d at 403, 404 (10th Cir. 1967); McSorley's Corp., 323 F.2d at 902;
Universal Casting Corp., 303 F.2d at 625-26. See generally Plumb, supra note 28, at 470-82; Stone,
supra note 36, at 253-65; Taylor, supra note 30, at 648-50; Note, Debt-Equity Financing Guidelines:
Capital Problems For Closely Held Business, 9 FoRDHAm URB. L. REv. 1019, 1024-26 (1981); Com-
ment, Tax and the Closely Held Corporation, 1969 Wis. L. REv. 1199, 1224.
392. See cases cited infra note 401.
393. I.R.C. § 385(b)(5) (1987).
394. See Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 1.385-6 & -7 (1980) withdrawn on July 6, 1983 in T.D. 7920
(Nov. 2, 1983).
According to Professor Eustice, the proposed regulations treated proportionality as a "key issue,"
a "super factor," a "megafactor." J. EUsaIcE, supra note 29, at 4.04 n.29.
For discussion of the aborted regulations' treatment of proportionality as a factor, see generally
Bloom & Bush, Final Regulations Under 385 Contain Complex Rules and Safe Harbors, 54 J. TAX'N
274 (1981); Footer & Klein, New Proposed Regulations Outline Steps Needed to Prevent Debt From
Being Reclassified as Equity, 9 TAx'N FOR LAW. 4, 7 (1980); Levin & Bowen, supra note 263; Mirsky
& Willens, The Debt/Equity Regulations: Round 3, 13 TAx ADvSER 196 (1982); Paley, Calimafde,
& Maclay, Regulations Impose New Standards for IRS to Reclassify Corporate Debt as Equity, 10
TAx'N FOR LAW. 4, 4-5 (1981); Pike, Proposed Debt-Equity Regs: Potent New Standards for Char.
acterizing Purported Debt, 7 J. CoRP. TAX'N 195 (1980); Stone & McGeehan, supra note 42.
395. See, e.g., Texas Farm Bureau, 725 F.2d at 313; Slappey Drive Indus. Park, 561 F.2d at
583-84; Fin Hay Realty Co., 398 F.2d at 697; Gilbert, 248 F.2d at 406; Rolwing Moxley Co. v. United
States, 452 F. Supp. 385, 388 (E.D. Mo. 1978), aff'd per curiam, 589 F.2d 353 (8th Cir. 1978);
Inductotherm Indus. v. Commissioner, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 167, 188 (1984); Steiner v. Commissioner,
41 T.C.M. (CCH) 1392, 1398 (1981).
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ments on the debt perform the same economic functions as divi-
dends, since they allow the shareholders to extract earnings from
the corporation without disturbing their relative ownership rights.
Yet more basically, it is a sense of distrust that has most influ-
enced courts and the government to pay close attention to corporate
debt held proportionally by shareholders. This distrust can be best
explained, perhaps, by referring to the inverse situation-corporate
debt held by shareholders in disproportion to their stockholdings.
The shareholder-creditor who holds a disproportionately high per-
centage of the corporate debt usually has paid extra for the special
advantages that the debt accords him. Though as a stockholder he
is still interested in the welfare of the corporation, he is more likely
to enforce the terms of the debt according to their tenor, like a true
creditor, due to his advantage over the other shareholders.39 6 In con-
trast, shareholders who hold debt in proportion to their stockholders
are more likely to have a silent agreement that none of them will
enforce the debt obligation when it would be harmful to their jointly-
owned corporation to do soy 7 Moreover, since disproportionate debt
does provide greater rights for some shareholders, it is less likely
to be a pure tax planning device designed solely to produce better
tax consequences on corporate distributions to shareholders.
Proportionality by itself is not enough to require reclassification
of debt as equity since the written terms of the debt, the economic
realities of the transaction, and the behavior of the borrower and
lender towards the obligation might all be probative of the genu-
ineness of the debt.3 98 Thus, whereas proportionality of debt and
396. See, e.g., Ortmayer v. Commissioner, 265 F.2d 848, 854-55 (7th Cir. 1959); Earle v. Jones
& Son, 200 F.2d 846, 850 (9th Cir. 1952); Post Corp., 640 F.2d at 1308 n.10; Hofert Co. v. United
States, 69-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9220, at 84,003 (C.D. Cal. 1969); Morgan, Inc. v. Commissioner, 30
T.C. 881, 893 (1958), rev'd on another issue, 272 F.2d 936 (9th Cir. 1959); Tauber v. Commissioner,
24 T.C. 179, 184 (1955). See generally Plumb, supra note 28, at 473-75.
397. See, e.g., Gilbert, 248 F.2d at 409, 410 (concurrence); Llantz Co. v. United States, 283 F.
Supp. 164, 168 (C.D. Cal. 1968), aff'd, 424 F.2d 1330 (9th Cir. 1970); Arlington Park Jockey Club
v. Sauber, 164 F. Supp. 576, 583, 585 (N.D. Ill. 1958), aff'd. 262 F.2d 902 (7th Cir. 1959); Wilbur
Sec. Co., 31 T.C. 949-50.
398. See, e.g., Priv. Ltr. Rul. 80-06-012; Texas Farm Bureau, 725 F.2d at 311; Lane, 742 F.2d
at 1314-15; Stinnett's Pontiac Serv., Inc., 730 F.2d at 638; Slappey Drive Indus. Park, 561 F.2d at
584 n.19; In re Indian Lake Estates, Inc., 448 F.2d 574 578-79 (5th Cir. 1971); P.M. Fin. Corp.,
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stock invites close scrutiny, 99 the government must show something
more than proportionality (e.g., thin capitalization) to convince a
court to disregard the investor's interest as debt. 4°°
As noted above, debt securities are not as likely to be treated
as stock, if the participants' holding of the debt are substantially
disproportionate to their holdings of stock. 40' Though a few courts
have completely disregarded disproportionality as a factor indicating
debt, 4  courts generally have reclassified disproportionately held debt
as stock only in extreme circumstances. 403 For example, dispropor-
tionately held debt was reclassified as equity when it had no fixed
maturity date, did not earn interest, and the holder neglected to
302 F.2d at 789; Earle, 200 F.2d at 850; Universal Racquetball Rockville Centre Corp. v. Commis-
sioner, 52 T.C.M. (CCH) 143, 146 (1986); R-W Specialties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH)
34, 41 (1981); Taylor, supra note 30, at 647-48; Note, supra note 391, at 1024-25; Note, supra note
385, at 58-59; Comment, supra note 391, at 1224.
399. See, e.g., Slappey Drive Indus. Park, 561 F.2d at 583; P.M. Fin. Corp., 302 F.2d at 789;
Earle, 200 F.2d at 850; Sayles Finishing Plants, Inc. v. United States, 399 F.2d 214, 221 (Ct. Cl.
1968); Peraino v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 1099, 1106 (1982).
400. See, e.g., Adelson, 782 F.2d at 1573 n.6; Slappey Drive Indus. Park, 561 F.2d at 584 n.19;
United States v. Haskel Eng'g & Supply Co., 380 F.2d 786, 788 (9th Cir. 1967); P.M. Fin. Corp.,
302 F.2d at 789; Liflans Corp., 390 F.2d at 971; Sayles Finishing Plants, Inc., 399 F.2d at 221.
See also Plumb, supra note 28, at 470-71. The reader should note that the burden of proof rests
with the taxpayer, though there must be present something other than proportionately for him to
lose.
401. See, e.g., Bauer, 748 F.2d at 1370; Piedmont Minerals Co., 429 F.2d at 563; Lansall Co.
v. United States, 512 F. Supp. 1178, 1181 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Coast Sash & Door Co. v. United States,
75-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9680 at 88,079 (W.D. Wash. 1975); Hutton v. United States, 73-1 U.S.
Tax Cas. (CCH) 9166 (W.D. Tenn. 1972), aff'd on another point, 501 F.2d 1055 (6th Cir. 1974);
Curry v. Commissioner, 43 T.C. 667, 687 (1965); Gooding Amusement Co. 23 T.C. at 422; R-W
Specialties, Inc., 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 34; Johnson v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 1780, 1788
(1977). See also Calkins, Coughlin, Hacker, Kidder, Sugarman & Wolf, supra note 384, at 36; Gold-
stein, supra note 308, at 7; Plumb, supra note 28, 473-82; Stone, supra note 36, at 262; Note, supra
note 391, 1024-25; Comment, supra note 391, at 1224.
402. See, e.g., In re Uneco, Inc., 532 F.2d 1204 (8th Cir. 1976); Indian Lake Estates, Inc., 448
F.2d 574; K&R Service Co., Inc. v. United States, 568 F. Supp. 38 (D. Mass. 1983); Gooding Amuse-
ment Co., 23 T.C. at 422; Farkas v. Commissioner, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 1085 (1985); Stark v. Com-
missioner, 45 T.C.M. (CCH) 22 (1982); Schine Chain Theaters, Inc. v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M.
(CCH) 488, 501 (1963), aff'd, 331 F.2d 849 (2d Cir. 1964); Barker v. Commissioner, 22 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1649, 1654 (1963).
403. See, e.g., Roth Steel Tube Co., 800 F.2d at 632; Indian Lake Estates, Inc., 448 F.2d 574;
Gooding Amusement Co., 23 T.C. at 408; Universal Racquetball Rockville Centre Corp., 52 T.C.M.
(CCH) at 146-48; Artistic Venetian Blind Corp. v. Commissioner, 15 T.C.M. (CCH) 192 (1956). See
also Kavitch, 507 F. Supp. at 1339 (same analysis but in a shareholder-guarantee situation). See
generally Plumb, supra note 28, at 474, 480-81.
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make demand for payment. 404 Courts also take familial4 5 and
economic40 6 solidarity into account when determining whether the
debt is truly disproportionate. Husband and wife, for example, have
been treated as a unit for purposes of determining the proportion-
ality of their advances.
40 7
VI. "SECURITIES": TAx CONSEQUENCES
An instrument purporting to be the debt of a corporation can
be interpreted to be one of three things: (1) stock (or evidence of
a contribution to capital); (2) a bona fide debt amounting to a se-
curity; or (3) a bona fide debt not amounting to a security. The
next few pages discuss the distinctions in tax treatment between bona
fide debts amounting to a security and bona fide debts not amount-
ing to a security. Then follows an examination of classification cri-
teria.
404. See Colony Inc. v. Commissioner, 357 U.S. 28 (1958); Roth Steel Tube Co., 800 F.2d at
631; Uneco, Inc., 532 F.2d at 1210; Universal Racquetball Rockville Centre Corp., 52 T.C.M. (CCH)
at 147.
405. See, e.g., Slappey Drive Indus. Park, 561 F.2d at 584; Foresun, Inc., 348 F.2d at 1008;
Motel Co., 340 F.2d at 446; P.M. Fin. Corp., 302 F.2d at 788 n.11; Liflans Corp., 390 F.2d at 971;
Peco Co. v. Commissioner, 26 T.C.M. (CCH) 207, 212 (1967); B. BITTKER & J. EusricE, supra note
27, at 4.04 n.30.
406. See, e.g., Road Materials, Inc. v. Commissioner, 407 F.2d 1121, 1124-25 (4th Cir. 1969);
Jewell Ridge Coal Corp. v. Commissioner, 318 F.2d 695, 698-99 (4th Cir. 1963); Affiliated Research
Inc., 351 F.2d at 650; Republic Steel Corp. v. United States, 159 F. Supp. 366, 369-70 (Ct. Cl. 1958);
Charles W. Williams Contracting Co. v. Commissioner, 25 T.C.M. (CCH) 500, 504 (1966); Ludwig
Baumann & Co. v. Commissioner, 20 T.C.M. (CCH) 1415, 1421 (1961), aff'd, 312 F.2d 557 (2d Cir.
1963). See generally Texas Farm Bureau, 725 F.2d at 310; Dixie Dairies Corp. v. Commissioner, 74
T.C. 476, 496 (1980) (an option to buy out remaining shareholders 2/3 holdings); B. BITrIKER & J.
EusTicE, supra note 27, at 4.04 n.30.
407. Plumb, supra note 28, at 477. See, e.g., P.M. Finance Corp., 302 F.2d at 789; Burr Oaks
Corp., 43 T.C. at 648; Gooding Amusement Co. 23 T.C. at 418-19; Peco Co., 26 T.C.M. (CCH)
at 212; BMC Mfg. Corp. v. Commissioner, 11 T.C.M. (CCH) 376, 378 (1952). See generally Plumb,
supra note 28, at 477.
In a few cases, courts have been willing to honor the disproportionality when the family members
were adults and seemed capable of acting independently. See, e.g., Hofert Co., 69-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) 9220, at 84,003; Curry, 43 T.C. at 687.
If family relations are disharmonious, perhaps the disproportionality should be a factor despite
the family ties. Cf. Slappey Drive Indus. Park, 561 F.2d at 584. If enough rancor exists between
family members, perhaps disproportionality between stock and debt ought to be disregarded as a
factor, too, since the warring parties are unlikely to act as a financial unit. More probably, at least
one of them will act like a true creditor.
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A. Section 351 Exchanges.
The most common controversy over whether a debt constitutes
a "security" occurs when someone transfers appreciated property
to a controlled corporation and in exchange receives a piece of paper
purporting to represent a debt of the transferee corporation.4 08 For
example, as explained in a recent Court of Claims case, 4°9 a land-
owner with a large tract of appreciated land suitable for development
knows that ultimately he will be taxed on that appreciation if he
develops that land. Naturally, he prefers that his taxable gain be
characterized as a capital gain rather than as ordinary income. While
he would be entitled to a capital gain on an outright sale of the
property to an outsider, he would then be deprived of the profits
to be reaped from its development. If he develops and sells the
property himself, he probably would be treated as a dealer, and any
gain generated through the sales, including the gain associated with
the land's appreciation in value while still undeveloped, would be
taxable to him as ordinary income. Therefore, instead of the outright
sale to an outsider, he tries to make a taxable sale of the property
to his own controlled corporation. If the Internal Revenue Service
honors the transaction as a taxable sale, the appreciation in value
of the undeveloped lands will be taxed to him as a capital gain and
not as ordinary income, and, at the same time, he can preserve his
opportunity to participate in the developmental profits as the share-
holder of the controlled corporation. Additionally, the transferee
corporation (the controlled corporation) will take a cost (i.e., fair
market value) basis in the property, thereby reducing the amount
of ordinary income to be realized from subsequent sales. Not sur-
prisingly, the government has repeatedly challenged the character-
408. See, e.g., Slappey Drive Indus. Park, 561 F.2d at 572; Hayutin v. Commissioner, 508 F.2d
462, 472 (10th Cir. 1974); Dennis v. Commissioner, 473 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1973); Estate of Mixon,
464 F.2d at 394; Gyro Eng'g Corp. v. United States, 417 F.2d 437 (9th Cir. 1969); Piedmont Corp.,
388 F.2d at 886; Aqualane Shores, Inc. v. Commissioner, 269 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1959); Bradshaw,
683 F.2d at 365; Stanley, Inc. v. Schuster, 295 F. Supp. 812 (S.D. Ohio 1969), aff'd, 421 F.2d 1360
(6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 822 (1970); D'Angelo Assoc. v. Commissioner, 70 T.C. 121 (1978);
Adams v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 41 (1972); Nye, 50 T.C. 203; Burr Oaks Corp., 43 T.C. 635; Camp
Wolters Enter. v. Commissioner, 22 T.C. 737 (1954), aff'd, 230 F.2d 555 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
352 U.S. 826 (1956).
409. See Bradshaw, 683 F.2d 365.
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izations of such incestuous transactions as taxable sales, instead
maintaining that the transfers are really either capital contributions
or nontaxable section 351 exchanges.
410
In many of the other reported decisions, the transferee corpo-
ration is the only taxpayer before the court, 41 ' perhaps because the
statute of limitations already has run on the year of the transfer,
thereby insulating the transferor from an inquiry into his charac-
terization of the transfer; the dispute is the size of the depreciation
deductions taken by the transferee corporation some years after the
transfer.412
If all that the transferor receives is the debt and it is treated as
a bona fide debt not amounting to a security, which is often the
tax treatment desired by the taxpayers, 413 the transaction is a taxable
sale, and these are the tax consequences:
(1) the transferor recognizes the gain on the sale of his property to the corpo-
ration;
4 14
(2) the recognized gain sometimes is a capital gain;'"
(3) the transferor takes a cost basis in the debt;
4 16
(4) the transferee corporation takes a cost basis in the transferred property;
4 1 7
410. See id. at 368.
411. See, e.g., Hayutin, 508 F.2d 462; In re Drage, 78-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9632 (M.D.
Fla. 1978); Burr Oaks Corp., 43 T.C. 635.
412. See, e.g., C-Lec Plastics, Inc. v. Commissioner, 76 T.C. 601 (1981); D'Angelo Assoc., 70
T.C. 121; Adams v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 41 (1972); Kamborian v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 847
(1971), aff'd, 469 F.2d 219 (lst Cir. 1972); Nye, 50 T.C. 203.
413. See, e.g., Piedmont Corp., 388 F.2d 886; Aqualane Shores, Inc., 269 F.2d 116; Bradshaw,
683 F.2d 365; Burr Oaks Corp., 43 T.C. 635.
414. See, e.g., Bradshaw, 683 F.2d 365; New Mexico Timber Co. v. Commissioner, 84 T.C.
1290 (1985); Buono v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 187 (1980); Howell v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 546
(1972); Van Heusden v. Commissioner, 44 T.C. 491 (1965), aff'd, Estate of Van Heusden v. Com-
missioner, 369 F.2d 119 (5th Cir. 1966); Thomas v. Commissioner, 42 T.C.M. (CCH) 496 (1981),
aff'd, Cates v. Commissioner, 716 F.2d 1387 (11th Cir. 1983).
415. The character of the gain to the transferor, of course, depends upon the nature of the
asset transferred and, for capital assets, the transferor's holding period. In addition to problems with
the usual recapture rules, the tax lawyer must be especially alert to section 1239, which requires
ordinary income treatment for the full amount of gain recognized on the sale or exchange of de-
preciable property between a shareholder and an 80-percent owned corporation. See I.R.C. § 1239
(1987).
416. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1012 (1987). See also Ketler v. Commissioner, 196 F.2d 822 (7th Cir.
1952); Gould Sec. Co. v. United States, 96 F.2d 780 (2d Cir. 1938); Society Brand Clothes, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 18 T.C. 304 (1952).
417. See, e.g., Bradshaw, 683 F.2d 365; C-Lec Plastics, Inc., 76 T.C. 601; D'Angelo Assoc.,
70 T.C. 121; Nye v. , 50 T.C. 203.
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(5) for the transferor, later principal payments on the debt will be nontaxable
returns of capital up to his basis in the debt;41' and
(6) since the principal usually is the transferor's "cost" in the debt, 100% of the
principal payments ordinarily will be nontaxable returns of basis to the transferor;
(7) the transferee corporation will take an interest deduction for those payments
on the debt that constitute interest,' 9 (though it gets no deduction for payments
on principal);
(8) because the transferee corporation takes a cost basis in the transferred prop-
erty, it will have a smaller taxable gain on resale, which is especially important
for property which is intended for resale but which will not qualify for capital
gains treatment, e.g., the undeveloped real estate mentioned above;2 0 and
(9) again because the transferee corporation takes cost basis in the transferred
property, it will have larger depreciation deductions, which is important when the
transferred property is depreciable.41'
The tax consequences substantially differ when the instrument is
honored as debt, but is treated as a "security." This is because
section 351 usually applies when a shareholder transfers property to
a controlled corporation in exchange for securities of that corpo-
ration. Unless he receives boot, the transferor does not recognize
his gain422 and is required to take the lower substituted basis in the
debt:423 the transferee corporation takes the lower, carryover basis
in the transferred property. 424 Principal payments on the debt will
still be nontaxable up to the transferor's basis, but to his lower,
substituted basis, the principal payments will exceed his basis in the
debt, and that excess of principal payments over basis will be taxable
to him.42 The transferee corporation still will be entitled to deduct
interest payments, but the lower, carryover basis will result in lesser
depreciation deductions or greater gains on resale of the property.
418. See I.R.C. § 1271(a)(1) (1987) (formerly § 1232(a)(1)).
419. See id. § 163(a) (1987).
420. See Fin Hay Realty Co., 398 F.2d at 696 n.8; Bradshaw, 683 F.2d 365.
421. See, e.g., C-Lec Plastics, Inc., 76 T.C. 601; D'Angelo Assoc., 70 T.C. 121; Adams, 58
T.C. 41; Kamborian, 56 T.C. 847; Nye, 50 T.C. 203.
If the property is depreciable, the transferor might incur ordinary income under the recapture
rules under section 1239. As mentioned in the text, however, in many of the reported decisions, the
transferee corporation is the only taxpayer before the court, and, since it need not worry about adverse
tax consequences for the transferors, it can choose the characterization of the transaction that is best
for itself.
422. See I.R.C. § 351(a) (1987).
423. See id. § 358(a)(1) (1987).
424. See id. § 362(a)(1) (1987).
425. See id. § 1271(a)(1) (1987) (formerly section 1232(a)(1)) (exchange treatment for amounts
received in retirement of a debt instrument).
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If the transaction is treated as a contribution to capital, the trans-
feror does not recognize any gain on the transfer, increases his basis
in his stock by his basis in the transferred property,426 and treats
payments on the debt as section 301 distributions, 427 i.e., ordinary
income to the extent of the transferee corporation's earnings and
profits. The transferee corporation gets no interest deduction for
making the payments, because they are section 301 distributions;
428
it takes the lower, caryover basis in the transferred assets, 429 resulting
in lower depreciation deductions and greater gain on resale of the
transferred property.
If the debt instrument is treated as stock, the transaction is a
351 exchange. 430 Neither the transferor 431 nor the transferee
corporation 432 recognizes a gain. The transferor takes the substituted
basis in his stock.4 3 The corporation takes a carryover basis in the
transferred property. 434 Principal payments on the debt are treated
as payments in redemption of stock, 435 meaning that the shareholder
might be entitled to exchange treatment, though more typically he
must treat the payments as section 301 distributions .436 Interest pay-
ments are section 301 distributions.4 7 The corporation has no in-
terest deduction and is stuck with the lower, carryover basis for
purposes of depreciation and resale of the transferred property.
426. See Treas. Reg. § 1.118-1 (1987); B. Brrmp.R & J. EusTicE, supra note 27, at § 3.14. See
generally Rev. Rul. 80-76, 1980-1 C.B. 15; Western Hills, Inc. v. United States, 71-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
(CCH) 9410 (S.D. Ind. 1971).
427. See, e.g., Falkoff v. Commissioner, 604 F.2d 1045 (7th Cir. 1979); Wheeler v. United States,
75-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9170 (W.D. Tex. 1974).
428. See, e.g., United States v. Simon, 60-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9631 (6th Cir. 1960);
Chapman v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M. (CCH) 35 (1982); Swanson v. Commissioner, 2 B.T.A. 1112
(1925).
429. See I.R.C. § 362(a)(2) (1987).
430. See id. § 351(a) (1987).
431. Id.
432. Id. § 1032(a) (1987).
433. Id. § 358(a)(1) (1987).
434. Id. § 362(a)(1) (1987).
435. See, e.g., Brains v. Commissioner, 734 F.2d 290 (6th Cir. 1984); Coates Trust v. Com-
missioner, 480 F.2d 468 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1045 (1973); Commissioner v. Stickney,
399 F.2d 828 (6th Cir. 1968).
436. See, e.g., Falkoff, 604 F.2d 1045; Wheeler, 75-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) 9410.
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The tax law adds a wrinkle when the transferor of property to
the controlled corporation receives both stock and debt in the ex-
change. If the debt is treated as a security, the transaction is fully
nontaxable under section 351.438 If the debt is treated as stock, the
transaction is also fully nontaxable. 4 9 If the debt is treated as a debt
not amounting to a security, however, it is treated as boot,440 i.e.,
the recipient of the boot is required to recognize any realized gain
to the extent of the boot received. 44' The boot recipient takes a fair
market value basis in the boot, 442 which ordinarily ought to be the
face value of the debt. Since payments in retirement of debt are a
nontaxable return of capital up to the holder's basis, the debt-holder
is unlikely to have any additional taxable gain upon collection, ex-
cept for the interest payments. The transferee corporation's basis in
the transferred property will be carryover plus the gain recognized
to the transferor on account of the boot. 443
B. Reorganizations and Corporate Divisions.
The term "securities" is also used in the Code sections on
reorganizations 4" and corporate divisions. 445 Indeed, much of the
jurisprudence concerning the meaning of the term "securities" de-
veloped in reorganization cases. 446 "Securities" has the same mean-
438. Section 351 provides for nonrecognitlon treatment to the transferor when he received either
"stock or securities." I.R.C. § 351(a) (1987) (emphasis added).
439. Id.
440. See, e.g., Wham Constr. Co. v. Commissioner, 600 F.2d 1052 (4th Cir. 1979); Turner v.
Commissioner, 303 F.2d 94 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 922 (1962), reh'g denied, 371 U.S. 965
(1963), on remand, 23 T.C.M. (CCH) 952 (1964), aff'd, 343 F.2d 150 (4th Cir. 1965).
441. I.R.C. § 351(b) (1987).
442. Id. § 358(a)(2) (1987).
443. Id. § 362(a) (1987).
444. See id. §§ 354(a), 356(d), 361(a), (b), 362(b) (1987).
445. See id. §§ 355(a)(1), (3), 356(d) (1987).
446. See, e.g., Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co. v. Commissioner, 287 U.S. 462 (1933); West
Side Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 494 F.2d 404 (6th Cir. 1974); Turner Constr. Co. v.
United States, 364 F.2d 525 (2d Cir. 1966); Neville Coke & Chem. Co. v. Commissioner, 148 F.2d
599 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 726 (1945); Capital Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 607
F.2d 970 (Ct. C1. 1979); Camp Wolters Enter., 22 T.C. 737. See also, e.g., Rev. Rul. 73-473, 1973
2 C.B. 115, Rev. Rul. 59-98, 1959-1 C.B. 76. See generally Hutchins, Tax Consequences of Reor-
ganizations Depend on Particular Type Selected, 26 TAx'N 28 (1981); Samuels, The Limited Role of
Section 351 in Corporate Acquisitions, 60 TAxEs 955 (1982); Wolfman, "Continuity of Interest" and
The American Law Institute Study, 57 TAxEs 840 (1979); Plumb, supra. note 28, at 555.
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ing for reorganizations and corporate divisions as it does for section
351 exchanges .44
7
In reorganizations and corporate divisions, investors are entitled
to receive securities tax free, but only to the extent that the principal
amount of the securities received does not exceed the principal amount
of the securities surrendered. 44 If a security holder surrenders se-
curities in exchange for other securities and the principal of the
securities received exceeds the principal of the securities surrendered,
the fair market value of that excess is treated as boot. 449 If a share-
holder receives stock and securities and surrenders stock but no-
securities, the securities are treated as boot.4 0  If a shareholder
surrenders stock and receives only securities in return, the trans-
action is outside the reorganization sections and is fully taxable to
him.451 A security holder who exchanges securities for stock is en-
titled to nonrecognition treatment.
452
These detailed rules are based on a theory that an investor ex-
changing stock for securities is cashing out his investment to the
extent of the securities-he's not entitled to nonrecognition treat-
ment under the continuity of interest principle. 4 3 The security holder
447. See, e.g., Neville Coke & Chem. Co., 148 F.2d 599; Lloyd-Smith v. Commissioner, 116
F.2d 642 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 313 U.S. 588, (1941); Camp Wolters Enter., 22 T.C. 737; Rev. Rul.
73-473, 1973-2 C.B. 115.
448. I.R.C. §§ 354(a)(2)(A), 355(a)(3)(A) (1987).
449. Id. § 356(d) (1987).
450. Id. §§ 354(a)(2)(A), 355(a)(3), 356(d) (1987).
451. See, e.g., Paulsen v. Commissioner, 469 U.S. 131 (1985); Le Tulle v. Scofield, 308 U.S.
415, 420 (1939), reh'g denied, 309 U.S. 694 (1940); Helvering v. Minnesota Tea Co., 296 U.S. 378
(1935); Helvering v. Watts, 296 U.S. 387, 388 (1935); West Side Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 494 F.2d
404; Rev. Rul. 69-6, 1969-1 C.B. 104; Rev. Rul. 112(g), 1940-1 C.B. 151. See generally Coleman,
Analyzing the Continuity of Interest Doctrine: Paulsen v. Commissioner, 39 Sw. U. L.J. 929 (1985);
Henkel, Paulsen v. Commissioner: Supreme Court Follows Minnesota Tea to a Tee, 63 TAXEs 647
(1985); Soukup, The Continuity-of-Proprietary Interest Doctrine and Thrift Institution Mergers, 12
J. CORP. TAx'N 141(1985); Comment, Exchange of Stock for Savings Accounts in Savings Institution
Reorganization Is Sale of Assets, 51 LEGAL ButLL. 191 (1985).
452. See I.R.C. §§ 354(a)(1), 355(a)(1)(A)(i) (1987). Neither section 354 nor section 355 sets a
ceiling of limitation on the nonrecognition treatment available to the security holder receiving stock,
like those sections do for both the stockholder and security holder receiving securities.
453. See Paulsen, 469 U.S. 131; Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co., 287 U.S. 462; West Side Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 494 F.2d 404; Everett v. United States, 448 F.2d 357 (10th Cir. 1971); Capital
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 607 F.2d 970; Rev. Rul. 69-6, 1969-1 C.B. 104; see generally S. Lnin, S. ScinvAgz,
D. LATHROPE, & J. ROSENBERG, FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE TAXATION 492 (1985); Henkel, supra
note 451, at 648. Cf. Coleman, supra note 451.
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who surrenders his securities for stock is upgrading the character
of his investment rather than cashing out and, accordingly, ought
not to be taxed on the exchange. 4
If an investor receives nothing except debts not amounting to a
security, the transaction is completely outside of the reorganization
sections and is fully taxable, both under the language of the Code
itself455 and the landmark Supreme Court case of Pinellas Ice & Cold
Storage Co. v. Commissioner.456 This rule applies even if the investor
himself surrendered securities. If, in addition to the debt not con-
stituting a security, the investor receives other consideration that
qualifies for nonrecognition treatment, i.e., stock, then the debt not
amounting to a security is treated as boot.457
In addition to classifying the interest received by an investor in
an exchange, an investor may need to classify the interest that he
is giving up. If the only interest surrendered is a debt not amounting
to a security, the transaction is again completely outside the reor-
ganization sections, 458 which apply only to exchanges in which both
sides surrender either stock or securities.
The classification issue can also affect a corporation that trans-
ferrs property in a reorganization. If it exchanges the property solely
for stock or securities, it does not recognize a gain. 4 9 But if, in
addition to stock or securities, it receives a debt not amounting to
a security, that debt is considered boot. It must recognize its realized
gain to the extent of any boot received, including the debt, but only
if it does not distribute the boot pursuant to a plan of reorgani-
zation.46o
454. See, e.g., Le Tulle, 308 U.S. 415.
455. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 354(a)(1) (1987) (nonrecognition treatment for investor exchange in stock
or securities for "stock or securities"); § 355(a)(1)(A) (1987) (nonrecognition treatment for investor
on receipt of "stock or securities" of a corporation controlled by the distributing corporation).
456. Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage Co., 287 U.S. 462.
457. See, e.g., Carlberg v. United States, 281 F.2d 507 (8th Cir. 1960); Henkel, supra note 451,
at 651; Plumb, supra note 28 at 558.
458. See, e.g., Paulsen, 469 U.S. 131; Neville Coke & Chem. Co., 148 F.2d at 599; Sisto Fin.
Corp., 139 F.2d 253; see also Griswold, "Securities" and "Continuity of Interest", 58 HAjv. L.
Rav. 705 (1945); Henkel, supra note 451; Plumb, supra note 28, at 558 n.1144.
459. I.R.C. § 361(a) (1987).
460. Id. § 361(b)(1) (1987). See also Plumb, supra note 28, at 557-58.
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For a corporate division to be tax-free, the parent must distribute
all of the securities it owns in the controlled corporation, unless
excused by good business reasons. 461 The parent need not distribute
a debt of the controlled corporation that is not considered a se-
curity. 462
C. Miscellaneous Tax Rules Using the Term "Securities."
Other Code sections use the term "securities." (1) Section 165(g)
is probably the most important. It provides for capital loss treatment
on the worthlessness of any "security.'"463 As discussed earlier, debts
not amounting to securities are governed by section 166, 46 the bad
debt section. (2) For purposes of the rules on distributions and re-
demptions, section 317(a) defines the term "property" to include
securities. 465 (3) Section 333, the "one month liquidation" section
now repealed, allowed nonrecognition treatment for certain share-
holders on the receipt of liquidating distributions. 466 Even qualified
electing shareholders, however, had to recognize their realized gain
to the extent that they received, amongst other things, securities
acquired by the liquidating corporation after 1953.467 (4) Section
461. Id. § 355(a)(1)(D) (1987).
462. Plumb, supra note 28, at 559.
463. See I.R.C. § 165(g)(2) (1987).
464. See id. § 166 (1987).
465. Id. § 317(a) (1987).
Unlike in sections 351(a), 354(a)(1) and 355(a)(1), the word "securities" in section 317(a) is not
preceded by the words "stock or." Does it therefore include equity as well as debt securities, as the
term generally does in financial circles? The answer would seem to be mostly academic, since the
only thing excluded from the term "property" is stock rights of the distributing corporation. Id. at
§ 317(a). Stock and stock rights of other corporations and debt-securities of the distributing cor-
poration, therefore, should be included within that definition.
466. See id. § 333 (1954).
467. Id. § 333(e)(2), (f)(1) (1987). More particularly, a qualifying electing shareholder other than
a corporation recognized his realized gain on the greater of (1) his ratable share of the distributing
corporation's accumulated earnings and profits and (2) any money, stock or securities distributed to
him. His recognized gain was a dividend to the extent that it was covered by the distributing cor-
poration's earnings and profits. Any recognized gain above his dividend was treated as a capital gain.
Id. at § 333(e).
A qualifying electing shareholder that was also a corporation recognized its realized gain to the
same extent as would a shareholder other than a corporation. No part of the recognized gain, however,
was a dividend. Instead it was a capital gain. Id. at § 333(0.
If the liquidating corporation has no accumulated earnings and profits, the qualified electing
shareholder who received no cash, stock or securities recognized no gain. Id. at § 333(a), (e), (f).
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367(a)(1) denies the nonrecognition treatment accorded by sections
332, 351, 354, 356 and 361 when a "United States person" transfers
property to a foreign corporation. 468 Section 367(a)(2), however, ren-
ders section 367(a)(1) inapplicable, i.e., restores the nonrecognition
treatment accorded by those five sections, when the property trans-
ferred consists of securities of a foreign corporation that is a party
to the transaction.4 69 (5) Section 1244, the section granting prefer-
ential tax treatment for losses on "small business stock," is not
available to the holders of (A) stock issued for securities470 or (B)
issued by a corporation that, for five years preceding the loss, de-
rived more than 50% of its aggregate gross receipts from a variety
of investment activities, including sales or exchanges of securities.4 7'
VII. "SECURITIES:" CLASSIFICATION CRITERIA
Neither the Internal Revenue Code nor its regulations define the
term "securities.' '472 Although the need to define the term has en-
gendered substantial litigation,471 the line of demarcation between
securities and other debts is said to be "shrouded" with much the
same uncertainty as the line between debt and equity. 474 Unfortu-
nately, the Internal Revenue Service does little to help the tax prac-
titioner; as it has a policy of not issuing advance rulings on whether
468. Id. § 367(a)(1) (1987).
469. Id. § 367(a)(2) (1987).
470. Id. § 1244(c)(1)(B) (1987).
471. Id. § 1244(c)(1)(C) (1987).
472. While the Code does not provide a general definition, section 165, the general section on
losses, provides a definition of the word "security" for purposes of the rule on "worthless securities."
See id. § 165(g)(2) (1987).
473. See, e.g., Pinellas Ice & Cold Storage, 287 U.S. 462; Dennis, 473 F.2d 274; United States
v. Mills, 399 F.2d 944 (5th Cir. 1968); United States v. Hertwig, 398 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1968); Wolf
Envelope Co. v. Commissioner, 197 F.2d 864 (6th Cir. 1952); Neville Coke & Chem. Co., 148 F.2d
599; Sisto Fin. Corp., 139 F.2d 253; Bradshaw, 683 F.2d 365; D'Angelo Assoc., 70 T.C. 121; Camp
Wolters Enter., 22 T.C. 737.
474. Plumb, supra note 28, at 559.
For more commentary on the definition of "securities," see, e.g., Fisher, The Conversion Of
Ordinary Income To Capital Gain By Intentionally Avoiding Section 351 Of The Internal Revenue
Code of 1954, 32 Mo. L. REv. 421, 436 (1967); Griswold, supra note 48; Jacobs, Something Simple:
A Tax-Free Incorporation, 37 TAx LAW. 133, 134 (1983); Kaufman, Securities Within The Tax-Free
Reorganization and Exchange Provisions, 8 N.Y.U. INST. ON FEr. TAx'N 117 (1950); Plumb, supra
note 28, at 555-74; White, Sleepers That Travel With Section 351 Transfers, 56 VA. L. REv. 37, 51
(1970); Comment, Section 351 Transfers to Controlled Corporations: The Forgotten Term "Securi-
ties." 114 U. PA. L. REv. 314 (1965).
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debt instruments payable within 10 years amount to securities. 475 At
least one certain comment can be made: outside of section 165's
treatment of worthless securities, 476 in tax law the word "securities"
refers to debt obligations only. It does not include both stock and
debt, as it does in the financial world.
477
What debts are "securities" for tax purposes? Despite the fre-
quent judicial protestations that the time period of the instrument
is not determinative, 478 the term of the debt is clearly the single most
important factor in determining whether a debt obligation amounts
to a security. 479 Debt instruments payable in full within five years
generally are not considered securities, 4 0 except in unusual circum-
stances. 48 1 The rationale is that such debts are too close to a cash
equivalent to be considered an investment in the business, a sine
qua non for securities status. In contrast, a debt instrument maturing
in ten years or more is almost certainly to be considered a security,
412
for it is then an integral part of the capitalization of the corporation.
Though some might consider debts maturing within a five to ten
year period to be of questionable status, 483 debts within that time
frame generally have been deemed to be securities. 4 4 Debts calling
475. See Rev. Proc. 62-32, § 4.015, 1962-2 C.B. 527, 532.
476. See I.R.C. § 165(g)(2) (1987) (term "worthless securities" includes stock, stock rights and
corporate or government debts).
477. See, e.g., W. CAY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 7, at 1106-12; F. O'NEAL, supra note 8,
at § 2.10.
478. See, e.g., Sisto Fin. Corp., 139 F.2d at 255; Bradshaw, 683 F.2d at 377; Nye, 50 T.C. at
212. See also Camp Wolters Enter., 230 F.2d at 560; Plumb, supra note 28, at 562.
479. See, e.g., Dennis, 473 F.2d 274; Hertwig, 398 F.2d 452; Campbell v. Carter Found. Prod.
Co., 322 F.2d 827, 832-35 (5th Cir. 1963); Bradshaw, 683 F.2d at 377 n.28.
See also W. BrrrKER & M. EusnicE, supra note 27, at § 3.04; Plumb, supra note 28, at 562.
480. See Pinnellas Ice & Storage Co., 287 U.S. 462; Neville Coke & Chem. Co., 148 F.2d 599;
Bradshaw, 683 F.2d at 377 n.28; Nye, 50 T.C. at 212 n.9; W. BrrTKR & M. EUSTICE, supra note
27, at § 3.04; Plumb, supra note 28, at 562-63.
481. See Campbell, 322 F.2d at 832-35; Plumb, supra note 28, at 563.
482. See, e.g., Hertwig, 398 F.2d 452 (12 1/2 years); Parkland Place Co. v. United States, 354
F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1966), aff'g, 248 F. Supp. 974 (N.D. Tex. 1964) (ten years); Burnham v. Com-
missioner, 86 F.2d 776 (7th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 683 (1937) (ten years); Bradshaw, 683
F.2d at 377 n.28; Nye, 50 T.C. 203 (ten year installments). See generally Kaufman, supra note 474,
at 119; Plumb, supra note 28, at 563.
483. See, e.g., Kaufman, supra note 474, at 120; Plumb, supra note 28, at 563.
Cf. Bradshaw, 683 F.2d at 377 n.28; Nye, 50 T.C. at 212 n.9.
484. See, e.g., Parkland Place Co., 354 F.2d 916 (ten year promissory note); Campbell, 322
F.2d 827 (five year promissory note); Commissioner v. Freund, 98 F.2d 201 (3d Cir. 1938) (six year
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for payments both before and after the five year dividing line-a
common occurrence-resist easy classification. The authorities have
looked at both the average term and the date of final payment. 45
A redemption feature generally does not destroy a long-term debt's
status as a security.4 6 If it did, few long-term debts would be se-
curities since virtually all of them are redeemable. Moreover, though
short-term debt and redeemable long-term debt share the potential
for being paid in full shortly after their creation, the power to re-
deem the long-term debt usually rests with the corporation, not the
holder. In contrast, the power to compel full payment of the short-
term debt resides with the holder, a fact that renders that debt less
investment-like than redeemable long-term debt. 487 A Supreme Court
case implies that redeemable debt held by a controlling shareholder
in a close corporation is more like cash than a security since the
holders control the decision-making process inside the corporation
and can make the corporation call the debt at any time.48 This
rationale would seem to apply with equal force to and debts held
by the controlling shareholders of close corporations, whether re-
deemable or not. In such circumstances, a formal redemption feature
is superfluous because the holders have the power to make the cor-
poration prepay the debt at any time anyway.489 Yet none of the
cases applied the implication from the Supreme Court case to re-
deemable much less nonredeemable debt. 490
Courts have also had to wrestle with early prepayment of long-
term debt. Does the prepayment impair the debt's status as a se-
serial bonds); Burnham, 86 F.2d 776 (ten year promissory note); Watts, 296 U.S. 387 (one to seven
year bonds); Camp Wolters Enter., 230 F.2d 555 (installment notes payable between five and nine
years). See also Plumb, supra note 28, at 563-64.
485. See Rev. Rul. 59-98, 1959-1 C.B. 76; Rev. Rul. 56-303, 1956-2 C.B. 193. See also Hertwig,
398 F.2d 452; Bradshaw, 683 F.2d at 377 n.28; Nye, 50 T.C. at 213.
486. See Wolf Envelope Co., 197 F.2d 864; Camp Wolters Enter., 22T.C. at 752; Pan Am.
Travel Co. v. Commissioner, 4 T.C.M. (CCH) 555 (1945). See also Plumb, supra note 28, at 564.
487. See Wolf Envelope Co., 197 F.2d 864; Pan Am. Travel Co., 4 T.C.M. (CCH) 555; Plumb,
supra note 28, at 564.
488. Bazley v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 737, 742, reh'g denied, 332 U.S. 752 (1947).
489. See Rev. Rul. 59-98, 1959-1 C.B. 76. See also Emery, Taxing Distributions Pursuant to
Corporate Reorganizations, 50 MICH. L. R-v. 549, 556-57 (1952); Eisenstein, Book Review, 20 TAx
L. REv. 215, 230 (1965) (reviewing HvARD LAW SCHOOL INT'L PROoRAM OF TAXAION, OF TAXATMiON
iN a UNnmI STATEs, (1963); Plumb, supra note 28, at 565.
490. See Bazley, 331 U.S. 737; Adams, 58 T.C. 41; Plumb, supra note 28, at 565.
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curity? In a landmark case, 491 the debtor corporations paid off five
to nine year installment notes should be examined as of the date of
issuance.4 92 Other courts, though, have stressed early payments as
a factor not indicating security status. 493 The issue, therefore, should
be considered unsettled.
A second major factor is the extent to which the payment on
the corporate obligation depends upon the ultimate success or failure
of the business.494 To have an "investment quality, ' 495 i.e., to be
a security, the debt must provide a "degree of participation and
continuing interest in the business. "496 Accordingly, when on the
date of issuance it appears that repayment is inextricably and in-
definitely tied up to success of the venture, the debt constitutes a
security. 497 Thus, the emphasis is on the degree of risk taken by the
holder of the debt. If (1) the debtor corporation lacks sufficient
liquid assets to retire the debt soon after its creation, (2) the debt
can be paid only through a sale of the business as a going concern
at that point, and (3) payment is intended to be derived from future
earnings, which may or may not occur, that debt is likely to be
considered a security49s (or maybe even equity), 499 even if the os-
tensible due date falls within less than five years.
491. Camp Wolters Enter., 22 T.C. 737. Camp Wolters has been cited for stating the applicable
test for the definition of "securities" seventeen times by circuit courts alone. See, e.g., Dennis, 473
F.2d at 279; Mills, 399 F.2d at 947; Hertwig, 398 F.2d at 455; Turner Constr. Co., 364 F.2d at 535;
Bradshaw, 683 F.2d at 376.
492. Camp Wolters Enter., 22 T.C. 737.
493. See, e.g., L. & E. Stirn, Inc. v. Commissioner, 107 F.2d 390, 392-(2d Cir. 1939); Raich
v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 604, 612 (1966), overruled on other issues, Focht v. Commissioner, 68
T.C. 223 (1977); Graham v. Commissioner, 37 B.T.A. 623, 629 (1938). See also Plumb, supra note
28, at 564.
494. See, e.g., Hertwig, 398 F.2d at 455; Camp Wolters Enter., 230 F.2d 560; Bradshaw, 683
F.2d at 376; American Processing & Sales Co., 371 F.2d at 856-57; Nye, 50 T.C. at 217.
495. Nye, 50 T.C. at 217.
496. See Camp Wolters Enter., 230 F.2d at 560; See also Nye, 50 T.C. at 213-14.
497. See Camp Wolters Enter., 230 F.2d at 560; Bradshaw, 683 F.2d at 376; Nye, 50 T.C. at
217.
498. See Mills, 399 F.2d at 947-48; Hertwig, 398 F.2d at 455; Bradshaw, 683 F.2d at 374-75;
D'Angelo Assoc., 70 T.C. at 134; Nye, 50 T.C. at 217.
499. Several of the courts have recognized that virtually the same risk-taking analysis is used
in deciding the debt-equity issue. See, e.g., Bradshaw, 683 F.2d 365; Nye, 50 T.C. 203; Camp Wolters
Enter., 22 T.C. 737.
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Inferentially, since high risk is indicative of a security, low risk
is indicative of a debt not amounting to a security:0° For example,
in one case,50' a close corporation issued promissory notes to its sole
shareholder in exchange for real estate. 02 Though still undeveloped,
the property already had substantial commercial value and predict-
ably was later developed into a swank residential subdivision.503 The
notes were held not to be securities because, in part, the prospects
for financial success were always bright and the promise of repay-
ment was never in jeopardy due to the value of the land.5 4 Re-
payment on the notes was not subject to the fortunes of the business.
The court found a stark contrast with another case 05 where a cor-
poration issued notes in exchange for mangrove swampland.5 06 Vast
improvements were essential to that tract's successful development,
which, even then, was highly speculative.50 7 Because repayment de-
pended on the risks of the business, those debts were held to be
securities.50
8
500. See Bradshaw, 683 F.2d at 377; D'Angelo Assoc., 70 T.C. at 135.
510. Bradshaw, 683 F.2d 365.
502. Bradshaw presented a prototypical section 351 dispute. An owner of real estate formed a
corporation and paid cash for all of its stock. In what he hoped would be considered a separate
transaction, he then transferred the undeveloped real estate to the corporation in exchange for prom-
issory notes. If, as he hoped, the second transaction was considered a sale that fell outside of section
351, he would recognize a capital gain on the pre-transfer appreciation in the value of the property;
the corporation would take a stepped-up fair market value basis in the property so that it would
have less ordinary income on subsequent sales of the property after its development; since the trans-
feror would take a basis in the notes equal to their full principal amount, he would treat principal
payments on the notes as a tax-free return of his basis; and the corporation would be entitled to
deduct interest payments on the note. The government, on the other hand, wanted the payment of
the cash and the transfer of the property for notes to be considered part of one section 351 exchange.
The corporate transferee would then be required to take a section 362(a)(1) low carryover basis in
the transferred property, resulting in greater ordinary income upon the later sales of the property
after its development. This would have happened if the notes are considered either stock or securities,
but not if the notes were considered debts not amounting to a security. The government also wanted
the transfer of the property to the corporation to be considered either a contribution to capital or
an exchange of property for stock. Then all of the payments on the notes would be section 301
distributions to the shareholder, and the corporation would not be entitled to any interest deductions.
Id. at 370.
503. Id. at 368, 369.
504. Id. at 375.
505. Aqualane Shores, Inc., 269 F.2d 116.
506. Id. at 117-18.
507. Id. at 119.
508. Id. at 119-20.
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Most of the cases using risk analysis could have been rested as
well on the term of the debt. 09 Risk analysis has never resulted in
a debt payable over more than ten years being found a debt not
amounting to a security. Risk analysis does help to explain those
"unusual circumstances" when debt instruments payable in full within
five years are considered securities. For example, risk analysis re-
sulted in security status for a demand note,5 10 a one year note,511
and a debt payable in five annual installments.5 1 2 In each of these
cases, the actual payments on the notes extended well beyond their
due dates, a fact that strongly influenced the courts in declaring the
debts to be securities.5 13
The lone statutory definition of the word "security" is contained
in section 165(g), the section on "worthless securities." 5 4 According
to this definition, corporate debt constitutes a "security" only if it
is issued with interest coupons or in registered form.5 15 Outside the
section 165 context, it is well settled that promissory notes, which
neither have coupons nor are registered, may qualify as securities.5 16
Section 165(g)'s definition of "security" also includes stock and rights
to subscribe or "receive" stock. 517 In that respect, section 165 differs
509. See, e.g., Hertwig, 389 F.2d 452, (debts payable over a 12 1/2 year period held to be
securities); Bradshaw, 683 F.2d at 377 n.28 (corporate notes with maturity dates ranging from 2 1/
2 to 6 1/2 years held not to be securities).
510. D'Angelo Assoc., 70 T.C. at 133-36.
511. Mills, 399 F.2d 944. In Mills the parties contemplated an indefinite extension of the note.
Id. at 947.
512. Aqualane Shores, Inc., 269 F.2d 116. In Aqualane, a five year installment obligation was
held to be a security, since its repayment depended on a plan to reclaim and subdivide swampland,
a risky venture. Id. at 118-19.
513. See, D'Angelo Assoc., 70 T.C. 121 (only 50% of principal paid after 16 years). See also,
Mills, 399 F.2d 944 (annual renewal of I year notes); Aqualane Shores, Inc., 269 F.2d 116 (no
payments until 4 years after maturity).
514. I.R.C. § 165(g)(2) (1987). According to the general rule of section 165(g), the holder of a
"security" that becomes worthless during the year recognizes the capital loss, provided that the security
is a capital asset. Id. at § 165(g)(1) (1987). With the exception of dealers, securities generally are
capital assets.
515. Id. § 165(g)(2)(C) (1987). See also Treas. Reg. § 1.165-5(a)(3) (1987); Plumb, supra note
28, at 383 n.70.
Plumb, supra note 28, at 383 n.71 mentions that securities held by a dealer for sale to customers
would be excepted from such treatment, i.e., would not result in long-term capital gain.
516. See, e.g., Mills, 399 F.2d at 947; Campbell, 322 F.2d at 833-35; D'Angelo Assoc., 70 T.C.
at 133; Nye, 50 T.C. at 212-14.
517. I.R.C. § 165(g)(2)(A), (B) (1987).
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from the more general tax definition of "securities," which is limited
to debt and excludes stock.
5 18
VIII. PREFERRED STOCK
Preferred stock has a variety of uses in close corporations, most
of which are not tax-oriented.51 9 While a detailed discussion of all
of them is beyond the scope of this text, it might be helpful to
describe two of the most important ones as illustrations.
First, preferred stock may be useful in carrying out the business
bargain between the founders of the enterprise, because it furnishes
a method of giving some of the participants priorities in earnings
and in assets.5 20 It can be used to distribute risk, control, and par-
ticipation among the investors of the business.521 Commentators, have
often advocated its use when one investor provides the newly formed
enterprise with capital and another provides special skills or the
promise of services. They each might agree to take 50% of the
common stock so that they can share equally in the control and in
future growth of the business. In the early stages of the enterprise,
the party offering the skills is likely to realize a "senior" return in
the form of reasonable compensation for services performed. The
party providing the capital, no less than the party providing the
skills, may insist that he too be entitled to a senior return, repre-
senting reasonable compensation for the use of his capital in the
518. But see id. § 165(g)(2) (1987) (term "worthless securities"includes stock rights and corporate
or government debts).
519. "Preferred stock" refers to a class of stock that grants its holders either a dividend or
liquidation preference or both. It has a dividend preference, if the corporation is prohibited from
distributing a dividend to common stockholders until after it pays the preferred stockholders a dividend
in a stated amount. It has a liquidation preference, if the corporation is prohibited from distributing
anything to its common stockholders in a liquidation until after it pays a stated amount to the preferred
stockholders. For either of these preferences to exist, they must be stated in the corporation's articles
of incorporation. The exact terms of the preferences (and any other special attributes) must be stated
in the articles of incorporation. Frequently, preferred stock is cumulative, redeemable, convertible
and nonparticipating and provides only contingent voting rights. The permutations of rights and
limitations are endless, however. For full discussions of preferred stock, see generally I Z. CAVITCH,
supra note 1, at § 2.21; F. O'NEAL, supra note 8, at § 2.15; ORANzINo CORPORATE AND OTHER
Busnass ENm'mRIsEs, surpa note 13, at § 8.06.
520. See F. O.NEA, supra note 8, at § 2.15.
521. See ORGANIZING CORPORATE AND OTnR Busnumss ENTERPRISES, supra note 13, at § 8.06.
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enterprise.5 22 Moreover, the provider of capital might need some pro-
tection against an early liquidation where the provider of skills would
receive a substantial portion of the assets on the liquidation, assets
contributed by the provider of capital, even though the skills person
has yet to make a real contribution to the business.
5 23
Nonvoting, nonparticipating, redeemable, cumulative preferred
stock issued to the provider of capital might be the perfect solution
for this situation.5 24 It would be issued to the party providing the
only capital. Since it would be nonvoting and nonparticipating, it
would not disturb the basic business bargain that provides for equal-
ity in the control and the growth of the business. The cumulative
dividend preference would entitle the party providing the money to
a senior return for the use of his capital, analogous to the com-
pensation paid for the shareholder providing the special skills or the
promise of future services. The liquidation preference would allow
the entrepreneur offering the capital to pull out the assets he con-
tributed in the event of an early liquidation. The corporation ul-
timately would redeem the preferred stock eventually insuring that
each entreprenuer would have a 50% stake in the business. If the
parties so desired, the amount of the dividends paid on the preferred
and its redemption price could be pegged at an amount that would
let the preferred stockholder recoup all (or a part) of his extra capital
contribution. Second, preferred stock can be useful in transferring
control of a close corporation to a younger generation. For example,
if a shareholder wishes to pass control of the corporation to his
children, but to retain securities representing substantially all of the
full present value of the business, he may recapitalize the corpo-
ration, creating and retaining a new class of nonvoting preferred
stock and giving the voting common to the children. In this manner,
the parent retains most of the present value of the corporation while
control and future appreciation in the corporation's value accrues
to the children. At the parent's death, the corporation might redeem
522. See Herwitz, Allocation of Stock Between Services and Capital in the Organization of a
Close Corporation, 75 HAuv. L. REv. 1098, 1118 (1962).
523. See W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, supra note 7, at 114.
524. Herwitz, supra note 522, at 1098, 1119. See generally e.g., W. CARY & M. EISENBERG,
supra note 7, at 114; R. DEER, LAWYER'S BAs Ic CoiuoiAm PRACcE MANiAL 26 (1978).
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the preferred in a section 303 redemption without altering control . 25
Alternatively, if the parent wishes to retain control, but to pass the
economic value of the business to his child, he can convey the pre-
ferred to the children and retain the common stock until his death.
Similar arrangements can be made to pass either control or an ec-
onomic interest to key employees.5 26
From the corporation's viewpoint, preferred stock, especially if
held by outsiders, has some non-tax advantages over debt. First,
unlike debt, preferred stock generally does not carry a fixed obli-
gation from the corporation to the stockholder. If the corporation
is in financial trouble, it can withhold the payment of dividends.
Unlike a debtholder, the preferred stockholder ordinarily lacks the
power to either compel payments or to force the corporation into
bankruptcy.5 27 This benefit, however, is offset by a corresponding
burden, discussed below,when the preferred is held by common
stockholders. Second, putative lenders, e.g., banks, are wary of bal-
ance sheets heavily laden with debt. In contrast to debt, preferred
stock strengthens the balance sheet by decreasing the debt to equity
ratio, thereby making the corporation a more attractive borrower
to outsiders.528
525. See F. O'NEAL, supra note 8, at § 2.15.
526. See id.
527. See generally id.; ORGANING CORPORATE AND OTm BUSINEss ENTERPISS, supra note
13, at § 8.06.
This difference between preferred stock and debt is often illusory for securities held propor-
tionately by common stockholders in close corporations. While such holders technically have the power
to compel payment on debt or to force the defaulting corporation into bankruptcy, either a lawsuit
to enforce the debt or a corporate bankruptcy is inimical to their interests as common stockholders.
Accordingly, they are likely to waive a default on the debt by the corporation and not insist on
payment until the corporation is healthy enough to be able to afford it. The result is exactly the
same as when, as directors, they decide on behalf of the corporation to make the corporation withhold
payments of dividends to themselves as preferred stockholders.
528. See generally 1 Z. CAvrrcH, supra note 1, at § 2.21[2]; F. O'NEAL, supra note 8, at § 2.15;
ORGANIZING CORPORATE AND OTHER BushEss ENTERPRISES, supra note 13, at § 8.06.
This advantage of preferred stock over debt may be tempered somewhat by the inclination of
sophisticated lenders like banks to require shareholder-creditors to subordinate their claims as creditors
to the claims of the bank as a precondition for a bank loan. 1 Z. CAViTcH, supra note 1, at § 2.21[2].
Another advantage of preferred stock often mentioned by commentators is that the issuance of
preferred shares permits the corporation to raise money from trustees, institutions, and other con-
servative investors who either will not or cannot purchase common shares. See, e.g., F. O'NEAL,
supra note 8, at § 2.15. With the disintegration of much of the regulatory prohibitions on investments
by such investors, one might question whether this particular advantage still exists.
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Since preferred stock does not place a fixed obligation on the
corporation, there is a tremendous downside when the preferred stock
is to be held by the common stockholders. The preferred stock-
holder, unlike the debt holder, must wait in line in a corporate
bankruptcy for all creditors to be paid in full before he can be paid
even his liquidation preference. The preferred shareholders' position
in bankruptcy, though superior to the common stockholders', is in-
ferior to debt and is an enormous deterrent to the use of preferred
stock in a close corporation. This is especially so since there is often
nothing left in bankruptcy for the stockholders whether preferred
or common. Thus, if the common stockholders have the choice be-
tween making their corporation issue themselves debt or preferred
stock, the superior position of debt over preferred stock in bank-
ruptcy is likely to tip the scales in favor of the debt.5 29
As with all planning devices, preferred stock offers a mix of
good and bad tax consequences. First for the bad. The subchapter
S election is limited to corporations with no more than one class
of stock.530 If the corporation already has issued a class of preferred
stock, it is ineligible for a subchapter Selection. If a corporation
has previously elected subchapter S treatment, the issuance of pre-
ferred stock results in an automatic termination of subchapter S
status.53
Additionally, if the choice for the planner is between corporate
debt and preferred stock, the debt is often more advantageous for
the reasons discussed earlier in this text, e.g., the double tax on the
corporate earnings distributed as dividends. Moreover, if, as often
is the case, the preferred is issued proportionately to the common
529. If the owners of the business must look to a sophisticated outside creditor like a bank for
credit, however, this advantage of debt over preferred stock may again be somewhat illusory. The
bank probably will require the shareholder-creditors to subordinate their claims in favor of those of
the bank, thereby placing the shareholders' claims in a position similar to that of preferred stockholders
anyway.
530. I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1)(D) (1987).
531. Id. §§ 1361(b)(l)(D), 1362(d)(2)(A) (1987).
Congress eliminated another detriment of preferred stock prior to 1984. Only "common" stock
was eligible for the special treatment accorded by section 1244. The Tax Reform Act of 1984 deleted
the word "common" from section 1244(c)(1) so that section 1244 now applies to preferred as well
as to common stock. See id. § 1244(c)(1) (1987).
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stockholders with a view to a redemption at a future date, the re-
demption, if proportionate (as it often is), will be treated as a section
301 distribution.5 32 Furthermore, while subchapter S often enables
the shareholders of close corporations to avoid the double taxation
problem, as mentioned above, it is not available to a corporation
with preferred stock.
Now for the good. Nonvoting preferred can be used to spread
the ownership of a business among the various members of a family
and thereby shift some of the business income to those in the lower
tax brackets without permitting them to participate in the control
of the business.533 Also, if the corporation has no earnings and prof-
its when the preferred stock is issued, it cannot be considered tainted
section 306 stock5m that would produce ordinary income on a sub-
sequent sale535 or redemption 536 under the section 306 preferred stock
bail-out rules. Since a corporation has no earnings and profits at
the time of incorporation, it has sometimes been suggested that close
corporations issue preferred stock at this point to preserve the op-
portunities for a later preferred stock bail-out.5 37 Though a later
preferred stock bail-out is not an impossibility, it is not highly prob-
able either. For one thing, the common stockholders are likely to
532. See Randolph v. Commissioner, 76 F.2d 472 (8th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Randolph
v. Helvering, 296 U.S. 599, and cert. denied sub nom. Helvering v. Randolph, 296 U.S. 600 (1935).
See also F. O'NEAL, supra note 8, at § 2.05.
If the common shareholders do not hold preferred stock in proportion to their common stock,
redemption of the preferred probably will not be deemed a dividend. See Himmel v. Commissioner,
338 F.2d 815 (2d. Cir. 1964).
The government has posited that redemption of all preferred stock is not equivalent to a dividend,
if no proportional relationship or pattern of stock ownership exists between the holders of preferred
stock, and the holders of the common stock. Rev. Rul. 68-547, 1968-2 C.B. 123; F. O'NnAL, supra
note 8, at § 2.15 n.4.
The government now considers the result in Himmel to be incorrect because after the redemption
of the preferred stock the redeemed shareholder still retained voting control of the corporation, see
Rev. Rul. 85-106, 1985-2 C.B. 116. Congress decided to retain the "not essentially equivalent to a
dividend" language of § 302(b)(1) in the 1954 Code to allow exchange treatment for a partial re-
demption of preferred stock held by a stockholder who holds only preferred stock.
533. F. O'NEAL. supra note 8, at § 2.15.
534. See I.R.C. § 306(c)(2) (1987).
535. See id. § 306(a)(1) (1987).
536. See id. § 306(a)(2) (1987) (redemption of section 301 stock treated as a section 301 dis-
tribution).
537. See, e.g., F. O'NEA, supra note 8, at § 2.15.
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encounter problems in finding someone willing to buy the preferred
stock, since, in a close corporation, a nonvoting equity interest nor-
mally is not a very attractive investment for an outsider. If the
preferred is not section 306 stock, and, instead of a sale to an out-
sider, the plan is for the corporation to redeem the preferred stock
while it is still in the hands of the issuees, the redemption might
fail all of the section 302(b) tests and still produce ordinary income.
IX. CONVERTIBLE SECURITIES
A conversion right is another planning device that can be used
to distribute risk, control, and participation among the investors in
a closely-held corporation. A security is convertible when it entitles
its holder to surrender it to the issuing corporation in exchange for
a security of another type or class of that corporation. Usually, the
conversion is from a senior security to common stock of the issuer.
5 38
Attractive to the investor, a convertible senior security provides the
best aspects of a senior security and common stock.5 39 As a senior
security, it offers a fixed rate of return and a hedge against insol-
vency. Since it is convertible to common stock, it offers the holder
the right to participate in future growth. In the context of closely-
held corporations, a convertible senior security is sometimes the only
form of investment that is sufficiently alluring to attract capital from
a reluctant, outsider investor.5 40 Additionally; even if the senior se-
curity is already marketable, the conversion privilege adds to its
538. See, e.g., Fleischer & Cary, The Taxation Of Convertible Bonds And Stock, 74 Hiaxv. L.
REv. 473 (1961). For other discussions of convertibles, see generally B. BrrrKER & J. EUsTIcE, supra
note 27, at 4.06; F. O'Nm, supra note 8, at § 3.36; Canellos, New Financial Products, 63 TAXEs
970 (1985); Corneel, Andrews, Finnegan, Kirk & Piper, Convertible Debentures and Strange Securities,
28 N.Y.U. INsT. oN FED. TAX'N 331 (1970); Lee, The Tax Reform Act and Convertible Debt Securities,
44A ST. JoHN's L. REv. 1081 (1970); Madison, The Deductibility of "Interest" on Hybrid Securities,
39 TAx LAw. 465, 467 (1986).
A revenue ruling offers an illustration of common stock that is convertible into preferred. All
of the common stock of a corporation was owned by its employees. The articles of incorporation
required the shareholders to convert their common into preferred upon their retirement. The purpose
of the conversion privilege was to eliminate common stock ownership by retiring employees and to
reduce the cash expenditures by the corporation that otherwise would be required if the corporation
redeemed the common stock of all retiring employees for cash. See Rev. Rul. 72-238, 1977-2 C.B.
115, 116.
539. The only things lacking in a convertible senior security are participation and voting rights,
and the holder can obtain these by converting to common stock.
540. See generally Fleischer & Cary, supra note 538, at 474-75.
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"speculative charm" and thus may increase its selling price.14 1 Con-
vertible securities trigger variegated tax consequences. The most im-
portant are discussed below.
A. Tax Consequences of the Conversion.
It is an axiom of tax law that an exchange of property is a fully
taxable event, unless specifically excepted from the requirement of
recognition by the Code. Yet it is well-settled that the act of con-
verting a convertible debt security to stock of the issuing corporation
is not a taxable event to the holder of the security54 2 notwithstanding
that this type of exchange is nowhere mentioned in the Code. As
with most nonrecognition exchanges, the converter takes a substi-
tuted basis in the newly received stock, i.e., same basis that he had
in the prior held security 43 He also tacks his holding period in the
debt on to the stock.544 The most widely accepted rationale for the
nonrecognition treatment is that the conversion is an open trans-
action. The holder is merely exercising a right granted him by the
underlying security and has yet to dispose of that security.5 4 Rec-
ognition of gain or loss thus awaits a taxable disposition of the
stock.
Nonrecognition treatment is also accorded a shareholder who
converts his stock into another class of stock of the same corpo-
ration.5 46 While conceptually the open transaction theory seems as
appropriate for convertible stock as it is for convertible debt, the
most frequently offered justification for treating the conversion of
stock into another class of stock as a nonrecognition event is that
541. F. O'NEa., supra note 8, at § 3.36.
542. Rev. Rul. 72-265, 1972-1 C.B. 222, 223. This "convertible bond rule" has been part of
the tax law since 1920. Id.; Fleischer & Cary, supra note 538, at 477. See also Rev. Rul. 72348, 1972-
2 C.B. 97.
543. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 72-265, 1972-1 C.B. 222, 223.
544. Rev. Rul. 57-535, 1957-2 C.B. 513, 517; Fleischer & Cary, supra note 538, at 478.
545. See, e.g., B. BITrKER & J. Eus=riE, supra note 27, at 4.06; Fleischer & Cary, supra note
538, at 477-78.
The conversion of debt into stock of a different corporation is a taxable event, however. See,
e.g., Estate of Timken v. Commissioner, 47 B.T.A. 494 (1942), aff'd on other issues, 141 F.2d 625
(6th Cir. 1944); Rev. Rul. 69-135, 1969-1'C.B. 198.
546. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 77-238, 1977-2 C.B. 115, 116; B. BITTKER & J. EusTIcE, supra note
27, at 4.06; Fleischer & Cary, supra note 538, at 481.
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it is a tax-free recapitalization, i.e., an "E" reorganization.5 47 Bring-
ing these conversion exchanges under the reorganization umbrella,
of course, requires the importation of all of the paraphernalia of
the reorganization regime. For example, to constitute a reorgani-
zation, the conversion exchange must be pursuant to a plan of re-
organization and for a proper business purpose. 548 Generally, these
requirements are not likely to cause problems, unless the conversion
is clearly a sham designed to extract earnings and profits from a
profitable corporation.5 49 The provision in the articles of incorpo-
ration creating the conversion privilege probably ought to satisfy the
plan of reorganization requirement, and a revenue ruling found that
a desire to simplify the capital structure of the corporation sufficed
as an acceptable business purpose for a conversion of preferred into
a common stock. 550 Moreover, a corporation almost always has a
definitive business reason for issuing convertible stock since it fa-
cilitates the raising of capital.
5 51
The conversion of convertible stock is a nontaxable event to the
issuing corporation. The governing section is 1032(a), which provides
that a corporation has neither a gain nor a loss when it issues its
own stock in return for money or other propertv.5 52 The regulations
state that the nonrecognition rule of section 1032(a) applies when
the corporation issues its own stock to acquire some of its own
shares. 53 The issuance of its own shares upon the holder's surrender
of the convertible stock fits neatly within the rule mentioned in the
regulation.
Also, prior to 1984, the act of converting convertible debt into
stock of the issuing corporation was not a taxable event to the is-
547. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 77-238, 1977-2 C.B. 115, 116; B. BITrKER & J. EusTIcE, supra note
27, at 4.17; Fleisher & Cary, supra note 538, at 481.
548. See Rev. Rul. 77-238, 1977-2 C.B. 115, 116.
549. See Fleischer & Cary, supra note 538, at 484.
The most famous recapitalization case, Bazley, 331 U.S. 737, involved an asserted recapitalization
that had no purpose other than to bail out earnings and profits. The Supreme Court held that it
lacked a business purpose and, therefore, did not constitute a tax-free reorganization.
550. See Rev. Rul. 77-238, 1977-2 C.B. 115, 116 (situation 2).
551. Fleischer & Cary, supra note 538, at 484.
552. I.R.C. § 1032(a) (1987).
553. Treas. Reg. § 1.1032-1(b) (1987). The corporation need not issue previously unissued shares
for section 1032(a) to apply in this (or any other) context. Section 1032(a) applies even when the
corporation is issuing treasury stock.
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suing corporation. 5- 4 This rule on convertible debt was part of a
larger rule that a corporation did not recognize income when it is-
sued stock to cancel its own indebtedness.5 55 TRA of 1984, however,
reversed the larger rule by adding a subsection 108(e)(10)(A) to the
Code:55 6 Subsection 108(e)(10)(A) requires a corporation issuing stock
in cancellation of its own indebtedness with an amount of money
equal to the fair market value of the stock.5 57 As a result, a cor-
poration has discharge of indebtedness income to the extent that the
principal of the debt exceeds the value of the stock. According to
the legislative history, this rule applies where the principal amount
of a corporate debt is discharged by reason of the exercise of a
conversion right by the holder of the debt.55 8 Thus, a corporation
thereafter will have income on conversion of a convertible debt into
stock to the extent the principal of the debt discharged exceeds the
fair market value of the stock. Of course, the holder of debt is
unlikely to convert when the stock to be received in the conversion
is worth less than the principal of the debt. This new income rec-
ognition rule does not apply to convertible debt issued prior to June
7, 1984. 559 The conversion of such convertible debt falls under the
old rule that the act of converting convertible debt to stock does
not produce any income, gain, or loss to the issuing corporation.
B. Bond Premiums.
A conversion feature drastically affects the tax treatment of bond
premiums. For example, a bondholder cannot take an amortization
deduction for any part of a bond premium attributable to a con-
version feature in the bond, though the holder can deduct any part
of the premium attributable to other features of the bond, e.g., a
554. See, e.g., Eustice, Cancellation of Indebtedness and the Federal Income Tax: A Problem
of Creeping Confusion, 14 TAx L. REv. 225, 238-40 (1959); Fleischer & Carv, supra note 538, at
497.
555. See, e.g., Motor Mart Trust, 156 F.2d 122; REvEauE PROVISIONS, supra note 168, at 167;
Eustice, supra note 554; Fleischer, supra note 538, at 497.
556. See supra note 49.
557. I.R.C. § 108(e)(10)(A) (1987); REvEmmE PROVISIONS, supra note 168, at 167-68.
558. See REVENuE PROVISIONS, supra note 168, at 168.
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higher than market interest rate. This and other bond premium is-
sues, including those involving convertibility, are discussed later in
this paper.
C. Original Issue Discount.
For purposes of the original issue discount rules, a convertible
debt's issue price includes a premium paid to the issuing corporation
for the conversion privilege. 60 Accordingly, the conversion preimum
produces neither an original issue discount interest deduction for the
corporation nor original issue discount interest income for the
holder.5 6' It is well settled that the issuing corporation may amortize
original issue discount on convertible debt so long as the debt is
outstanding. The discount is deductible until the time of conver-
sion.162 Upon conversion, however, the corporation loses the right
to deduct any unamortized discount, either as a loss in the con-
version year or as an expense in a later year. The reasoning is that
as long as interest payments are being made, adjustments for the
discount (or premium) must be made where the interest rate does
not reflect the true yield of the bonds. Upon conversion of the debt
into stock, the obligation to pay both the interest and the discount
ceases, and, hence, the justification for the deduction disappears.5
63
It seems plausible that under the tax benefit rule, the corporation
should be made to include the previously deducted discount in its
income during the conversion year, since the corporation has taken
a deduction on the assumption it ultimately would pay the discount
on retirement of the debt and, due to the conversion, it never will
pay that discount 64 However, no cases have been found to support
560. See, e.g., Chock Full O'Nuts Corp. v. United States, 322 F. Supp. 772 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd,
453 F.2d 300 (2d Cir. 1971); Treas. Reg. § 1.1232-3(b)(2)(i) (1987); Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.1273-2(e).
561. See, e.g., Chock Full O'Nuts Corp., 322 F. Supp. 772.
562. See, e.g., Union Pac. R.R., 293 U.S. 282; Fleischer & Cary, supra note 538, at 505.
563. See, e.g., Chicago North Shore & Milwaukee Ry. v. United States, 326 F.2d 860 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 964, reh'g denied, 379 U.S. 872 (1964); Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac.
R.R. v. United States, 404 F.2d 960 (Ct. Cl. 1968), later proceeding, 187 Ct. Cl. 733 (1969); Pierce
Oil Corp. v.Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 403 (1935); Chicago, R.I. & Pac. Ry., 13 B.T.A. 988; Rev.
Rul. 72-348, 1972-2 C.B. 97; B. BrrrIER & J. EusTicE, supra note 27, at 4.06; Fleischer & Cary,
supra note 538, at 505-07.
564. Fleischer & Cary, supra note 538, at 509-12.
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this argument. Perhaps, new section 108(e)(10)(A), discussed above,
subsumes the question by providing a general principle for the is-
suance of stock to cancel corporate indebtedness, i.e., the corpo-
ration has discharge of indebtedness income to the extent that the
principal of the debt exceeds the value of the stock. 565
X. BoND PREm-ts AND RELATED ISSUES
A bond sells at a premium when the amount required to be paid
by the issuing corporation at maturity or upon call is less than the
taxpayer's purchase price. The bond premium is the amount of the
taxpayer's cost that exceeds the face value or value of the bond.
While there are a variety of reasons for a bond selling at a premium
(or at a discount, for that matter), 66 often the reason is that the
interest rate on the bond exceeds the yield on similar securities in
the marketplace. In that situation, the premium is the extra cost
that the purchaser must pay to acquire the higher than market rate
of interest. When a taxpayer purchases a bond at a premium, the
actual rate of interest, thus, is not a true reflection of the bond's
yield, but represents, in part, a return of the premium. Since the
bondholder pays more than the face value of the bond, he will not
recover his purchase prince in full upon retirement. 67 Accordingly,
the tax law conceivably could have taken a hands-off approach and
have made the bond purchaser wait until retirement and take a loss
then.5 6 Instead, section 171 of the Code allows a taxpayer to am-
ortize the premium by deducting it over the life of the bond.5 69 The
amortization deduction is designed to give "a better yearly ap-
proximation of the 'true' interest income earned by the bond-
holder. "570
565. See I.R.C. § 108(e)(10)(A) (1987).
566. For a list of reasons for debt discount or premium, see Fleischer & Cary, supra note 538,
at 499 n.119.
567. See, e.g., National Can Corp. v. United States, 687 F.2d 1107, 1113 (7th Cir. 1982); Fried,
Taxation of Securities Transactions, in liB BuSINESS ORGANiZATnONS § 17.02[5][a] (1987); Fleischer
& Cary, supra note 538, at 504.
568. National Can Corp., 687 F.2d at 1113.
569. I.R.C. § 171 (1987). If the bond is callable, the amortizable bond premium is computed
by subtracting the greater of the price due on maturity or on the earlier call date from the taxpayer's
basis in the bond. Id. at § 171(b)(1)(A), (B) (1987).
570. National Can Corp., 687 F.2d at 1113.
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A conversion privilege is such an attractive feature for a bond
that it, too, often results in the bond selling at a premium.17l Section
171 expressly states, however, that a bondholder cannot take an
amortization deduction for any part of a bond premium attributable
to the conversion feature of the bond.5 72 The rationale for the ex-
clusion is that a bondholder who has paid a premium to acquire an
unexercised conversion right in effect has bought an option to buy
the stock of the issuer. The value of the conversion right is, there-
fore, unconnected to the differential between the bond's and the
market rate of interest. Unlike the higher-than-market rate of in-
terest, the conversion feature does not produce a distorted picture
of the bondholder's interest income. Accordingly, the amortization
deduction for the bond premium is not needed as an offset to reflect
the bond's effective interest rate.5 7 3 Yet the fact that a bond is con-
vertible does not, in itself, prevent the application of section 171. 574
A convertible bond is within the scope of section 171, if the option
to convert rests with the holder.5 7 5 The bondholder must prove, how-
ever, that at least part of the premium is attributable to a feature
other than the conversion privilege, e.g., a higher-than-market rate
of interest. In other words, he must be able to allocate the premium
between the conversion feature and the high interest rate. 576
Bond premium is included in a holder's basis, since it represents
a part of his cost in purchasing the bond. He must reduce his basis
in the bond, however, by the amounts of his bond premium am-
ortization deductions 77
571. See, e.g., Fleischer & Cary, supra note 538, at 499 n.119.
572. I.R.C. § 171(b)(1) (1987).
573. See, e.g., National Can Corp., 687 F.2d at 1113; Honeywell, Inc. v. Commissioner, 87.
T.C. 624 (1987).
574. See Treas. Reg. § 1.171-2(c)(1) (1987).
575. See id.
576. See id. The bondholder ascertains the value of the conversion feature by referring to the
"assumed" price at which the bond minus the conversion feature, would be purchased on the open-
market and then by subtracting that "assumed" price from his cost in purchasing the bond. He
ascertains the assumed price of the bond without the conversion feature by comparing the yields on
bonds with similar character, not having the conversion feature, as sold on the open market. Id.
For a case denying amortization deductions on bond premiums attributable to a conversion
feature, See National Can Corp., 687 F.2d 1107.
577. See I.R.C. § 1016(a)(5) (1987); Treas. Reg. § 1.1016-5(b) (1987).
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If a bondholder converts his bond into common stock before
fully amortizing the part of the bond premium not attributable to
the conversion feature, he loses the right to take a deduction for
the part of the bond premium that is unamortized at the date of
conversion.5 78 The unamortized bond premium is considered part of
the taxpayer's basis in the stock received by exercise of the con-
version right, and any future gain or loss will be recognized upon
disposition of that stock.5 79 The bondholder is not required to re-
capture the premium that he has already deducted since it represents
his cost in acquiring the higher rate of interest which interest he has
already taken into income.58 When a convertible debt is redeemed
prior to maturity, the holder can deduct, in the year of the re-
demption, the part of the unamortized bond premium that is not
attributable to the conversion right. 8'
A corporation realizes no income, gain, or loss when it issues
bonds at face value.582 When it issues bonds at premium, the pre-
mium, excluding any part attributable to a conversion privilege, is
income to the corporation, though the corporation prorates the pre-
mium over the life of the bond instead of including it all in income
in the issue year.583 This requirement that the premium be included
annually in income on a prorated basis is based on the notion that
the issuing corporation is entitled to deduct only its effective rate
of interest on its debt obligations,5 84 which is computed by sub-
tracting the premium paid to the corporation for the higher interest
rate, prorated annually, from the higher interest rate. The prorated
inclusion of the premium in income serves as an offset to the higher
than market interest deduction, thereby in effect reducing the amount
of the interest deduction each year to the effective interest rate paid
578. See Ades, 38 T.C. at 512.
579. Id.
580. See Fleischer & Cary, supra note 538, at 505.
581. I.R.C. § 171(b)(1), (2) (1987); Treas. Reg. § 1.171-2(a)(2)(iii) (1987). Cf. Ades, 38 T.C.
501.
582. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12(c)(1) (1987).
583. See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12(c)(2) (1987); Bayshore Gardens, Inc. v. Commissioner, 267
F.2d 55, 57 (2d Cir. 1959); Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Commissioner, 22 B.T.A. 1407, 1433-34 (1931),
rev'd on other issues, 66 F.2d 61 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 290 U.S. 672 (1933); Fall River Elec. Light
Co. v. Commissioner, 23 B.T.A. 168, 172-74 (1931).
584. See, e.g., Ades, 38 T.C. 501; Fleischer & Cary, supra note 538, at 500.
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by the corporation. It is also thought that a corporation should be
able to exclude from its income any bond premium that has yet to
be amortized at the time of a conversion, whether or not the un-
amortized premium is attributable to a conversion feature. This
thought is based on the presumed applicability of section 1032(a),
which exempts a corporation from recognized income, gain, or loss
when it receives property in exchange for its stock. Upon conversion,
the unamortized bond premium is deemed to be part of the stock's
issue price. 585
When a corporation retires a bond at maturity, it ordinarily will
not have income, gain, or loss even if the bonds were originally
issued at a premium or a discount. This is because the issuing cor-
poration already will have amortized any premium or discount over
the life of the bond, treating the premium as income58 6 and deducting
the discount.5 87 Special rules are required, however, for redemptions
or repurchases of bonds prior to maturity. When a corporation pays
more than the issue price5 88 to redeem or repurchase, 89 for example,
the indenture for an issue of redeemable bonds typically requires
the issuing corporation to pay a call premium for redemptions prior
to maturity. Subject to an exception contained in section 249, the
call premiums are deductible expenses to the corporation.5 90 Section
249 disallows a corporate deduction for any part of a call premium
attributable to the conversion feature of convertible debt.5 91 It allows
the corporation to deduct a "normal call premium," which is de-
fined as "an amount equal to a normal call premium on a non-
585. See, e.g., B. BrrTma & J. EusTicE, supra note 27, at 4.06; Fleischer & Cary, supra note
538, at 500-02.
586. Treas. Reg. § 1.61-12(c)(2) (1987). See Fried, supra note 567, at § 17.05[1].
587. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-3(a)(1) (1987). See Fried, supra note 567, at § 17.05[1].
588. Actually, "issue price" is misleading in this context for bonds issued at either a discount
or a premium. For bonds that were issued at a premium, the excess of the redemption (or repurchase)
price over the issue price minus any bond premium included in the corporation's income prior to
repurchase is the amount deductible as an expense in the year of redemption (or repurchase). For
bonds issued at a discount, the excess of the redemption (or repurchase) price over the issue price
plus any discount deducted by the corporation prior to redemption (or repurchase) is the corporation's
deductible expense in the redemption (or repurchase) year. Fried, supra note 567, at § 17.05(1].
589. Treas. Reg. § 1.163-3(c)(1) (1987).
590. Id.
591. I.R.C. § 249(a) (1987).
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convertible obligation which is comparable to the convertible
obligation.' '592
In other words, the corporation is entitled to deduct only that
part of the premium attributable to factors other than the conversion
privilege. The effect is to allow a deduction on the portion of the
premium representing an additional interest expense, but to disallow
a deduction on that part of the premium analogous to an amount
paid in a capital transaction. 93
XI. LEASES
Closely-held corporations and their shareholders can gain both
non-tax and tax advantages by making the shareholders purchase
business property in their own name and then lease it to the cor-
poration rather than contribute it as capital or transfer it in exchange
for stock.
The primary non-tax advantage is simple. The leasing arrange-
ment protects the shareholder against a bankruptcy of the business.
The crucial point is that the shareholders retain title to the business
property. The closely-held corporation never takes title to it, and it
never becomes subject to attachment by creditors of the corporation
or a trustee in bankruptcy acting in their behalf. Of course, both
state courts and bankruptcy courts have substantial equitable powers
to invalidate fraudulent conveyances, voidable preferences, or other
fraudulent schemes involving shareholders and closely held corpo-
rations. And courts have used these powers to characterize payments
of rents to shareholders as fraudulent conveyances or voidable pre-
592. See id.; Treas. Reg. § 1.249-1(d)(1) (1987).
593. S. RaP. No. 552, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 149 (1969). See also Fried, supra note 567, at §
17.05[2] n.8.
Section 249 legislatively institutes the position of the Internal Revenue Service, taken in Rev.
Rul. 67-409, 1967-2 C.B. 62, that an excess premium does not constitute a cost of borrowing money
and hence should not be deductible as interest. See J. CHommi, supra note 127, at § 74 n.89.
For cases denying the deductibility of premiums reflecting conversion features, see, e.g., National
Can Corp., 687 F.2d 1107; Roberts & Porter, Inc. v. Commissioner, 307 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1962)
(superceded by statute as stated in National Can Corp.); AMF, Inc. v. United States, 476 F.2d 1351
(Ct. Cl. 1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 930 (1974); Chock Full O'Nuts Corp., 322 F. Supp. 772;
Honeywell, Inc., 87 T.C. 624; Hunt Foods & Indus. v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 633 (1972), aff'd,
496 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1974).
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ferences. 94 One would think that a trustee in bankruptcy at one
time or another also would have advanced a thin incorporation or
inadequate capitalization argument against these shareholder leases.
This would be especially true when the term of the lease equals or
approaches the useful life of the leased assets. The transaction then
closely parallels a sale of the property by the shareholders with the
shareholders retaining a security interest in the property, a trans-
action that perhaps could be recharacterized as a contribution to
capital or as a payment in exchange for stock, resulting in a sub-
ordination of the claims of the shareholder-seller to those of external
creditors .95 Given the close parallel between the sale and lease trans-
actions, one would think that at some point a trustee in bankruptcy
might succeed in convincing a court to treat a lease or sale as a
contribution to capital or a transfer of property in exchange for
stock. Surprisingly, so far there seems to be no reported bankruptcy
law cases confronting this argument.
Leases provide multiple tax advantages. 96 Generally, the share-
holder-lessor must include the rental payments in gross income,
but he is entitled to the tax advantages of ownership of business
property 98 i.e., depreciation or cost recovery deductions, formerly
594. See e.g., In re Gillespie Tire Co., 54 F. Supp. 336 (W.D.S.C. 1944); In re Flamini, 23
Bankr. 668 (E.D. Mich. 1982).
595. Several Subchapter S cases have focused on the lease v. sale issue. In these cases, generally
the Service has argued that the corporation is a lessor rather than a seller of property. Accordingly,
payments to it were passive investment income, thereby endangering the corporation's status as an
S corporation. See e.g., Van Elten v. Commissioner, 623 F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1980). See generally J.
EUSnICE & J. KurNz, FEDRAL INcoamE TAXATiON OF S CORPORATIONS, 5.04[2][b] n.144 (rev. ed.
1985) (and cases cited therein). See also In re Beker Indus., 69 Bankr. 937 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) ("lease"
of property was held to be a "conditional sale"); Johnson v. Commissioner, 21 T.C.M. (CCH) 1126
(1962) ("lease" of property held to be a "sale"); Colonial Leasing Co. v. Larson Bros. Constr. Co.,
731 P.2d 483 (Utah 1986) ("lease" of property held to be a "disguised sale"). Cf. Footpress Corp.
v. Strickland, 242 Ga. 686, 251 S.E.2d 278 (1978). For a general discussion on lease financing, see
Gant, Illusion In Lease Financing, 37 H]v. Bus. Rv. 121 (1959).
596. For discussions of the tax treatment of leases, see generally Cook, Sales and Leasebacks,
36-3d Tax Mgmt (BNA) 97 (1986); Walthall, Equipment Leasing, 12-6th Tax Mgmt (BNA) 31 (1986);
Baskes, Tax Planning for Lease Transactions, 1972 U. ILL. L. FoRUm 482; Fink, Shareholder Lease
of Property to Corporation Can Maximize Tax Benefits to Both Parties, 26 TAX'N FOR ACCT. 248
(1981); Warren, The Corporate Interest Deduction: A Policy Evaluation, 83 YArH L.J. 1585, 1610-
14 (1974).
597. I.R.C. § 61(a)(5) (1987).
598. Warren, supra note 596, at 1610.
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the investment tax credit, and interest expense deductions.5 99 Indeed,
the shareholders might even have the option of transferring several
of these advantages (the depreciation and investment tax credit) to
the corporation. 60 Moreover, the corporation is entitled to deduct
reasonable rent paid to the shareholders as an ordinary and necessary
business expense under section 162(a)(3). 601 Thus, although the rent
payments are income to the shareholder, the deduction for the cor-
poration allows the taxpayers to avoid the double tax of corporate
earnings at the corporate level. This is an important advantage of
leasing over equity financing. As with all transactions between share-
holders and their closely-held corporations, the Internal Revenue
Service sometimes has challenged the taxpayers' characterization of
various aspects of lease transactions as a true lease. The Service has
been particularly active in seeking to reduce corporate deductions
for rent, by arguing that the corporation can deduct only reasonable
rent payments and that payments in excess of a reasonable rent are
disguised section 301 distributions to the shareholders. 0 2
The Service sometimes has also been unwilling to accept the tax-
payers' characterization of a transaction as a lease, arguing that the
transaction should be considered a sale rather than a lease. 603 If the
transaction is recharacterized as a sale, the shareholder-seller must
recognize a gain or a loss unless the transaction fits under the non-
recognition rule of section 351. If the lease is recast as a sale, the
depreciation or cost recovery deductions and any available invest-
ment credits are shifted from the shareholder to the corporation.
The corporation may also be entitled to an interest deduction under
599. See, e.g., Cook, supra note 596; Fink, supra note 596; Warren, supra note 596.
600. See, e.g., Warren, supra note 596, at 1610.
601. See I.R.C. § 162(a)(3) (1987).
602. See, e.g., Sparks Nugget, Inc. v. Commissioner, 458 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied
sub nom. Graves v. Commissioner, 410 U.S. 928 (1973); Fairmount Park Raceway, Inc. v. Com-
missioner, 327 F.2d 780 (7th Cir. 1964); Armstrong Co. v. Commissioner, 188 F.2d 531 (5th Cir.
1951); Limericks, Inc. v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 483 (5th Cir. 1948).
603. See, e.g., Western Contracting Corp. v. Commissioner, 271 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1959); Ar-
kansas Bank & Tr. Co. v. United States, 224 F. Supp. 171 (W.D. Ark. 1963); Abramson v. United
States, 133 F. Supp. 677 (S.D. Iowa 1955); Mills v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 25 (1948); Rev. Rul. 55-
540, 1952-2 C.B. 39; Rev. Rul. 60-122, 1960 1 C.B. 56. See generally Walthall, supra note 596, at
A-3; Baskes, supra note 596.
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the imputed interest rules. 604 Unfortunately, the corporation often
has too little income to actually benefit from the deductions and
credits which it unwittingly has acquired. The harm is to the share-
holder-lessor who undoubtedly has enough income to make fruitful
use of the transferred tax benefits.
The worst case would be a recharacterization of the lease trans-
action as a contribution to capital or a payment in exchange for
stock. In that situation, the shareholder-lessor would lose all the tax
benefits associated with owning business property such as depreci-
ation deductions. Both the shareholder-lessor and the corporation
would suffer all the tax disadvantages associated with equity in-
cluding treatment of the rental payments as section 301 distributions.
So far, fortunately, and perhaps surprisingly, the government seems
not yet to have tried to recast a purported lease as a payment for
stock or a contribution to capital.
XII. STOCK TRANSFER RESTRICTIONS
A change in the mix of individuals entitled either to manage the
affairs of the business or to participate in profits has presented re-
current problems for close corporations. Shareholders have sought
to avoid these problems through restrictions on the issuance and
transfer of their shares. 605 Indeed, stock transfer restrictions are
amongst the cornerstones in sound planning for close corporations.
More specifically, there are three basic reasons for imposing
transfer restrictions on the stock of close corporations. The first is
the retention of the right to choose one's own business associates.
As in the partnership, a personal element is crucial in the make-up
and management of a closely held corporation. 60 6 Because there is
frequently an identity in closely held corporations between share-
holders and management, the success or failure of the venture de-
pends ultimately on the quality of the shareholders. 6°7 For example,
604. See Walthall, supra note 596.
605. The text on stock transfer restrictions condenses some materials from two earlier articles
by the author. See Rands, Closely Held Corporations: Restrictions on Stock Transfers, 84 CoM. L.J.
461 (1979) [hereinafter Rands Stock Transfers]; Rands, Tax Consequences, supra note 257.
606. See Rands, Stock Transfers, supra note 605, at 462.
607. See id. at 462.
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when all of the shareholders participate in the business, it might be
wise to use a transfer restriction to avoid substitution of a nonactive
shareholder (frequently an heir) for one of the present shareholders,
a situation that frequently generates friction between old and new
shareholders.6°s
The second reason for transfer restrictions is to provide a method
for shareholders, particularly minority shareholders, to recoup their
investment upon divestment of their shares. Since often there is no
market for minority shares in a closely held corporation, a with-
drawing shareholder (or the heirs of a deceased shareholder) might
receive nothing absent a buy-sell agreement compelling the others
in the enterprise to purchase the stock at a fair price. Therefore,
planners often recommefid a buy-sell agreement to assure each share-
holder of a market for his shares upon his withdrawal or upon his
death.0
The third reason for transfer restrictions is to assure compliance
with the requirements of statutes that provide special treatment for
closely held corporations. 60 For example, the parties may desire to
restrict stock transfers to ensure that the transferee will not dis-
qualify the corporation from eligibility under Subchapter S of the
Internal Revenue Code.61'
The tax consequences of stock transfer restrictions naturally de-
pend on the terms of the restriction and the choices made by the
608. See, e.g., In re Radom & Neidorff, Inc., 307 N.Y. 1, 119 N.E.2d 563 (1954), discussed in
Rands, Stock Transfers, supra note 605, at 462 n.13.
The reasons for the stock transfer restriction may be quite specific. They include: (1) a desire
to keep share ownership within the family, see, e.g., Fayard v. Fayard, 293 So. 2d 421 (Miss. 1974);
(2) to prevent interference or control by competitors, see, e.g., Mason v. Mallard Tel. Co., 213 Iowa
1076, 240 N.W. 671 (1932); (3) prevent a small group of shareholders from obtaining absolute control,
see Campbell v. Campbell, 198 Kan. 181, 422 P.2d 932 (1967); and (4) encourage employees to stay
with the business by requiring them to sell stock in the close corporation at a low price upon ter-
mination of employment. See, e.g., Harker v. Ralston Purina Co., 45 F.2d 929 (7th Cir. 1930), cert.
denied, 284 U.S. 619 (1931) (Missouri law). See Note, Close Corporation Stock Repurchase Agree-
ments, 11 W. Ras. L. REv. 278, 279 (1960). See generally Rands, Stock Transfers, supra note 605,
at 462-463.
609. See, e.g., Hornstein, Stockholders' Agreements in the Closely Held Corporation, 59 YALE
L.J. 1040, 1049 (1950); Rands, Stock Transfers, supra note 605, at 463.
610. Nanfito v. Tekseed Hybrid Co., 341 F. Supp. 240, 246 n.5 (D. Neb. 1972), aff'd, 473 F.2d
537 (8th Cir. 1973); Rands, Stock Transfers, supra note 605, at 463.
611. Nanfito, 341 F. Supp. at 246 n.5; Rands, Stock Transfers, supra note 605, at 463.
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parties to the restriction. Enforcement of a stock transfer restriction
may result in a transfer of stock to an outsider, a transfer to other
shareholders, a redemption by the corporation, or no transfer of
the stock at all.612 When the operation of the restriction results in
a sale of stock by the withdrawing shareholder to other shareholders,
the tax consequences usually are straightforward. The sale results
in recognition of a capital gain or loss to the selling shareholder,
though, in the case of a loss, section 267 will deny a deduction if
the purchaser is a "related" taxpayer.61 3 The buying shareholder, of
course, realizes neither gain nor loss, unless he uses property other
than cash. If he uses cash only, the purchaser's adjusted basis in
the stock will be the amount of cash he pays for the stock.6 14
If operation of the transfer restriction results in a redemption,
the tax consequences are more -complex. The redeemed shareholder
recognizes a capital gain or loss, as he would if he sells his stock-
but only if the redemption meets one of the tests described in section
302(b).615 If the redemption meets none of the section 302(b) tests,
the redemption proceeds are treated like section 301 distributions,
61 6
i.e., dividends and ordinary income to the extent of the corporation's
earnings and profits.6 17 The section 302(b)(3) test, which requires a
redemption of all the stock owned by the selling shareholder, is
ordinarily satisfied, because the selling shareholder usually desires
to sell all of his shares and, at least under most buy-sell restrictions,
is usually required to do so. Restrictions seldom allow the corpo-
ration or the continuing shareholders to buy only a part of the shares
offered to them.6 18 For less than complete redemptions, the section
612. For a full discussion of the permutations in the enforcement of stock transfer restrictions,
see Rands, Tax Consequences, supra note 257, at 450.
613. Section 267 denies a deduction for a loss from the sale of property between specified related
persons. Related persons include, amongst others, an individual's brothers, sisters, spouse, ancestors
and lineal descendants. I.R.C. § 267(a)(1), (b)(1), (c)(2), (4) (1987). Related party rules, like those
contained in section 267, often have an adverse impact on close corporations, which, by their nature,
commonly have related parties as shareholders.
614. See id. § 1012 (1987).
615. Id. § 302(a), (b) (1987). For a full discussion of section 302 and its impact on stock transfer
restrictions, see generally Rands, Tax Consequences, supra note 257, at 451-55.
616. Id. § 302(d) (1987).
617. Id. §§ 301(c)(1), 316(a) (1987).
618. Rands, Tax Consequences, supra note 257, at 452.
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318 attribution rules, which make the redeemed shareholder the con-
structive owner of stock owned by other family members, 619 stand
as formidable barriers to exchange treatment for a redeemed share-
holder in a family-owned corporation. Moreover, if, pursuant to the
stock transfer restriction, a subsidiary acquires stock of a parent or
a shareholder sells a stock to a related corporation, the special re-
demption rules of section 304 will be triggered. 620
Ordinarily, the corporation recognizes neither a gain nor a loss
from the enforcement of a stock transfer restriction. When the re-
sulting transaction is a sale of stock, the corporation is not involved
in the transaction at all. Corporate assets and liabilities are not af-
fected, and the corporation usually has no legal interest in the iden-
tity of its shareholders. 621 When the resulting transaction is a cash
redemption, the corporation again has no gain, loss or deduction.622
The corporation is likely to recognize a gain, however, if it uses
appreciated property-in-kind to pay for a redemption, 623 but this
potential income tax liability has dissuaded most companies from
using anything other than cash to fund redemptions.
624
Stock transfer restrictions can generate a host of other issues.
One potential problem is constructive dividend treatment for non-
redeemed shareholders. 625 The vortex of this controversy has been
the disproportionate redemption. At one time the Internal Revenue
Service contended that when the redemption of another's stock in-
creased the value of the non-redeemed shareholders' stock, that en-
hanced value constituted a constructive dividend. After a series of
619. See I.R.C. §§ 302(c)(1), 318(a)(1) (1987). The attribution rules apply to complete redemp-
tions, too, but section 302(c)(2) alows the completely redeemed shareholder to be free of the family
attribution rules by meeting three conditions, one of which is that he must retain no interest of the
corporation after the redemption other than that of a creditor. Id. at § 302(c)(2)(i) (1987).
For an unfortunate example of a redeemed shareholder keeping a minor position with the cor-
poration, see Levin v. Commissioner, 385 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1967).
For illustrations of the impact of the attribution rules on less than complete redemptions in
family corporations, see Rands, Tax Consequences, supra note 257, at 453-54.
620. See I.R.C. § 304(a)(l)-(2) (1987).
621. Rands, Tax Consequences, supra note 257, at 455.
622. See I.R.C. § 311(a)(2) (1987).
623. See id. § 311(b)(1) (1987).
624. Rands, Tax Consequences, supra note 257, at 455.
625. For a full discussion, see generally Rands, Tax Consequences, supra note 257, at 456-58.
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courthouse defeats, 626 however, the Service at last conceded on this
issue.6 27 The remaining problem area, one which lawyers can avoid,
is the transfer restriction that requires the continuing shareholders
purchase the stock of the withdrawing shareholder. If the corpo-
ration redeems the stock the payment discharges a personal obli-
gation of the non-redeemed shareholder and is a constructive
distribution to him.6 28 The key to avoiding a constructive distribution
treatment, therefore, is to place the primary obligation to buy shares
of the withdrawing shareholder in the corporation itself.629 The con-
tinuing shareholders can even guarantee the payment of the re-
demption price by the corporation without risking constructive
distribution treatment. 630
Stock transfer restrictions also can have accumulated earnings
tax implications.6 31 The recurring issue in tax litigation has been
whether the need to accumulate funds to pay for the redemption of
stock of a closely held corporation constitutes a "reasonable need
of the business," thereby pretermitting imposition of the accumu-
lated earnings tax. The problem is that many redemptions satisfy
both shareholder and corporate objectives. A prime example is the
buy-sell restriction requiring a corporation to redeem stock at a fair
price on the death or termination of employment of a shareholder.
Since the restriction is triggered by end of employment, the re-
demption disenfranchises shareholders who may harbor ill will against
the company, perhaps because the corporation fired them or because
they have gone to work for a competitor. Obviously, in these cir-
626. See, e.g., Niederkrome v. Commissioner, 266 F.2d 238 (9th Cir. 1958); Holsey v. Com-
missioner, 258 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 1958); Wall v. United States, 164 F.2d 462 (4th Cir. 1947); Bennett
v. Commissioner, 58 T.C. 381 (1972); Ciaio v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 447 (1967).
627. See Rev. Rul. 58-614, 1958-1 C.B. 920, acq., Holsey, 258 F.2d 865.
628. See, e.g., Sullivan v. United States, 363 F.2d 724, 729 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 387
U.S. 905, reh'g denied, 388 U.S. 924 (1967); Rev. Rul. 69-608, 1969-2 C.B. 43.
629. Rands, Tax Consequences, supra note 257, at 458.
630. The nonredeemed shareholder receives a constructive distribution only if he is subject to
an "existing primary and unconditional obligation" to make the payment himself. When he guarantees
the corporate obligation to redeem the stock, he is only secondarily liable. Rev. Rul. 69-608, 1969-
2 C.B. 43.
631. For a discussion of stock transfer restrictions and the accumulated earnings tax, see generally
McFadden, The Accumulated Earnings Tax Accumulations To Finance Stock Redemptions, 58 TAxEs
719 (1980); Rands, Tax Consequences, supra note 257, at 461-63.
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cumstances, accumulations to fund such redemptions are part of a
plan serving a corporate objective. 632 Such a buy-sell agreement,
however, also serves the primarily personal objective, discussed above,
of enabling a withdrawing shareholder (or his heirs) to recoup at
least part of his investment upon divestment of his shares. This
tension between corporate and personal objectives is highlighted by
a group of decisions involving friction between various shareholder
groups. Courts have found a corporate objective when a redemption
eliminates a strident and dissident minority shareholder group,
633
breaks a deadlock 634 or is in lieu of sale of stock to an outsider who
wishes to alter the corporation's current policies. 635 Since internal
strife disrupts the efficient operation of the business, these re-
demptions serve a corporate objective in freeing or protecting the
corporation from internal conflict. 636
The key issue, though, (and it's one that's not fully developed)
is whether accumulations to fund a possible redemption satisfy a
corporate objective in the absence of present shareholder strife. Per-
haps, they should, and at least one case has so held.637 Because the
success of close corporations depends on the identity of the share-
holders, and because the jurisprudence is replete with bitter contests
between old and new shareholders in fights following the death or
withdrawal of one of the original shareholders and substitution of
a new one, accumulations to fund stock transfer restrictions that
give remaining shareholders the right to reject proposed new share-
632. See, e.g., Shaw-Walker Co. v. Commissioner, 24 T.C.M. (CCH) 1709, 1736 (1965), vacated,
390 F.2d 205 (6th Cir. 1968), vacated, 393 U.S. 478 (1969), on remand, 412 F.2d 858 (6th Cir. 1969),
appealed sub nom. Nolen v. Shaw-Walker Co., 449 F.2d 506 (6th Cir. 1971). See also Rands, Tax
Consequences, supra note 257, at 461-62.
633. See, e.g., Mountain State Steel Foundries, 284 F.2d at 744.
634. See, e.g., Farmers & Merchants Inv. Co., 29 T.C.M. (CCH) 705.
635. See, e.g., Gazette Publishing Co. v. Self, 103 F. Supp. 779, 784 (E.D. Ark. 1952).
636. Rands, Tax Consequences, supra note 257, at 462.
637. Hooper, Inc. v. United States, 539 F.2d 1276 (Ct. Cl. 1976). In Hooper, the corporation
had a "preexisting policy that ownership and control of the business should, if possible, be confined
to those who managed it .. " Id. at 1289. The court concluded that accumulation of earnings to
buy out a withdrawing shareholder served a business need. Id. Unfortunately, Hooper is weak prec-
edent because the court offered no reasons for its conclusions. Instead it merely cited to earlier cases,
both of which involved redemptions carried out to resolve shareholder conflict. Furthermore, the court
did not even cite, much less try to distinguish, several contrary cases. Rands, Tax Consequences,
supra note 257, at 463.
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holders ought to be considered sufficiently connected with the well-
being of the corporation and within the reasonable needs of the
business. 63 8 At least four cases, however, have found redemptions
to be for personal and not corporate purposes.
63 9
To insulate itself as much as possible from the accumulated earn-
ings tax liability, the corporation should document its reason for
the stock transfer restriction: a desire to foster an orderly contin-
uation of the business following the death or withdrawal of one of
its shareholders. 640
Stock transfer restrictions also affect the value of the underlying
shares and are among the factors that must be considered any time
the shares are valued for tax purposes. 641 Restrictions that limit the
investment decisions available to the shareholder, especially the right
of the shareholder to sell to the highest offeror, tend to diminish
the value of the underlying stock. 642 A few restrictions, on the other
hand, enhance the value of the stock. For example, a restriction
might assure the continuity of ownership or management, or, in the
case of a buy-sell restriction, create a market for the stock of a
close corporation that otherwise might not have existed.
643
XIII. SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF THE S CORPORATION
The S corporation is an especially desirable choice of business
organization for many closely held businesses. Unlike general part-
ners, its shareholders have a shield of limited liability. Unlike limited
partners, the shareholders are not constrained from managing the
business affairs of their enterprise. If the business loses money, the
638. Rands, Tax Consequences, supra note 257, at 462-63.
639. See Pelton Steel Casting Co. v. Commissioner, 251 F.2d 278, 281-82 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
356 U.S. 958 (1958); John B. Lambert & Assoc. v. United States, 212 Ct. Cl. 71, 83-84 (1976); Firstco,
Inc. v. United States, 430 F. Supp. 1193, 1202 (S.D. Miss. 1977), aff'd, 607 F.2d 704 (5th Cir. 1979);
Cadillac Textiles, Inc. v. Commissioner, 34 T.C.M. (CCH) 295, 308 (1975).
640. Rands, Tax Consequences, supra note 257, at 463.
641. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 68-609, 1968-2 C.B. 327; 65-192, 1965-2 C.B. 259. See also J. MERTENS,
LAW OF FEDERAL INComE TAXATION, § 59.20 (1976); Friedlob, Effect IRS Gives to Restrictions in
Determining Value of Stock Varies, 8 TAX'N FOR LAw. 90 (1979); Rands, Tax Consequences, supra
note 257, at 463-65; Schreier & Joy, Judicial Valuation of "Close" Corporation Stock: Alice in
Wonderland Revisited, 31 OKLA. L. R~v. 853, 865-66, 872-76 (1978).
642. See, e.g., Worcester County Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 134 F.2d 578, 582. (Ist Cir. 1943).
643. Rands, Tax Consequences, supra note 257, at 464.
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S corporation, unlike the C corporation, passes the losses through
to the shareholders, who, with some limitations, can deduct them
on their individual income tax returns. Even the flow through of
income to the S corporation shareholder generally is good, now that
the highest marginal tax rate for non-corporate taxpayers (28%) is
lower than the rate for C corporations (34%). However, the height-
ened desirability of the S corporation election requires an increased
scrutiny of capital structure and related issues.
A. Limitations on Shareholders.
Unfortunately, the 1986- Code contains all of the old 1954 Code
eligibility requirements for S corporations. Accordingly, to be eli-
gible for S corporation status, the corporation must:
(i) be a domestic corporation;
(ii) have no more than 35 shareholders;
(iii) not have another corporation, a partnership or a non-qualifying trust as a
shareholder; and
(iv) not have a non-resident alien as a shareholder.-"
Yet, while any restrictions on the number or types of investors that
a business can have might inhibit capital formation for that business,
new closely held ventures are not likely to encounter problems with
the S corporation limitations. As a matter of fact, the founders
probably would be delighted to find more than 35 investors, in-
cluding some nonresident aliens and numerous partnerships and cor-
porations dying to put capital into the venture. If, at the beginning
of the venture, the founders did run afoul of the S restrictions, they
would probably choose a limited partnership as their form of busi-
ness organization. The more likely problem is apt to occur several
years down the road when, for example, a co-founder might die
and bequeath his stock in the S corporation to an ineligible share-
holder. The obvious preventative measure is to use stock transfer
restrictions that prevent the stock from falling into the hands of
ineligible shareholders.
644. I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1) (1987).
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B. Classes of Stock.
Subsection 1361(b)(1)(D) pronounces broadly that an S corpo-
ration can have no more than one class of stock." 5 One needs to
read on, however, because, a later subsection, 1361(c)(4), casually
mentions that "differences in voting rights among the shares of com-
mon stock shall not be treated as resulting in more than one class
of stock.""66 Each share, however, must be "identical as to the rights
of holders in the profits and of the assets of the corporation.""6
7
What Congress is saying, in a long-winded way, is that an S cor-
poration cannot have preferred stock. It cannot have stock that has
varied dividend or liquidation rights. An S corporation must use
common stock only, though it can have more than one class of
common stock with varying voting rights. It can even have non-
voting common stock. Also, the Service has opined that stock trans-
fer restrictions do not create a second class of stock, provided that
the restriction does not affect the shareholders' economic rights in
the corporation. 4
Is prohibition against preferred stock wise tax policy? Probably
not. A primary advantage of the partnership form over S corpo-
rations is the ability of the partners to allocate specific items of
partnership income or deduction to each of the partners by contract,
provided the allocation has substantial economic effect. 49 S cor-
poration shareholders, unfortunately, are not allowed to alter con-
tractually the reporting of their pro rata share of each corporate
tax item.65 0 This difference in tax treatment between partnerships
and S corporations undercuts the basic thrust of the Subchapter
Revision Act of 1982, which was to provide parity in treatment of
the two forms of business organizations.65 1 The new Code could have
645. Id. § 1361(b)(1)(D) (1987).
646. Id. § 1361(c)(4) (1987).
647. THE SUBCHAPTER S REvisION AcT OF 1982, S. REP. No. 640, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982).
648. Rev. Rul. 85-161, 1985-2 C.B. 191.
649. J. EUsTICE, supra note 29, at 6.02; S. LND, S. SctwAgz, D. LATHROPE & J. ROSENBERG,
supra note 453. See I.R.C. § 704(b) (1987).
650. J. EusTicE, BrrrKER & EUSTICE's FEDERAL INCOME TAXATioN OF Co, oRAioNs AND SHARE-
HOLDERS 6.02 (abr. stud. ed. cum. supp. 1987); S. LIND, S. ScHWARz, D. LATHROPE & J. ROSENBERG,
supra note 453.
651. J. EUsTICE, supra note 650.
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achieved something akin to parity by allowing S corporations to issue
preferred stock. Moreover, the justification for the one class of stock
restriction-the need to maintain simplicity in allocating income or
loss-seems outmoded in a computer age, particularly as the allo-
cations would be no more difficult to make for S corporation share-
holders than for partners.
6652
Can the shareholders of the S corporation circumvent the pro-
hibition against preferred stock? Yes, at least partially. Since they
control the decision-making process for the corporation, they can
cause the corporation to enter into any one of innumerable trans-
actions with the shareholders to whom they wish to grant a prior
claim on earnings. For example, the corporation can lease property
from that shareholder. Or it could hire that shareholder as an em-
ployee or consultant. Of course, these incestuous transactions are
fecund areas for litigation with the Service, which might contest their
bona fides. The would-be preferred stockholder, of course, can take
corporate debt rather than stock, a topic discussed in the following
materials.
C. Debt of the S Corporation.
1. Uses of debt by S corporations.
The issuance of corporate debt by an S corporation has the same
non-tax advantages and disadvantages of corporate debt issued by
C corporations-a hedge against bankruptcy when issued to the S
corporation shareholders or leverage when issued to nonsharehold-
ers. Most importantly for the S corporation, however, the owners
of the enterprise can use debt to serve the same functions that pre-
ferred stock serves for the C corporation. For example, if part of
the business bargain is to provide a senior return of income to one
of the shareholders, the S corporation can use debt, but not pre-
ferred stock (due to the one class of stock limitation) to accomplish
that objective.
652. J. EusTicE, supra note 29.
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2. Tax consequences of S corporation debt.
The basic tax consequence for the S corporation itself is that the
S corporation takes an interest expense deduction for interest paid
to the debtholder when computing its nonseparately computed in-
come or loss for the year. Interest payments received by the debt-
holder, of course, are ordinary income. If the shareholders hold the
debt proportionately, this tax treatment of the interest component
is scarcely of crucial importance because it works out as a wash.
The interest expense deduction by the S corporation reduces the net
amount of nonseparately-stated income that is passed through and
taxed to the shareholders, but those same shareholders pick up that
same amount as interest income. Any payments on S corporation
debt that exceed a holder's basis are treated by the holder under
the same rules that apply to the holders of C corporation debt. Thus,
a payment on principal of the debt is a tax-free return of capital
up to the investor's basis in the debt. Principal payments in excess
of the investor's basis in the debt is treated as a capital gain, unless
the original issue discount or market discount rules require that pay-
ment on principal above basis is to be treated as interest income.
One of the key features of S corporation debt issued to a share-
holder is its impact on the deductibility of losses that are passed
through to the shareholders. Subchapter S limits a shareholder's
deduction to his basis in his shares and in debt owed to him by the
corporation.65 3 Unfortunately, unlike a partner who can add his pro-
portionate share of the partnership's liability to his basis in his part-
nership interest, an S corporation shareholder is not entitled to add
liabilities incurred by the entity to his basis in his stock or in his
debt.6 5
4
Because the shareholder's basis in a highly leveraged enterprise,
e.g., most real estate ventures, often is too low to absorb all the
corporate deductions and losses, 6 5 the S corporation has not served
653. I.R.C. § 1366(d)(1) (1987).
654. See id. § 752(a) (1987); Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1987). See generally Friedman, Choosing Between
Corporate and Partnership Entities for Real Property Depends on Its Use, 11 TAx'N FOR LAW. 366,
367-68 (1983); Kanter, To Elect or Not To Elect Subchapter S That Is A Question, 60 TAxEs 882,
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as a popular device for tax sheltered investments, which typically
rely on nonrecourse financing. 656 Moreover, the shareholder's basis
in the stock does not include corporate debt owed to third parties
even though that debt is guaranteed by the shareholder. 6 7 The S
corporation shareholder may be able to circumvent this disadvantage
by insisting that the loan be made personally to him. He can then
turn over the proceeds of the loan to the corporation either as a
capital contribution or as a loan from him to the corporation. Either
way he increases the amount of loss deductions that can be passed
through to him, because he has increased his basis in either his shares
or in debt owed to him by the corporation. 6 8 In that instance, how-
ever, the shareholder loses the advantage of limited liability, which
is one of the primary reasons for using both an S corporation and
nonrecourse financing. Still, for parties that have already decided
on an S corporation, the issuance of debt by the corporation to the
shareholders is apt to be a wise choice, because a shareholder ag-
gregates his basis in the S corporation debt with his basis in his
stock when computing the cap on the deductibility of losses and
deductions that his S corporation passes through to him.
3. Debt reclassified as stock: A second class of stock?
If a purported debt instrument is reclassified as stock for tax
purposes, is it the second class of stock that renders the issuing
corporation ineligible for S corporation status? Once a frequent bat-
tleground between the Service and the private sector,6 9 the Sub-
656. See, e.g., D. LANG, ALI-ABA CHOICE OF BusinEss ENTITY AFTER THE TAx RBFORM ACT OF
1986 34 (1987).
657. See, e.g., Perry v. Commissioner, 47 T.C. 159 (1966), aff'd, 392 F.2d 458 (8th Cir. 1968).
658. See generally Rands, supra note 1, at 88-89.
659. Prior to 1966, the regulations treated any purported debt reclassified as stock as a second
class of stock, thereby rendering the corporation ineligible for S corporation status. T.D. 6432, 1960-
1 C.B. 317, 24 Fed. Reg. 10294 (Dec. 19, 1959); Plumb, supra note 28, at 391. Eventually, the Tax
Court rejected this analysis. In its opinion where the debt was substantially proportionate to stock,
the reclassified debt probably would constitute contributions to capital. Gamman v. Commissioner,
46 T.C. 1, 9 (1966). After that courtroom defeat, the Service acquiesced, but only partially. According
to amended regulations, the debt would not be treated as a second class of stock, if the stockholders
held the debt in substantially the same proportion as they owned the stock. Then the debt was to
be treated as a contribution to capital rather than a second class of stock. Unwilling to give up easily,
the amended regulation posited that any changes in the proportionate interests of the stock and the
debt might result in a creation of a second class of stock. The private sector again attacked the
regulations, and again, the Tax Court declared them invalid. See Stinnett v. Commissioner, 54 T.C.
221 (1970). See also Portage Plastics Co., 301 F. Supp. 684.
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chapter S Revision Act of 1982660 sought to end the carnage by
adding a "safe harbor" rule to the Code. Accordingto subsection
1361(c)(5), a debt that qualifies as "straight debt" is not to be treated
as a second class of stock for purposes of applying Subchapter S'
one class of stock limitation. 661 The definition of "straight debt" is
relatively easy to understand and to meet: (A) the debt must be in
writing and include an unconditional promise to pay on demand or
on a specified date a certain sum in money; (B) the interest rate
and interest payment schedule must not be contingent either on the
corporation's profits or the borrower's discretion; and (C) the holder
of the debt must be a taxpayer who would be eligible to be an S
corporation stockholder, 662 e.g., the debtholder cannot be a non-
resident alien. Presumably, debt issued with nondetachable warrants
to buy stock would be treated as convertible and would take the
debt outside the straight debt safe harbor.663 That the interest rate
is pegged to the prime rate or a similar factor not related to the
debtor corporation does not disqualify the instrument from fitting
within the safe harbor.
66
Congress anticipated that straight debt instruments would be
treated as debt under Subchapter S so that no corporate income or
loss would be allocated to the instruments. The payments on the
instruments would be includable in the income of the holder and
deductible by the corporation, as per regular income tax rules.
665
Shareholder-held S corporation debt outside the straight debt safe
harbor should be classified according to the usual class law clas-
sification principles .666 However, it is difficult to say why any S
corporation would use debt that does not satisfy the straight debt
safe harbor, because it is so easy to comply with safe harbor re-
quirements.
660. Subchapter S Revision Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-354, 96 Stat. 1669 (1982).
661. I.R.C. § 1361(c)(5) (1987).
662. Id. § 1361(c)(5)(B) (1987).
663. Id. § 1361(c)(5)(B)(ii) provides that "there is no convertibility (directly or indirectly) into
stock." (emphasis added). The word "indirectly" would seem to encompass debt issued with non-
detachable warrants to buy stock.
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XIV. CONCLUSION
How does one conclude a paper on the capital structure of the
closely-held corporation in the federal tax laws? A summary would
be redundant. The paper is not a latent argumentative brief that
would use the conclusion as a final parrying thrust. Perhaps, the
one thing left to do is to conjecture for a moment on what the
future might hold.
The predominant issue is the future of the distinctive tax treat-
ment accorded debt and equity. Does it make sense to tax them
differently? At some point tax policy-makers are finally likely to
tackle that issue in depth. Perhaps, the distinctive tax treatment
makes little sense. Taxpayers are investing in a corporation, whether
the piece of paper they receive is labeled debt or stock or some
hybird in between. They invest in the hope of gaining some economic
advantage, no matter which of the two labels is used. Whether the
investment is classified as debt or equity, often it is expected to
provide the investor with a regular return of interest or dividends.
In either case, that's the fee paid for using the investor's money.
Whether it issues stock or debt, the corporation is acquiring cash
and other assets to use in its business. Moreover, as the failures of
the courts, the Treasury and Congress show, it is impossible to devise
sensible and predictable guideposts for separating what is debt and
what is equity. Yet, our current tax system insists on encouraging
the use of debt. Maybe in the United States there is too much debt,
both public and private, corporate and personal, and it ought not
to be further encouraged by our tax system. Certainly, some people
think that it should not. So why not eliminate the tax distinction
between debt and equity? Some undoubtedly will want to do that.
How would the distinction between debt and equity be elimi-
nated? One way would be to attack the debt side. The basic change
in the tax code probably would be to eliminate the corporate debtor's
interest expense deduction. Dividends and interest are alike in that
they constitute the payment of a fee to an investor for the use of
funds. If dividends are not deductible, why should interest be? Con-
gress already has made inroads on the deductibility of interest, im-
posing, for example, a cap on the deductibility of investment
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interest667 and disallowing the deduction for "personal interest,' '668
e.g., consumer interest paid on credit cards. It could complete the
progression by eliminating the interest expense deduction altogether.
At the opposite pole from the elimination of the interest expense
deduction would be the elimination of the double tax on distributed
corporate income or property. Indeed, in the past innumerable pro-
posals have been made to "integrate" the individual and corporate
income taxes. While an infinite number of permutations exist, Con-
gress is likely to consider two primary methods of integration. The
first is to eliminate the tax at the entity level by extending the pass-
through regime of partnerships and S corporations to all corpora-
tions. All corporations would be tax-reporting but not tax paying
entities. They would pass the income tax consequences from their
operations through to the shareholders who then would report those
consequences on their own personal income tax returns. Perhaps,
the most appealing aspect of the pass-through models is our exten-
sive experience with them, thirty years with S corporations and even
longer with partnerships. A model is already in place. Additionally,
in the marketplace, the private sector has been developing its own
model-master limited partnerships. (One writer calls them the new
generation of ad hoc, self-help integration. 669) Congress probably
would make the corporation withhold a percentage of dividends dis-
tributed. The shareholder would be provided with a form similar to
a W-2 and would take a credit for the tax withheld by the cor-
poration.
A less dramatic form of integration would be to allow a dividend-
paid deduction for the corporation. Alternatively, shareholders could
be allowed a full or partial dividend exclusion (like that contained
in former section 116(a)). However, either of these two proposals
would probably generate vigorous public and political opposition,
regardless that firm economic data can be used to support either. 670
667. See I.R.C. § 163(b)(3) (1987).
668. See id. § 163(h) (1987).
669. See Canellos, Corporate Tax Integration: By Design or By Default, 35 TAX NoTEs 999
(1987); Leonard, A Pragmatic View of Corporate Integration, 35 TAX NotEs 889, 895 (1987).
670. Leonard, supra note 669, at 895.
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Retention of the status quo or further incursions against the in-
terest expense deduction are more palatable politically.
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